PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID DUDLEY TAYLOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 26, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 221172
Huron Circuit Court
LC No. 99-004050-FH
DAVID DUDLEY TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Griffin and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction, following a jury trial, of first-degree
home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2)(b); MSA 28.305(a)(2)(b). The trial court sentenced defendant
to a term of seven to twenty years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
According to the complainants, in the early morning hours of January 22, 1999, the
victims were awakened when defendant and William Brian O’Connor1 broke into the home they
shared with their three young children. During the ensuing moments both the husband and wife
were brutally attacked, and the wife was sexually assaulted by O’Connor. After the couple’s
daughter ran for help, the wife managed to retrieve an unloaded firearm from the attic in an
attempt to ward off their attackers.2 When police arrived moments later, it took repeated
attempts by two uniformed officers to pull defendant off of the husband, who he was savagely
attacking.
Defendant first argues that the trial court denied him of his constitutional right to
confrontation by improperly limiting his cross-examination of the prosecution’s key witnesses.
See US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. Specifically, defendant asserts that he was not
permitted to thoroughly question the victims about the potential criminal consequences of the
1
Defendant and O’Connor were tried jointly. O’Connor was also convicted of first-degree home
invasion, as well as CSC II, MCL 750.520c; MSA 28.788(3). O’Connor’s appeal is pending
before another panel of this Court in Docket No. 221033.
2
The ownership of this firearm, and whether the husband was permitted to possess a firearm was
a contested issue at trial.
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husband possessing a firearm. According to defendant, this line of cross-examination was
necessary to allow him to expose the victims’ motive to fabricate their testimony. On appeal,
defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in foreclosing defendant from
questioning the husband about potential criminal consequences arising from his possession of a
firearm. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision limiting cross-examination for an abuse of discretion.
People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608, 620; 591 NW2d 669 (1998). We recognize that
limitations on cross-examination may infringe on the constitutional right to confrontation where
the defendant is prevented from placing before the jury “facts from which bias, prejudice or lack
of credibility of a prosecution witness might be inferred.” People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627,
644; 588 NW2d 480 (1998), citing People v Cunningham, 215 Mich App 652, 657; 546 NW2d
715 (1996). As this Court observed in People v Minor, 213 Mich App 682, 685; 541 NW2d 576
(1995):
A witness’ motivation for testifying is always of undeniable relevance and
a defendant is entitled to have the jury consider any fact that may have influenced
the witness’ testimony. [Id., citing People v Mumford, 183 Mich App 149, 154;
455 NW2d 51 (1990).]
However, the right of cross-examination does not guarantee a defendant the right to
cross-examine on any subject. People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 564; 496 NW2d 336 (1992).
Rather, a trial court may properly deny cross-examination with respect to collateral matters that
bear only on a witness’ general credibility. Id.
With the foregoing principles in mind, we are satisfied that defendant’s right of
confrontation was not violated. After the jury was selected, defense counsel raised the issue of
the scope of cross-examination of the victims. Specifically, defense counsel articulated his
concern that the jury be made aware that the husband was not permitted to possess a firearm, and
that he could face criminal consequences for doing so. The trial court ruled that defendant could
question the witness about whether he was permitted to possess a firearm and the potential
ramifications of this possession. A review of the trial court’s ruling demonstrates that it was
attempting to balance defendant’s right to cross-examination against the need to adhere to MRE
609(a),3 which prohibits the admission of evidence relating to a witness’ prior criminal
conviction to impeach credibility.4
3
Although the trial court considered the admissibility of defendant’s prior convictions in a
hearing before trial, it does not appear that defendant sought admission of the husband’s prior
criminal conviction, nor did the trial court conclusively rule on this issue. In his brief on appeal,
defendant suggests that evidence of the husband’s prior marijuana related conviction should not
have been excluded under MRE 609(a). This argument is somewhat baffling in that a review of
the record does not support defendant’s contention that the evidence was excluded. In any event,
defendant has waived this issue on appeal by failing to raise it below. See People v Grant, 445
Mich 535, 546; 520 NW2d 123 (1994). Nor is this issue properly before this Court because it
was not included in defendant’s statement of the issues on appeal. See People v Yarbrough, 183
Mich App 163, 165; 454 NW2d 419 (1990). MRE 609(a) provides in pertinent part:
(continued…)
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During his extensive cross-examination of the husband, defense counsel inquired whether
he was permitted to possess a firearm, and whether he was concerned that having a firearm in his
home would “create a problem” for him. Defense counsel pursued an identical line of inquiry
when he cross-examined the wife. Further, in response to the wife’s testimony that she owned
the firearm, defense counsel asked specific details about it, presumably to raise an issue with
regard to the true ownership of the firearm. Further questioning elicited testimony that the
victims were concerned about the legal ramifications of possessing the firearm when they were
interviewed by the police after this incident. Defense counsel also elicited testimony that the
husband and defendant shared an acrimonious relationship dating back many years.
In our view, defendant was permitted to place before the jury ample facts from which the
victims’ potential bias, prejudice or lack of credibility might be inferred. Kelly, supra at 644.
We do not accept defendant’s contention that it was necessary for defense counsel to inquire
specifically about “criminal” consequences that could arise from the husband’s possession of a
firearm in order for the jury to infer that the victims had motivation to fabricate their testimony.
We believe that defense counsel’s questioning of both the husband and wife adequately
illustrated to the jury that the husband was not permitted to possess a firearm, and provided a
sufficient basis for a reasonable juror to infer that the victims may have fabricated their testimony
in an attempt to protect the husband from potential criminal consequences.5 That defense
(…continued)
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a crime shall not be admitted unless the evidence
has been elicited from the witness or established by public record during crossexamination, and
(1) the crime contained an element of dishonesty or false statement, or
(2) the crime contained an element of theft, and
(A) the crime was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year or death
under the law under which the witness was convicted, and
(B) the court determines that the evidence has significant probative value on the
issue of credibility. . . .
