IN RE TEICHMAN MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of HELENA TEICHMAN and
NAOMI TEICHMAN, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 27, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 228901
Shiawassee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-008137-NA
TIMOTHY TEICHMAN,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
KAREN TEICHMAN,
Respondent.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Hood and Griffin, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court’s June 2, 2000, order
terminating his parental rights to the minor children. We affirm.
On September 27, 1999, the trial court issued an opinion in which it found that petitioner
established statutory grounds for termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g), and that
termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
However, the trial court delayed entry of an order terminating respondent-appellant’s parental
rights for a six-month period. In a prior appeal, this Court reversed the trial court’s delaying
order and remanded for entry of an order terminating respondent-appellant’s parental rights. In
re Teichman, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided May 12, 2000
(Docket No 222736). The six-month delay was erroneous because, upon finding that a statutory
ground for termination was established, the court was required to order termination of
respondent-appellant’s parental rights, unless termination was clearly not in the children’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 353; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
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On appeal, respondent-appellant argues that the trial court’s September 27, 1999, opinion
should be interpreted as a finding that, despite his past and current problems, there remained a
reasonable likelihood that he could resolve those problems within a reasonable period. We
disagree. The trial court clearly and unequivocally stated that there was no likelihood of
respondent-appellant becoming a fit parent within a reasonable period of time. The trial court’s
decision to impose a six-month delay on the order was in the nature of a discretionary act of
leniency. It does not negate the trial court’s factual finding of no reasonable likelihood that
respondent would be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time. The
court’s decision to delay entry of the order, which this Court subsequently reversed as a violation
of the statute, cannot be reasonably inferred as a favorable finding for respondent-appellant.
We review a trial court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR
5.974(I); In re Trejo, supra at 356-357; In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
Under this standard, the trial court’s decision “must strike [the reviewing court] as more than just
maybe or probably wrong.” In re Trejo, supra at 341, quoting In re Sours Minors, 459 Mich
624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). We find no clear error in the trial court’s finding that
petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for termination.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
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