CLAYTON H MILLER V VILLAGE HILL DEVELOPMENT CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CLAYTON H. MILLER,
UNPUBLISHED
July 3, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross Appellant,
v
No. 220297
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-620603-CK
VILLAGE HILL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, DAVID D. PHIPPS, and
KALLID A. JABARA,
Defendants-Appellants/Cross
Appellees.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Cooper and K. F. Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal as of right the trial court’s denial of their motions for partial summary
disposition, directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), new trial, and
remittitur in this action alleging, in pertinent part, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty
claims. Plaintiff cross-appeals as of right the trial court’s denial of his motion for mediation
sanctions. We affirm.
In approximately 1985, plaintiff and defendants, David D. Phipps and Kallid A. Jabara
(defendants), began their association when plaintiff decided to build a condominium complex
called Meadow Hill located in Plymouth Township. Toward that end, defendants agreed to
finance the project and plaintiff agreed to provide the labor and supervision related to its
construction. After its successful completion, plaintiff and defendants decided to pursue another
condominium development on Plymouth Road in Plymouth Township with the same division of
responsibility. An S corporation was formed called Village Hill Development Corporation
(VHDC). They purchased an option on property for the proposed site of construction, however,
the township would only approve a sixty unit luxury apartment development. After a second
option on the property was purchased and prior to its expiration, the township approved the
parties’ proposed sixty unit luxury apartment development. Thereafter, a land contract on the
optioned property was entered into by plaintiff, defendants, and plaintiff’s wife. However, about
twenty months later and after Phipps commissioned a market/feasibility study on the property
and their proposed plans, defendants abandoned the project, the land contract was forfeited, and
the property was deeded back to the owners. Plaintiff’s loss on the project totaled approximately
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$34,900 and the loss on the entire project totaled approximately $251,520, which was allocated
to VHDC.
In approximately 1992, plaintiff and defendants decided to pursue another condominium
project, called Meadow Creek in Canton Township, with the same division of responsibility.
During the construction of the project, in approximately 1995, there was a breakdown in the
relationship between plaintiff and defendants causing Phipps to assume control over the project
and plaintiff to be excluded from the project as well as VHDC. Thereafter, plaintiff initiated the
instant action alleging, in pertinent part, breach of contract regarding the Plymouth Road
development and breach of fiduciary duty and conversion claims regarding defendants’
withdrawal of VHDC funds in the amount of $543,000 for alleged personal use and permitted
rent-free use by Phipps’ daughter of an apartment unit owned by VHDC. Plaintiff also pleaded a
shareholder’s derivative claim for conversion and waste. Following a jury trial, a verdict was
rendered in plaintiff’s favor regarding these claims.
On appeal, defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for partial
summary disposition regarding plaintiff’s breach of contract claim involving the Plymouth Road
project. Although defendants raise several issues on appeal, the only issue raised in the trial
court was whether the statute of frauds barred plaintiff’s breach of contract claim because the
oral agreement allegedly involved an interest in land. This Court is obligated to review only
issues that are properly preserved. Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 544; 564 NW2d
532 (1997). Issues not raised and addressed in the trial court are not preserved for appeal. Fast
Air, Inc v Knight, 235 Mich App 541, 549; 599 NW2d 489 (1999). Consequently, the
application of the statute of frauds to the oral agreement is the only issue that will be addressed
by this Court with regard to the breach of contract claim.
Defendants argue that the statute of frauds barred plaintiff’s claim because “the land
development agreement as Miller alleges it requires a conveyance of land in order to create a
duty to take steps to create a profit.” We disagree. It is undisputed that the parties entered into
an oral agreement to develop a parcel of land. It is also uncontested that the agreement included
that defendants would finance the project, including the acquisition of the necessary land to be
developed, and plaintiff would provide the labor involved in developing the project and property
for its proposed use. The agreement simply detailed plaintiff’s and defendants’ responsibilities
and obligations with respect to the proposed project. Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim arose
out of defendants’ failure to perform an obligation that they assumed by the agreement – to
provide the financing for the project. The statute of frauds only applies to contracts and
conveyances of interests in land. MCL 566.106; Board of Control of Eastern Michigan Univ v
Burgess, 45 Mich App 183, 187; 206 NW2d 256 (1973). It is not an alleged interest in land that
gave rise to plaintiff’s breach of contract action. The subject of the breach of contract action was
defendants’ failure to finance the project. Therefore, the agreement was not within the
contemplation of the statute of frauds. Consequently, although the trial court reached the right
result, it did so for the wrong reason. See Samuel D Begola Services, Inc v Wild Bros, 210 Mich
App 636, 640; 534 NW2d 217 (1995).
Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motions for directed
verdict and JNOV regarding plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claims. We disagree. A trial
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court's ruling on motions for directed verdict and JNOV are reviewed de novo on appeal.
Thomas v McGinnis, 239 Mich App 636, 643; 609 NW2d 222 (2000); Chiles v Machine Shop,
Inc, 238 Mich App 462, 469; 606 NW2d 398 (1999). A directed verdict is appropriate only
when no factual questions exist on which reasonable minds could differ. Thomas, supra at 644.
A jury verdict may not be disturbed if reasonable jurors could have honestly reached different
conclusions. Central Cartage Co v Fewless, 232 Mich App 517, 524; 591 NW2d 422 (1998),
quoting Severn v Sperry Corp, 212 Mich App 406, 412; 538 NW2d 50 (1995).
The Business Corporation Act, particularly MCL 450.1541a(1), provides that directors
and officers of a corporation must discharge their duties in good faith, with the care an ordinary
prudent person in a similar situation would exercise, and in a manner reasonably believed to be in
the best interests of the corporation. Further, directors, officers, and majority shareholders are
fiduciaries who owe a strict duty of good faith to both the corporation and the minority
shareholders. See Salvadore v Connor, 87 Mich App 664, 675; 276 NW2d 458 (1978).
Review of the record reveals disputed issues of fact upon which reasonable minds could
differ and that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence in support of his breach of fiduciary duty
claims. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, during the Meadow Creek
project and without plaintiff’s consent or notice, defendants (1) hampered construction efforts by
failing to release necessary funds causing delay, the appearance of financial problems, and
decreased marketability, (2) reduced prices on the units by $10,000 resulting in a loss of $87,100,
(3) removed plaintiff as project manager of the Meadow Creek development and as president of
VHDC without notification or a corporate meeting, (4) repeatedly refused to communicate with
plaintiff or plaintiff’s counsel regarding the Meadow Creek project or VHDC, (5) allowed
Phipps’ daughter to live rent-free for twenty-three months in a Meadow Creek unit with a fair
rental value of $1,400 a month and a sale value of $145,000, and (6) removed $543,000 from
VHDC while this action was pending.
Further, there were disputed issues of fact regarding (1) whether the losses incurred on
the Plymouth Township project, totaling $251,520, were properly charged to VHDC or whether
the losses were individual losses, and (2) whether the agreement between the parties was to
recoup losses on the Plymouth Township project from the total profits of the Meadow Creek
project, as defendants contended, or whether the agreement was that each party would recoup his
losses from his individual profits (60/40 split) on the Meadow Creek project, as plaintiff
contended. Although defendants deny most, if not all, of plaintiff’s allegations, disputed issues
of fact and credibility assessments of witnesses are properly within the province of the jury to
determine. Anton v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 238 Mich App 673, 689; 607 NW2d 123
(1999); Zeeland Farm Services, Inc v JBL Enterprises, Inc, 219 Mich App 190, 195; 555 NW2d
733 (1996). Consequently, the trial court properly denied defendants’ motions.
Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for remittitur or
new trial because the jury award was not supported by sufficient evidence. A trial court’s
decision regarding remittitur is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. Anton, supra at
683. When deciding a motion for remittitur, the trial court must determine whether the jury
verdict was for an amount greater than the evidence supported. Id.; MCR 2.611(E). Defendants
argue that the trial court did not properly consider the evidence when it denied their motion.
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However, it is clear from the record that the trial court specifically found that the evidence
presented by plaintiff, if believed by the jury, supported the verdict. Upon review of the record
and affording due deference to the trial court’s superior position to view the evidence, evaluate
the jury’s reaction to the evidence, and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the jury verdict was sufficiently
supported by the evidence.
