PEOPLE OF MI V ERIC KEITH RODGERS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 5, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 219808
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 99-164284
ERIC KEITH RODGERS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Holbrook and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA
28.797, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6), larceny from a motor
vehicle, MCL 750.356a; MSA 28.588(1), and two counts of possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced as a third habitual
offender, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083, to twenty-five to fifty years’ imprisonment for the armed
robbery conviction, five to ten years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession of a firearm
conviction, five to ten years’ imprisonment for the larceny from a motor vehicle conviction, and
consecutive two-year terms of imprisonment for the felony-firearm convictions. He appeals as of
right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the prior consistent statement of
his ex-girlfriend, Lisa Stephens, to the police. Defendant argues that the statement was not
admissible under MRE 801(d)(1)(B), because Stephens already had a motive to lie when she
made the statement. Although defendant did object to the admission of Stephens’ statements to
police, he did not do so on the same grounds raised on appeal. Because defendant did not object
at trial on the same ground raised on appeal, this issue is not properly preserved for appellate
review, and we need not address this matter unless failure to do so would result in manifest
injustice. People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 44; 597 NW2d 176 (1999). We find no manifest
injustice here because any error in the admission of this evidence was harmless. After an
examination of the entire record, including the eyewitness testimony of Hugh Schulkins and
Constance Edwards, it is clear that the challenged testimony was not outcome determinative.
People v Smith, 243 Mich App 657, 680; ___ NW2d ___ (2000).
Defendant also claims that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel
because defense counsel elicited testimony from defendant, on direct examination, that defendant
-1-
had previously been convicted of a “like offense.” Because defendant did not raise the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel in the trial court, our review of this issue is limited to mistakes
apparent on the record. People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 661; 608 NW2d 123 (1999).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the
representation so prejudiced defendant that he was denied the right to a fair trial. People v Toma,
462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that
there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. People v Johnson, 451 Mich 115, 122; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). The
defendant must also overcome the presumption that the challenged action might be considered
sound trial strategy. Toma, supra at 302. Decisions regarding what evidence to present are
presumed to be matters of trial strategy, and this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of
counsel or assess counsel’s competence with the benefit of hindsight. People v Rockey, 237 Mich
App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
It is apparent from our review of the record that defense counsel’s conduct was a matter
of trial strategy. We presume that by eliciting testimony that defendant had not committed a
“like offense” for over twenty years, defense counsel was attempting to refute Lisa Stephens’
testimony that defendant owned a shotgun and used it to rob people, and defendant has presented
nothing to overcome this presumption. Rockey, supra at 76. Moreover, even if defense counsel’s
conduct could not properly be characterized as trial strategy, defendant did not establish how he
was prejudiced by the conduct. In light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt,
defendant failed to show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. Johnson, supra at 122.
Lastly, defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the
“statement against interest” made by defendant’s brother Melvin Rodgers. The trial court ruled
that the statement allegedly made by Melvin Rodgers was inadmissible under MRE 804(b)(3),
because there were “no corroborating circumstances as to the trustworthiness of the statement.”
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to exclude the statement. People v
Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
In People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 268; 547 NW2d 280 (1996), our Supreme Court
stated that, when evaluating a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude a statement against penal
interest offered under MRE 804(b)(3), four factors should be considered: “(1) whether the
declarant was unavailable, (2) whether the statement was against penal interest, (3) whether a
reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have believed the statement to be true, and
(4) whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicated the trustworthiness of the statement.”
At issue in this case is whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicated the trustworthiness
of the statement.
Statements which are totally lacking in corroboration are not admissible under MRE
804(b)(3). Barrera, supra at 277. Factors favoring admissibility are whether the statement was
(1) voluntarily given, (2) made contemporaneously with events referenced, (3) made to family,
friends, colleagues, or confederates, i.e., to someone to whom the declarant would likely speak
the truth, and (4) uttered spontaneously at the initiation of the declarant and without prompting or
-2-
inquiry by the listener. Id. at 274. On the other hand, factors favoring a finding of
inadmissibility include whether (1) the statement was made to law enforcement officers or at the
prompting or inquiry of the listener, (2) the statement minimizes the role or responsibility of the
declarant or shifts blame to the accomplice, (3) the statement was made to avenge the declarant
or to curry favor, and (4) the declarant had a motive to lie or distort the truth. Id at 274-275.
We believe that the trial court properly determined that the statement allegedly made by
Melvin Rodgers lacked corroborating circumstances indicating its trustworthiness. Although the
statement was made to a family friend, there is no indication that it was uttered spontaneously
and without prompting or inquiry. Additionally, the statement was made approximately three
months after the charged robbery, not contemporaneously with the events referenced. Further,
McGhee testified that he really could not remember what Rodgers told him and that he was “not
totally sure about some of this stuff,” and this lack of specificity suggests untrustworthiness. The
fact that McGhee originally claimed that Rodgers told him he “fixed” defendant in September or
October 1998, weeks prior to when the actual crime occurred, further indicates that the statement
was untrustworthy. Additionally, according to McGhee, both men were “high” when the
statements were made. Lastly, McGhee admitted that he is a known liar, having been convicted
of approximately twelve crimes involving theft or dishonesty, and his lack of credibility further
diminishes the trustworthiness of the statements. Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the alleged statements made by Rodgers
were not sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible under MRE 804(b)(3).
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
