PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL THOMAS GREEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 29, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 222566
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 97-001935-FH
MICHAEL THOMAS GREEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Hood and Griffin, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of one count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree,
MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a). Defendant was sentenced to four to ten years’
imprisonment. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We
disagree.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Reid, 233
Mich App 457, 466; 592 NW2d 767 (1999). Such review is de novo.
Defendant was charged and convicted of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree.
MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a) states:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if he or
she engages in sexual penetration with another person and if any of the following
circumstances exists:
(a) That other person is under 13 years of age.
“Sexual penetration” is defined as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or
any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the
genital or anal openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.” MCL
750.520a(l); MSA 28.788(1)(l).
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Defendant was accused of engaging in cunnilingus with the child victim. Defendant
contends there was insufficient evidence because the victim did not testify that defendant placed
his mouth on her bare genitalia. Our Supreme Court has recognized that cunnilingus does not
require an act of physical intrusion. People v Lemons, 454 Mich 234, 255; 562 NW2d 447
(1997). See also People v Dimitris, 115 Mich App 228, 233-234; 320 NW2d 226 (1981).
Cunnilingus simply requires the “placing of the mouth of a person upon the external genital
organs of the female which lie between the labia, or the labia itself, or the mons pubes.” People
v Harris, 158 Mich App 463, 470; 404 NW2d 779 (1987).
The child victim, although reluctant to orally testify to where defendant had touched her,
pointed to the area between her legs. The child victim testified that defendant touched her there
with his mouth. The child victim explained that defendant had not touched her nightgown or her
underwear, but had touched her skin with his mouth. Defense counsel, on cross-examination,
even questioned the child victim about her interview with police. The child victim remembered
that she had told police that defendant had “licked her private areas.” Given the longstanding
rule that “[c]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can
constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime,” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757;
597 NW2d 130 (1999), quoting People v Allen, 201 Mich App 98, 100; 505 NW2d 869 (1993),
we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict.
Furthermore, to the extent that defendant argues the child victim was unbelievable and
her allegations were incredible, this argument has no merit. “[Q]uestions of intent and the
honesty of belief inherently involve weighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of
witnesses, which is a task for the jury.” People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 119; 605 NW2d 28
(1999). Furthermore, when reviewing an appeal based on the sufficiency of evidence, we must
not interfere with the role of the jury. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508; 489 NW2d 748 (1992),
amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992):
“[An appellate court] must remember that the jury is the sole judge of the facts. It
is the function of the jury alone to listen to testimony, weigh the evidence and
decide the questions of fact . . . . Juries, not appellate courts, see and hear
witnesses and are in a much better position to decide the weight and credibility to
be given to their testimony.” [Id. at 514-515, quoting People v Palmer, 392 Mich
370, 375-376; 220 NW2d 393 (1974).]
Here, the jurors were instructed on the elements of first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
The jurors found defendant guilty. This verdict provides every indication that the jurors found
the child victim’s testimony truthful and persuasive. Thus, we will not disturb this
determination.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
defendant’s motion for a new trial because the jury verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence. We review the trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of
discretion. People v Daoust, 228 Mich App 1, 16; 577 NW2d 179 (1998).
Motions for a new trial that argue the jury verdict was against the great weight of the
evidence are not favored and should be granted only when the evidence preponderates heavily
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against the verdict and a serious miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. People v
Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 639, 642; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). However, if there is conflicting
evidence, the question of credibility ordinarily should be left for the factfinder. Id at 642-643.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and for the same reason that we found sufficient
evidence, we conclude the jury verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence.
Therefore, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion
for a new trial.
Defendant also argues that a written statement he gave to police was inadmissible
evidence under MRE 404(b). However, we decline to address this argument, given defendant’s
failure to object at trial to the admission of this evidence under MRE 404(b). Indeed, “[a] party
opposing the admission of evidence must timely object and specify the same ground for objection
which it asserts on appeal.” In re Weiss, 224 Mich App 37, 39; 568 NW2d 336 (1997).
Finally, defendant argues that evidence of the child victim’s prior molestation by a
different individual was improperly excluded under the rape-shield law. We review the trial
court’s exclusion of evidence under the rape-shield law for an abuse of discretion. People v
Adair, 452 Mich 473, 485; 550 NW2d 505 (1996).
The rape-shield law, MCL 750.520j(1); MSA 28.788(10)(1), states as follows:
(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct, opinion
evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the child
victim’s sexual conduct shall not be admitted under sections 520b to 520g unless
and only to the extent that the judge finds that the following proposed evidence is
material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial
nature does not outweigh its probative value:
(a) Evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the actor.