Next, defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new trial as
a consequence of plaintiff’s counsel’s improper closing argument. We disagree. Asserted claims
of counsel misconduct, on the basis of improper comments, are reviewed by first determining
whether the attorney’s action was error and, if it was, whether reversal is required. Hunt v
Freeman, 217 Mich App 92, 95; 550 NW2d 817 (1996). The comments will not usually be
cause for reversal unless they indicate a deliberate course of conduct aimed at preventing a fair
and impartial trial. Id. After reviewing the contested comments in this unpreserved claim, we
conclude that such comments did not cause the result, play too large a part, or deny defendants a
fair trial. See Ellsworth v Hotel Corp of America, 236 Mich App 185, 192; 600 NW2d 129
(1999).
On cross-appeal plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff’s request for
mediation sanctions. We disagree. A trial court’s decision whether to grant mediation sanctions
is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd
Partnership v Markel, 226 Mich App 127, 129-130; 573 NW2d 61 (1997). Plaintiff argues that
he filed his motion for leave to amend his complaint to add breach of fiduciary duty and
conversion claims on the same day that the case was mediated and that he argued the merits of
these claims at the mediation hearing. Consequently, plaintiff argues, all of his claims were
subjected to mediation, were included in the mediation evaluation, and defendants’ rejection of
the evaluation coupled with plaintiff’s success at trial entitles him to mediation sanctions
pursuant to MCR 2.403(O)(1).
However, MCR 2.403(A)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] court may submit to
mediation any civil action in which the relief sought is primarily money damages or division of
property.” MCR 2.101(B) provides that “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint
with the court.” Interpretation of a court rule is subject to the same basic principles that govern
statutory interpretation, including that a court rule is construed in accordance with the ordinary
and approved usage of the language and in light of the purpose to be accomplished by its
operation. Saint George Greek Orthodox Church of Southgate v Laupmanis Associates, P C, 204
Mich App 278, 282; 514 NW2d 516 (1994). A well-established rule of statutory construction is
that statutes that relate to the same subject or share a common purpose are in pari materia and
must be read together as one law, even if they contain no reference to one another or were
enacted on different dates. State Treasurer v Schuster, 456 Mich 408, 417; 572 NW2d 628
(1998), quoting Detroit v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 374 Mich 543, 558; 132 NW2d 660
(1965). Consequently, claims alleged and pleaded in a complaint form a civil action and only
those claims, pursuant to MCR 2.403(A)(1), are permitted to be submitted to mediation for
evaluation. Although the parties may discuss a myriad of issues during the mediation hearing,
the evaluation rendered must be confined to the claims actually pleaded in the action.
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Further, MCR 2.403(J)(4) provides that “[s]tatements by the attorneys and the briefs or
summaries are not admissible in any court or evidentiary hearing.” A trial court is not required,
nor permitted, to speculate or read through the parties mediation summaries to determine whether
claims raised in a complaint that was amended subsequent to the evaluation were subjected to a
meaningful evaluation. A trial court relies on the evaluation as a benchmark of reasonableness
because it provides "an apparently meaningful understanding of both the merits and potential
value of [a] claim." Nostrant v Chez Ami, Inc, 207 Mich App 334, 340; 525 NW2d 470 (1994),
quoting Parkhurst Homes, Inc v McLaughlin, 187 Mich App 357, 364-365, 466 NW2d 404
(1991). Consequently, if a party’s position substantially changes after the mediation, it is
incumbent on the party to move for the evaluation to be set aside and request an order granting a
second, more meaningful, evaluation.
In this case, the claims that resulted in a verdict in plaintiff’s favor that would meet the
requirements of MCR 2.403 – the breach of fiduciary duty and conversion claims and
shareholder’s derivative action – were counts included in plaintiff’s amended complaint.
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend was not granted until after the mediation; therefore, the
claims were not properly submitted to mediation and mediation sanctions are not appropriate.
See Beach v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 216 Mich App 612, 626; 550 NW2d 580 (1996);
McCarthy v Auto Club Ins Ass'n, 208 Mich App 97, 102; 527 NW2d 524 (1994). In addition,
plaintiff’s reliance on the relation-back doctrine in support of his position is misplaced. The
purpose of the relation-back doctrine is simply not implicated here. See Smith v Henry Ford
Hosp, 219 Mich App 555, 558-559; 557 NW2d 154 (1996).
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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