DIANE L DOWDEN V OTIS ELEVATOR CO
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DIANE L. DOWDEN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 20, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 219294
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 96-045960-NO
OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: K. F. Kelly, P.J., and Smolenski and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by right from a judgment for plaintiff entered after a jury verdict. The
jury found that defendant’s negligent maintenance of an elevator ultimately injured plaintiff, who
stumbled while exiting the elevator because the elevator car stopped below the floor level. We
affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for a directed verdict
because plaintiff did not prove that her causation theory was more probable than other causation
theories. We review de novo a trial court’s decision to deny a motion for a directed verdict,
Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 708; 565 NW2d 401 (1997), viewing the
evidence up to the time of the motion in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Thomas
v McGinnis, 239 Mich App 636, 643-644; 609 NW2d 222 (2000).
Plaintiff’s causation theory was that defendant negligently allowed carbon dust to build
up in the elevator’s motor generator, thereby causing an electrical problem and ultimately a
misleveling of the elevator. Defendant contends that because misleveling can also be caused by
other factors, including a change in an elevator car’s weight, and because another elevator
company had recently made alterations to the elevator car in question that might have changed its
weight,1 plaintiff failed to show that her theory of causation was anything more than speculative.
We disagree. Indeed, plaintiff presented testimony from an expert witness that the most likely
cause of the misleveling was carbon dust buildup and that defendant’s maintenance personnel
1
We note that defendant’s expert witness admitted during defendant’s presentation of the case
that he did not know if the alterations actually did add weight to or subtract weight from the car.
-1-
should have noticed and eliminated the buildup. The expert admitted that misleveling can be
caused by a number of factors but nonetheless concluded that because defendant subsequently
fixed the problem in this case by adjusting the motor generator in a particular fashion, the most
likely cause of the misleveling was carbon dust buildup. Moreover, he answered “no” when
asked if the prior alterations to the car made by the other elevator company had anything to do
with the mechanical room or the motor generator, and he stated unequivocally that defendant was
responsible for the misleveling of the elevator. Another witness testified that the prior alterations
were “cosmetic” in nature. This testimony sufficed to show that plaintiff’s theory of causation
was more probable than others. See Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 164-166; 516 NW2d
475 (1994) (indicating that a plaintiff must show that the proffered theory of causation is more
likely than others to avoid a directed verdict for the defendant in a negligence case).
Defendant contends that plaintiff’s expert should not have been qualified as an expert and
that his conclusions were unworthy of belief. However, plaintiff’s expert was clearly qualified to
render opinion testimony under MRE 702. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the expert’s
testimony was not inherently unreliable, given his testimony that he was familiar with the
maintenance necessary for the type of elevator in question and that he had (1) worked in the
elevator industry for thirty-four years, (2) worked as an elevator inspector for the state of Indiana
for seven years, (3) served as the director of elevator safety for the state of Indiana for five years,
(4) surveyed elevator maintenance as an independent consultant for a year, and (5) trained
elevator inspectors regarding maintenance issues for six years. While another factfinder might
have concluded that the witnesses aligned with defendant (who testified that carbon dust buildup
was not the cause of the misleveling) were the more persuasive witnesses and therefore ruled for
defendant, the jury in this case nonetheless permissibly concluded that plaintiff’s expert was
persuasive and that defendant’s negligent failure to remove carbon dust buildup was the most
likely cause of the misleveling of the elevator. The trial court did not err by qualifying the
witness in question as an expert and by allowing this case to be submitted to the jury.
Defendant additionally argues that the trial court improperly excluded from trial
inspection and safety records showing that the elevator was not misleveling in 1996 and 1997
(plaintiff’s injury occurred in 1995). Defendant contends that the records were relevant to show
that adjusting the motor generator after plaintiff’s injury permanently fixed the misleveling
problem, thereby suggesting that the misleveling that caused plaintiff’s injury resulted from a
change in the elevator car’s weight and not from a buildup of carbon dust (because, according to
defendant, an adjustment to the motor generator would only temporarily fix misleveling caused
by carbon dust accumulation but would permanently fix misleveling caused by a change in the
weight of the car). We review a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion. Ellsworth v Hotel Corp of America, 236 Mich App 185, 188; 600 NW2d 129 (1999).
An abuse of discretion exists if an unprejudiced person, considering the facts available to the trial
court, would find no justification for the ruling. Id.
We find no abuse of discretion here. Indeed, we fail to see how the records supported an
inference that a weight change caused the misleveling in 1995. Evidence introduced before
defendant sought to admit the inspection and safety records at trial showed that carbon dust
accumulates in the motor generator over time, requiring regular cleaning of the generator. Thus,
the danger of carbon dust buildup would have remained, regardless of the type of problem that
-2-
existed in 1995. The records merely showed that the motor generator was being kept clean of
carbon dust and did not have a weight-change problem in 1996 and 1997. Because this showing
was not relevant to the cause of plaintiff’s accident in 1995, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding the records. See MRE 401 and 402.
We decline plaintiff’s invitation to impose sanctions on defendant for bringing a
vexatious appeal. See MCR 7.216(C)(1). Although we disagree with defendant’s arguments,
they are not so utterly without merit as to be vexatious.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.