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or
origin of semen, pregnancy, or disease.
In this case, defendant sought admission of the child victim’s prior molestation by
another person by arguing that it explained to the jury how the child victim could have
knowledge of sexual matters if she had not learned such things from defendant. Defendant also
stated this evidence supported defendant’s argument that the child victim had fabricated these
charges to get defendant, her mother’s boyfriend, out of the house so that her mother and father
could get back together.
Our Supreme Court in People v Arenda, 416 Mich 1; 330 NW2d 814 (1982), specifically
addressed this issue. The defendant in Arenda argued that he should be permitted to inquire
about the eight-year-old child victim’s prior sexual activity, stating that it explained the child
victim’s “ability to describe vividly and accurately the sexual acts that allegedly occurred.” Id. at
6. The defendant argued that this inquiry would dispel any inference that his ability to describe
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these sexual acts, in such detail, was a result of experiences with defendant. Id. at 12. Our
Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s refusal to allow the evidence, explaining:
In most cases, the relevancy, if any, of such evidence will be minimal. A
jury is unlikely to consider a witness’s ability to describe sexual conduct as an
independent factor supporting a conviction. This ability . . . need not be acquired
solely through sexual conduct.
In contrast, the potential prejudice from the admission of this evidence is
great. First, in order for it to have miniscule probative value, it would have to
refer not only to the existence of sexual conduct but also to the details of such
conduct. To demonstrate a source of knowledge the details of such conduct
would have to be compared to the details as presented at trial. There would be a
real danger of misleading the jury. There would be an obvious invasion of the
victim’s privacy.
***
Furthermore, the only cases in which such evidence can arguably have
more than a de minimis probative value are ones involving young or apparently
inexperienced victims. These children and others are the ones who are most likely
to be adversely affected by unwarranted and unreasonable cross-examination into
these areas. They are among the persons whom the statute was designed to
protect.
Finally, in most of the cases in which the source of the victim’s ability to
describe a sexual act may be relevant, there are other means by which one can
inquire into that source of knowledge without necessarily producing evidence of
sexual conduct with others. Counsel could inquire whether the victim had any
experiences (e.g., reading a book, seeing a movie, conversing with others,
schoolwork, or witnessing others engaged in such activity) which aided him or her
in describing the conduct that is alleged. [Id. at 12-13; emphasis omitted.]
Our Supreme Court pointed out that the defendant had no specific knowledge or evidence
that the child victim had engaged in any conduct with another person. Id. at 6. It was also
mentioned that the defendant was not prevented from inquiring about the child victim’s other
sources of knowledge about sexual activity. Id. Thus, our Supreme Court concluded that such
evidence was not admissible in that case, but did not foreclose the possibility that such evidence
might be admissible in another case. Id. at 13-14.
This Court in People v Morse, 231 Mich App 424; 586 NW2d 555 (1998),was faced with
a similar situation. The defendant in Morse claimed that the eight-year-old and nine-year-old
child victims had fabricated the charges against him and were relying on details from a prior
incident of molestation by the child victim’s mother’s boyfriend. Id. at 427. This Court, relying
on Arenda, stated that our Supreme Court did not deny that the “probative value of a young
child’s previous sexual abuse can be very significant.” Id. at 433. This Court also commented
that “a defendant’s allegations that a victim is biased or has a motive to make false charges may
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shift the balance in favor of permitting the proffered evidence.” Id. Thus, this Court stated that
such evidence may be admissible provided certain safeguards are met. Id. at 436. Specifically,
this Court stated that a defendant’s proffered evidence must be relevant; the defendant must be
able to establish that another individual was convicted of criminal sexual conduct involving the
child victim; and the facts underlying that conviction must be “significantly similar.” Id. at 437.
In this case, it is undisputed that the other individual was convicted of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct arising out of the prior incident of molestation of the child victim. In
addition, this evidence satisfies the relevancy requirement. This Court has recognized that
demonstrating that the child victim acquired the sexual knowledge from a source other than
defendant is relevant. Morse, supra at 433. This Court has also remarked that demonstrating the
child victim’s bias or motive to lie is also relevant. Arenda, supra at 14. However, the evidence
was properly excluded because the two incidents involved different sexual acts. The incident
with the other individual involved the child victim being forced to engage in fellatio. In contrast,
this case involved defendant engaging in cunnilingus. Thus, the “significantly similar”
requirement is not met and the evidence was properly excluded.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
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