IN RE FRANCES WILLIAMS MESSER TRUST
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re Estate of FRANCES WILLIAMS MESSER
TRUST, DATED JANUARY 10, 1939.
OLD KENT BANK, Trustee,
UNPUBLISHED
May 29, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee/CrossAppellant,
v
No. 220177
Kent Probate Court
LC No. 92-153441-WT
REMAINDER BENEFICIARIES,
Respondents-Appellants/CrossAppellees.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Hood and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondents, remainder beneficiaries, appeal as of right from a judgment entered by the
probate court. Petitioner trustee cross appeals from the portion of the judgment limiting recovery
of costs and expenses incurred defending this action. We reverse.
In In re Messer Trust, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued
June 25, 1996 (Docket No. 174624), we concluded that a remand for a new trial was warranted
regarding the issue of reasonable prudence in administering trust assets. On appeal from this
court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that the remainder beneficiaries were entitled to a “jury
trial on all factual issues except the issue of the trustee’s prudence, because that determination is
properly left to the probate court.” In re Messer Trust, 457 Mich 371, 373; 579 NW2d 73
(1998). At the probate level, petitioner filed a motion for entry of judgment that essentially
requested a default judgment. Specifically, petitioner alleged that a settlement conference had
been held on September 17, 1998, and remainder beneficiaries “were directed to come forward
with a statement of the issues which they contend are material, disputed fact questions unrelated
to prudence issues.” However, there is no order contained in the lower court record that
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evidenced a court ruling or directive to that effect.1 Consequently, the pleadings alleged that
petitioner was “powerless to move this case toward final resolution” without the pleading from
remainder beneficiaries. In response to the motion, remainder beneficiaries filed a pleading
identifying various factual issues that were to be tried before a jury pursuant to the Supreme
Court decision. There is no indication in the lower court record that the lower court ever ruled
on this motion.
On April 19, 1999, petitioner filed a second motion entitled motion for entry of judgment.
However, this motion should have been characterized as a motion for summary disposition.
Essentially, petitioner argued that there were no remaining genuine issues of material fact and the
entire case addressed and challenged the prudence of petitioner. Petitioner’s brief in support of
the motion was accompanied by a bound appendix of exhibits that included testimony from the
trial. In response, remainder beneficiaries argued that there were multiple questions of fact
regarding good faith and ordinary diligence involving conflict of interest, adequacy of price,
accounting, and retention of trust proceeds without court authorization. The probate court, after
remand, did not comply with the Supreme Court decision. In lieu of determining whether jury
submissible issues were presented outside of the prudence claim, the probate court merely
adopted the findings of the prior trial judge and concluded that he did not err. The probate court
granted petitioner’s motion for summary disposition, albeit entitled a motion for entry of
judgment.
Appellate review of the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition is de novo.
The Herald Co v Bay City, 463 Mich 111, 117; 614 NW2d 873 (2000). When reviewing a
motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), the affidavits,
pleadings, depositions, admissions and documentary evidence then filed in the action or
submitted by the parties must be considered.2 MCR 2.116(G)(5). Once the motion is made and
supported, the adverse party has an obligation to demonstrate, with documentary evidence, that a
genuine issue for trial has been presented. MCR 2.116(G)(4). In SSC Associates Limited
Partnership v General Retirement System, 192 Mich App 360, 363-365; 480 NW2d 275 (1991),
this Court noted the burden of each party with respect to a motion for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10):
The trial court adopted the expert’s opinion, submitted in letter form,
determined that there was no genuine issue of a material fact, and granted plaintiff
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). We hold that this was error.
1
We note that the lower court record on appeal is incomplete. Specifically, the transcript of the
bench trial has not been provided for our review. Both parties in this instance have filed claims
of appeal and were obligated, as appellants, to ensure that the full record was provided on appeal.
Band v Livonia Associates, 176 Mich App 95, 103-104; 439 NW2d 285 (1989). The deficiency
has hampered our ability to review this matter as will be explained further in this opinion.
