RICHARD C SIGISMOND V SUPER CAR WASH SYSTEMS WEST INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD C. SIGISMOND,
UNPUBLISHED
June 29, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross Appellee,
v
SUPER CAR WASH SYSTEMS WEST, INC.,
No. 217310
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 96-006897-NO
Defendant-Appellee/Cross
Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Cooper and K. F. Kelly, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s denial of his motion for a new trial or
additur and defendant cross-appeals as of right the trial court’s denial of its motions for summary
disposition and directed verdict. We affirm.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for a new trial or additur because the jury rendered an inadequate verdict when it failed to award
noneconomic damages after finding defendant negligent and awarding economic damages. We
disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for a new trial or additur for an
abuse of discretion. See Bean v Directions Unlimited, Inc, 462 Mich 24, 34-35; 609 NW2d 567
(2000); Setterington v Pontiac General Hosp, 223 Mich App 594, 608; 568 NW2d 93 (1997).
Awards for personal injury damages, particularly pain and suffering, rest within the sound
discretion of the trier of fact. Meek v Dep’t of Transportation, 240 Mich App 105, 122; 610
NW2d 250 (2000). There is no absolute standard for the measurement of such damages. Id.
There is no requirement that the jury award damages for pain and suffering or mental anguish,
even when the jury awards economic damages. See Setterington, supra at 608-609. Similarly,
there is no legal requirement that the jury award damages even in instances where liability was
found. Joerger v Gordon Food Service, Inc, 224 Mich App 167, 172-173; 568 NW2d 365
(1997).
Review of the evidence presented by plaintiff at trial fails to reveal that the trial court
abused its discretion when it found that plaintiff did not present significant or persuasive
evidence in support of his claim for noneconomic damages. There was little to no testimony
regarding plaintiff’s level of pain, incapacitation, ability to function or perform activities of daily
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living, use of pain medication, unreasonable physical limitations, or other physical or
psychological complications from the injury. Dr. Nowinski’s testimony repeated plaintiff’s
subjective complaints but his objective findings were limited primarily to a slight loss of ankle
range of motion and a slight size differential in plaintiff’s ankles. Affording due deference to the
trial court’s unique opportunity to observe the evidence and witnesses and evaluate the jury’s
reaction to the evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See
Setterington, supra at 609.
On cross-appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying its motions for
summary disposition or directed verdict because the open and obvious doctrine operated to
relieve defendant of any duty to plaintiff regarding allegedly dangerous conditions. We disagree.
This Court reviews a trial court’s rulings on motions for summary disposition and directed
verdict de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998);
Thomas v McGinnis, 239 Mich App 636, 643; 609 NW2d 222 (2000).
A landowner does not have a duty to warn invitees of open and obvious dangers. Hughes
v PMG Building, Inc, 227 Mich App 1, 10; 574 NW2d 691 (1997). Whether a danger is open
and obvious depends upon whether it is reasonable to expect an average person of ordinary
intelligence to discover the danger upon casual inspection. Id. However, despite the obviousness
of danger, a landowner may still have a duty to protect an invitee against unreasonable risks of
harm. Singerman v Municipal Service Bureau, Inc, 455 Mich 135, 142-143; 565 NW2d 383
(1997).
Considering the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the trial court properly
denied defendant’s motions for summary disposition and directed verdict. Although the ice and
water conditions were apparent to plaintiff prior to his slip and fall, he had traversed the area
without incident on three occasions before allegedly stepping in transmission fluid that was not
visible to him although he was watching where he was walking. Defendant allegedly knew of the
dangerous condition and failed to reduce the hazard, although patrons commonly retrieved towels
to further dry their vehicles after the car wash. There were disputed issues of material fact,
including whether the transmission fluid was present in the area, whether it was visible, and
whether it caused or contributed to plaintiff’s fall. Further, a reasonable factfinder could
determine that, even if plaintiff should have seen the transmission fluid, it posed an unreasonable
and unanticipated risk of harm to plaintiff in light of the circumstances. Therefore, this case was
properly submitted to the jury.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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