PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY JOSEPH MARICH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 29, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 221889
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 98-002627-FH
ANTHONY JOSEPH MARICH,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Markey, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of bank robbery, MCL 750.531.
Defendant was sentenced to twenty to forty years in prison as a fourth habitual offender, MCL
769.12. Defendant appeals by right. We affirm.
First, defendant argues that he was denied his due process right to a fair trial because
Makar’s in-court identification of defendant was the product of a suggestive photo display by
Fleming. We disagree.
The credibility of identification testimony is a question for the trier of fact that this Court
will not resolve anew. People v Davis, 241 Mich App 697, 700; 617 NW2d 381 (2000).
“Moreover, this Court has stated that positive identification by witnesses may be sufficient to
support a conviction of a crime.” Id. If a witness is exposed to an impermissibly suggestive
identification procedure, “the witness’ in-court identification will not be allowed unless the
prosecution shows by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification will be based
on a sufficiently independent basis to purge the taint of the illegal identification.” People v
Colon, 233 Mich App 295, 304; 591 NW2d 692 (1998). “[A]n improper suggestion often arises
when ‘the witness when called by the police or prosecution either is told or believes that the
police have apprehended the right person.’” People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 111; 577 NW2d 92
(1998), quoting People v Anderson, 389 Mich 155, 178; 205 NW2d 461 (1973). “Moreover,
when ‘the witness is shown only one person or a group in which one person is singled out in
some way, [the witness] is tempted to presume that he is the person.’” Gray, supra, quoting
Anderson, supra. If there were an invalid identification procedure, the next step in the analysis is
to determine whether the victim had an independent basis to identify the defendant. Gray, supra
at 114-115. “The independent basis inquiry is a factual one, and the validity of a victim's incourt identification must be viewed in light of the ‘totality of the circumstances.’” Id. at 115,
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quoting Neil v Biggers, 409 US 188, 199; 93 S Ct 375; 34 LEd 2d 401 (1972). This Court should
use the following eight factors in determining if an independent basis exists:
1. Prior relationship with or knowledge of the defendant. 2. The opportunity to
observe the offense. This includes such factors as length of time of the
observation, lighting, noise or other factor[s] affecting sensory perception and
proximity to the alleged criminal act. 3. Length of time between the offense and
the disputed identification. . . . 4. Accuracy or discrepancies in the pre-lineup or
showup description and defendant's actual description. 5. Any previous proper
identification or failure to identify the defendant. 6. Any identification prior to
lineup or showup of another person as defendant. 7. . . . [T]he nature of the
alleged offense and the physical and psychological state of the victim. . . . 8. Any
idiosyncratic or special features of defendant. [Gray, supra, at 115-116, quoting
People v Kacher, 400 Mich 78, 95-96; 252 NW2d 807 (1977).]
In Gray, supra at 111, a police officer told the victim that her assailant had been arrested
and showed her a single color photograph of the defendant. The Court found that the officer's
action was highly suggestive. Id. The instant case is distinguishable from Gray. First, when
Fleming showed Makar the surveillance photograph, defendant was not in custody. Second,
Fleming testified that when he showed Makar the surveillance photograph, he did not know the
identity of the individual in the photograph. Third, at the time Fleming showed Makar the
surveillance photograph, defendant was not a suspect in the robbery. For these reasons, the
instant case can be distinguished from Gray. Moreover, the general use of such surveillance
photographs to identify a subject is not impermissibly suggestive because “such films provide a
memory-refreshing device, showing ‘the man who actually committed the robbery’ as opposed to
the picture of ‘some possible suspect in the police files.’” People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289,
309-310 (Griffin, J.), 318 (Boyle, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part); 505 NW2d 528
(1993), quoting Sobel, Eyewitness Identification, § 5.3(g), p 5-44. Therefore, the photograph
Fleming showed Makar was not impermissibly suggestive.
Next, defendant argues that he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury when the trial
court dismissed juror Jones without asking any questions. We disagree.
Defendant failed to preserve this issue by objecting at trial. People v Grant, 445 Mich
535, 546; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). The plain error standard of review or the forfeiture rule applies
to unpreserved constitutional issues. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764; 597 NW2d 130
(1999). To avoid forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: (1) error
must have occurred, (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, (3) and the plain error affected
substantial rights. Id. at 763.
Having determined that the plain error rule applies to defendant’s claim, the next step is
to determine if defendant may avoid forfeiture of the alleged error. Id. at 768. The first step
under the plain error rule is to determine if an error actually occurred. Id. In the instant case,
defendant has failed to show that there was an error. Defendant has not presented any legal
authority supporting his contention that the trial court erred when it did not question Jones when
she was dismissed. Thus, defendant abandoned this claim on appeal. Davis, supra at 700.
Moreover, questioning Jones was unnecessary because at the conclusion of the first day of trial,
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the court told the jury “not to discuss the case among themselves or with anyone else.” It is
presumed that jurors will follow jury instructions. People v Banks, 438 Mich 408, 418; 475
NW2d 769 (1991). Further, defendant has not presented any evidence showing that Jones or any
other juror did not adhere to the court’s instruction. Therefore, defendant was not deprived of his
right to an impartial jury when the trial court dismissed Jones without asking any questions.
Finally, defendant argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is disproportionate
to the seriousness of the offense he committed and was an abuse of discretion. Again, we
disagree.
In reviewing sentences imposed for habitual offenders, the reviewing court must
determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion. People v Hansford (After Remand),
454 Mich 320, 323-324; 562 NW2d 460 (1997). The purpose of the habitual offender statutes is
to provide for escalating penalties for individuals repeatedly convicted of felonies. People v
Stoudemire, 429 Mich 262, 264; 414 NW2d 693 (1987). Defendant maintains that the trial court
abused its discretion when it sentenced him to a minimum of twenty years. Essentially,
defendant is arguing that the sentence was disproportionate.
Review of defendant’s sentence is limited to considering whether the sentence is within
the statutory limits established by the Legislature and if the defendant has the ability to conform
his conduct to laws of society. Hansford, supra at 326. Defendant’s sentence was within the
statutory limits. Bank robbery is an offense punishable by imprisonment for a maximum term of
life or any number of years. MCL 750.531. Pursuant to MCL 769.12, the trial court was allowed
to enhance defendant’s sentence to life or any other term of years. Thus, defendant’s sentence of
twenty to forty years was within the statutory limits. People v Reynolds, 240 Mich App 250,
252; 611 NW2d 316 (2000). Defendant argues that because he did not carry a weapon when he
robbed the bank and the fact that his last conviction was in 1987, shows that he does not deserve
such a harsh sentence. However, when the trial court sentenced defendant, the trial court made
reference to defendant’s two prior convictions for armed robbery and the great deal of prison
time defendant had served. After considering these factors, the court concluded that defendant
was “clearly a danger to society.” In light of the seriousness of the crime, defendant's criminal
history, and the fact that the sentence was within the statutory limits, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion. Id. at 252-253.
We affirm.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Jane E. Markey
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