2
Petitioner did not entitle its motion as requesting summary disposition and did not identify the
subsection of this court rule under which summary disposition was requested. However, we can
infer from the pleadings and appendices submitted with the brief that petitioner alleged that there
was no issue regarding any material fact and judgment should be entered in its favor. Petitioner
sought to invoke MCR 2.116(C)(10) without expressly identifying the rule.
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A motion for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
based on the lack of a genuine issue of material fact, tests whether there is factual
support for the claim.
Affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence in
support of the grounds asserted in the motion must be filed with the motion.
MCR 2.116(G)(3). The affidavits must be made on the basis of personal
knowledge and must set forth with particularity such facts as would be admissible
as evidence to establish or deny the grounds stated in the motion. Durant v
Stahlin, 375 Mich 628; 135 NW2d 392 (1965). They do not resolve issues of fact.
Their purpose is to help the court determine whether an issue of fact exists. Id. at
640, 645-647. Opinions, conclusionary denials, unsworn averments, and
inadmissible hearsay do not satisfy the court rule; disputed fact (or the lack of it)
must be established by admissible evidence. Remes v Duby (After Remand), 87
Mich App 534, 537; 274 NW2d 64 (1978).
The party opposing the motion must then come forward with a showing
that there is truly a dispute. Hollowell v Career Decisions, Inc, 100 Mich App
561; 298 NW2d 915 (1980). However, the party opposing a motion for summary
disposition has no obligation to submit any affidavit until the moving party
submits a proper affidavit regarding a dispositive fact. Bobier v Norman, 138
Mich App 819; 360 NW2d 313 (1984). In ruling on the motion, the trial court
must consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and other
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. MCR 2.116(G)(5). Metropolitan
Life Ins Co v Reist, 167 Mich App 112, 118; 421 NW2d 592 (1988). Giving the
benefit of all reasonable doubt to the opposing party, the trial court must
determine whether the kind of record that might be developed would leave open
an issue upon which reasonable minds could differ. Weeks v Bd of Trustees,
Detroit General Retirement System, 160 Mich App 81, 84; 408 NW2d 109 (1987).
A reviewing court should be liberal in finding that a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Rizzo v Kretschmer, 389 Mich 363, 372; 207 NW2d 316 (1973). A court
must be satisfied that it is impossible for the claim or defense to be supported at
trial because of some deficiency which cannot be overcome. Id. at 371.
It is well settled that where the truth of a material factual assertion of a
moving party’s affidavit depends on the affiant’s credibility, there exists a genuine
issue to be decided at trial by the trier of fact and a motion for summary
disposition cannot be granted. Metropolitan Life Ins, supra; Brown v Pointer,
390 Mich 346, 354; 212 NW2d 201 (1973); Crossley v Allstate Ins Co, 139 Mich
App 464, 468; 362 NW2d 760 (1984).
The trial court must not usurp a trial jury’s right, nor anticipate its own
right as the trial factfinder if such it may become late, to determine the affiant’s
credibility. Durant, supra at 647-652. Moreover, summary disposition is
especially suspect where motive and intent are at issue, or where the credibility of
a witness or deponent is crucial. Crossley, supra.
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Applying the above stated rules to the present case reveals that the trial court did not determine
whether a genuine issue regarding any material fact existed that did not pertain to the prudence
issue. For example in addressing the conflict of interest question, the probate court stated:
On the conflict of interest issue, again, the question – and the cases have
been cited about whether or not it’s a fact question that there’s a conflict of
interest, and that a duty, therefore, arises on the part of the – of the bank because
of that conflict. All of that was revealed in the testimony – the extensive
testimony before Judge DeYoung.
It seems to me that this is, again, an attempt to get a different result from
the same trial court. And, in effect, get this judge to overrule the prior judge’s
ruling on that matter. And I – I think it’s correct that I do not have the ability or
the authority to do that. That this is not a fact, but rather is a conclusion based on
the information which is undisputed. It is undi [sic] – it was laid out in all of the
pleadings and the testimony that the bank had a banking commercial relationship
with this corporation as well as a trust relationship with these beneficiaries and
their father – and their grandfather.