5
Defendant’s reliance on Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308; 94 S Ct 1105; 39 L Ed 2d 347 (1974);
United States v Garrett, 542 F2d 23 (CA 6, 1976) and People v Redmon, 112 Mich App 246; 315
NW2d 909 (1982) is misplaced. In Davis, supra, the defendant was precluded from questioning
a civilian witness about a prior juvenile record. Consequently, the United States Supreme Court
found that “[the witness’] protestations of unconcern over possible police suspicion that he might
have had a part in the . . . burglary and his categorical denial of ever having been the subject of
any similar law-enforcement interrogation went unchallenged.” Davis, supra at 314. Similarly,
in Garrett, supra, the defendant was not permitted to question a police officer witness in a drug
prosecution about the facts underlying his suspension from the police force for the use of hard
drugs. Garrett, supra at 26. Further, the defendant in Redmon, supra, was prohibited from
(continued…)
-3-
counsel’s questioning did not render answers detailing specific criminal consequences arising
from the possession of a firearm does not amount to a denial of the right to confrontation. See
People v Watson, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 218218; issued 5/4/01), slip
op p 6 (right of confrontation does not guarantee successful cross-examination).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the
defense of voluntary intoxication. After reviewing the jury instructions as a whole, we must
determine whether the trial court erred to the extent that reversal is required. People v Canales,
243 Mich App 571, 574; 624 NW2d 439 (2000). “Jury instructions must include all the elements
of the charged offense and must not exclude material issues, defense and theories if the evidence
supports them.” Id. citing People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 349-350; 224 NW2d 867 (1975) and
People v Piper, 223 Mich App 642, 648; 567 NW2d 483 (1997). We review the jury instructions
in the instant case mindful that the decision whether a certain instruction is supported by the
evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 189;
585 NW2d 357 (1998).
In People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 83; 537 NW2d 909, mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995), the
defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of
voluntary intoxication. Rejecting the defendant’s claim that an instruction on voluntary
intoxication was supported by the evidence, our Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Mallett, observed:
A defense of intoxication is only proper if the facts of the case could allow
the jury to conclude that the defendant’s intoxication was so great that the
defendant was unable to form the necessary intent. [Id. at 82, citing People v
Savoie, 419 Mich 118; 349 NW2d 139 (1984); see also People v King, 210 Mich
App 425, 428; 534 NW2d 534 (1995).]
In the instant case, the husband testified that he believed defendant had been drinking.
Similarly, during cross-examination, his wife admitted telling the police shortly after the incident
that defendant and O’Connor were “drunk as skunks.” Additionally, one of the police officers
(…continued)
questioning the witness in any regard about his extensive criminal history. This Court concluded
that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation took precedence over then MRE 609(b), now
MRE 609(c), which prohibits the admission of evidence of a conviction “if a period of more than
ten years has elapsed since the date of conviction . . . .”
In our view, the instant case is distinguishable from Redmon, Garrett, and Davis, because
defendant was not precluded from presenting his theory of the case to the jury or challenging the
witnesses’ testimony. Defendant was also not prevented from pursuing a key line of questioning,
rather, he was permitted to place ample facts before the jury on which a reasonable person could
conclude that the victims may have had a motive to fabricate their testimony. In our opinion,
defense counsel’s extensive questioning of the witnesses about whether the husband was
permitted to possess a firearm and whether “trouble” could ensue adequately conveyed to the jury
defendant’s theory that the witnesses were exaggerating the facts of the home invasion to protect
the husband from potential criminal consequences.
-4-
who investigated the incident testified that he suspected defendant had been drinking and that
defendant later vomited in the police vehicle.
Testifying on his own behalf, defendant claimed that he drank six beers and two shots of
liquor during an approximately five-hour period while at a bar on the evening of January 21,
1999. In response to defense counsel’s queries about his condition that night, defendant
indicated:
I was in a pretty good mood, I was smiling, joking around. I was – I mean,
I wasn’t wasted drunk, I was – I had a buzz on, I don’t – I don’t know how else to
really explain it. I wasn’t staggering, I wasn’t slurring my words, but the edge
was taken off, you know, I was – I don’t know how to say it.
Notably, throughout direct examination and later on cross-examination, defendant gave a
meticulously detailed account of his activities after leaving the bar at approximately 2:30 a.m. on
January 22, 1999. Specifically, defendant testified about how he directed O’Connor to the
victims’ home, though it appeared defendant had not visited there before and was not familiar
with the area. Defendant also gave a minute-by-minute account of the altercation that occurred
between him and the husband, even detailing what hand he punched with and what specific areas
he struck on the husband’s body. Defendant further indicated that he walked up to the victim’s
house without stumbling, and that he could remember what occurred in the victims’ house.
Defendant further stated that he could recall being dragged away from the house in handcuffs by
the police.
In our view, defendant’s detailed recollection of the events giving way to this appeal and
his behavior on the night in question belie his contention that an instruction on voluntary
intoxication was supported by the evidence. The trial court did not err in refusing to give the
requested instruction because there is no indication in the record that defendant “was incapable
of forming the intent to commit this crime.” Mills, supra at 83; see also People v Coddington,
188 Mich App 584, 604; 470 NW2d 478 (1991) (instruction on voluntary intoxication not
warranted where the defendant’s testimony “revealed that his drinking did not affect his
behavior.”); cf. People v Gomez, 229 Mich App 329, 333; 581 NW2d 289 (1998) (voluntary
intoxication instruction not warranted where police officer merely suspected intoxication and the
defendant “had no trouble landing multiple blows on the victim.”).
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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