The Supreme Court concluded that the remainder beneficiaries were entitled to a jury trial
addressing any factual matters relating to prudence. In re Messer Trust, supra. Thus, the issue
was not whether the successor trial judge had the ability to overrule the prior factual
determinations in the prior trial. Rather, the issue, that was never reached by the successor judge,
was whether the issue of conflict of interest fell outside the realm of the prudence issue. If the
conflict of interest issue was outside the scope of prudence, then remainder beneficiaries were
entitled to a jury trial on the matter if there were genuine issues of material fact. In re Messer
Trust, supra. Furthermore, the probate court stated that the conflict of interest issue did not
present “a fact, but rather is a conclusion based on the information presented which is
undisputed.” While we do not have the complete record on appeal, it appears that the statement
is erroneous. The fact that petitioner had a relationship with the company to which the shares
were sold was undisputed. However, whether that relationship had any bearing on the treatment
of trust involving remainder beneficiaries seemingly presented a credibility issue that was for
resolution by the trier of fact.3
Additionally, the probate court made the following general statement:
So for all of those reasons, I cannot find that there are factual issues that
have not been plumbed thoroughly. And that the – the remaining so-called factual
issues, are really not factual issues at all but conclusions, based on openly
stipulated facts. I cannot imagine that a jury would be able to elucidate the
situation any further because nobody’s disagreeing with the underlying facts.
3
We are unable to hold that this issue presents a question of fact for the jury because of the
limited record. Furthermore, we address issues that are raised and addressed by the lower court.
Miller v Inglis, 223 Mich App 159, 168; 567 NW2d 253 (1997).
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Again, while we do not have the full record on appeal, the pleadings indicate that even where
facts were undisputed, the construction of the facts and the assessment of credibility of witnesses
was crucial. For example, while one could conclude that it is arguably prudent to have a diverse
portfolio, remainder beneficiaries seemingly argued that a conflict of interest by petitioner
resulted in an inadequate price for the sale of the stock. The Supreme Court held that fact issues
outside the realm of prudence were to be submitted to a jury. In re Messer Trust, supra. It is not
for the trial court to imagine or speculate whether a jury would reach a different conclusion than
the prior trial judge. Rather, the right to a trial by jury is provided for in the Michigan
Constitution. Const 1963, art. 1, § 14. (“The right of trial by jury shall remain, but shall be
waived in all civil cases unless demanded by one of the parties in the manner prescribed by law.
In all civil cases tried by 12 jurors a verdict shall be received when 10 jurors agree.”).
Furthermore, the Constitution of 1963, Art. 6, § 5 affords the Supreme Court rule making
authority. MCR 2.508(A) provides “[t]he right of trial by jury as declared by the constitution
must be preserved to the parties inviolate.” Accordingly, the issues following the Supreme Court
decision continue to be whether the allegations characterized as good faith and due diligence,
including but not limited to, breach of fiduciary duties involving conflict of interest, adequacy of
price, accounting, and retention of trust proceeds without court authorization fall outside the
realm of prudence. Once that decision is reached, the trial court is required to provide remainder
beneficiaries their right to a jury trial, regardless of the opinion of the prior conclusion and
findings by the prior trial court, if there are genuine issues of material fact. The determination
regarding genuine issues of material fact must be made based on available documentary evidence
and where evidence is contingent upon credibility issues, summary disposition may not be
granted. SSC, supra. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for consideration of these issues.
We also note that petitioner is correct in its assertion on cross appeal that the trial court
erroneously failed to make any inquiry regarding the reasonableness of attorney fees. In re
Krueger Estate, 176 Mich App 241, 248; 438 NW2d 898 (1989). However, in view of our
decision to reverse and remand, this matter will depend on the resolution of the issues on remand.
Reversed and remanded to the probate court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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