IN RE TOLBERT/THORNTON MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of M.T., D.T., D.T., Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 230713
Genessee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 93-096110-NA
LINDA TOLBERT,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Hood and Griffin, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent, biological mother of the involved minor children, appeals as of right a
family court order terminating her parental rights to the children pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g). We affirm.
We review for clear error both the family court’s decision that a ground for termination
has been proven by clear and convincing evidence and, where appropriate, the court’s decision
regarding the child’s best interest. MCR 5.974(I); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355-357; 612
NW2d 407 (2000); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). A finding of fact is
clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 22;
610 NW2d 563 (2000). To terminate parental rights, the family court must find that at least one
of the statutory grounds for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence. MCR
5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Once a statutory ground is
established, the court must terminate parental rights unless “there exists clear evidence, on the
whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best interests.” MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo, supra at 354.
Respondent argues on appeal that there was not clear and convincing evidence of parental
unfitness sufficient to warrant termination of her parental rights. She maintains that her alleged
behavior was not abandonment, but rather an intra-family transfer of custody of her minor
children which did not rise to the level of neglect. Respondent further argues that she was not
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given adequate services and opportunities in light of her mental impairment (attention deficit
disorder) to allow her to comply with the court-ordered treatment plan. Finally, respondent
contends that the family court erred by terminating her parental rights without specifying the
statutory grounds or authority for termination. We disagree.
As a preliminary matter, respondent argues the trial court failed to establish jurisdiction
by affirmatively showing that respondent and the relative caretakers failed to agree on a custody
arrangement or that the relative caregivers’ homes were unfit. However, because respondent
pleaded no contest to the termination petition filed by petitioner to initiate this matter, she has
waived the issue of jurisdiction. See In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426, 439; 505 NW2d 834 (1993);
In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 587-588; 528 NW2d 799 (1995).
We conclude the family court did not clearly err in finding that § 19b(3)(g) was
established by clear and convincing evidence. Under § 19b(3)(g), parental rights may be
terminated if a “parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care and custody for the
child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care
and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” The record indicates that
respondent appears to have simply abandoned her three minor children. The uncontested proofs
reflect that during the second week of January 2000 respondent left two of the minor children,
her two-year-old twin daughters, in the care of their great aunt, informing the aunt that she was
unable to care for the children. She later attributed her inability to care for her children to
depression and the lack of financial resources. During the third week of January 2000 respondent
contacted the paternal grandmother of the third minor child involved in this matter ( a son then 5
1/2 years of age), and asked her to “watch him” for a while; respondent did not return for five
weeks. The initial petition in this matter was filed in the family court on February 25, 2000, by
petitioner after respondent made no further effort to contact or care for her children. Although
respondent subsequently had some contact with her children, she never visited the children on
her own initiative; rather, she only saw them when the relatives brought the children to her. The
testimony indicated that respondent had not been involved in the twins’ lives on a consistent
basis since approximately two weeks after they were born. She regularly left the children with
relatives not only for days, but months at a time. It is significant that respondent’s behavior
reflected a pattern of abandonment: in 1994, she voluntarily terminated her parental rights to her
two oldest children, twin boys, following the initiation of termination proceedings based on
similar allegations that she would leave those children with relatives for prolonged periods of
time without making any provisions for their basic needs. A family court may apprise itself of all
relevant considerations. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 26; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). Evidence
of the mistreatment of one child is probative of the treatment of other children of the party. Id.
Respondent suffers from attention deficit disorder. In a psychological evaluation entered
as evidence at trial, the examiner, retained by petitioner, opined that respondent is intellectually
impaired, with poor comprehension and erratic in her ability to verbally integrate information.
The examiner further concluded that respondent’s prognosis for independently parenting her
children was “guarded and poor” due to psychiatric problems much more severe than depression.
The evaluation indicated that respondent has the symptoms of a characterilogical disorder
including symptoms of paranoia, withdrawal, and delusions. Such a condition would cause
respondent to be guarded, mistrustful, suspicious, and very prone to perceive people as being
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motivated antagonistically towards her. The examiner, retained by petitioner, concluded that
respondent had long-term deficiencies in her ability to function consistently, was neglectful and
had abandoned her children. In sum, she had significant difficulty taking care of herself, let
alone her children.
Petitioner’s foster care worker assigned to the case testified that pursuant to the parent
agency agreement, respondent was required to maintain a stable residence, maintain monthly
contact with the caseworker, participate in educational planning for her child, attend a life skills
course, abstain from any illegal substances, and maintain a legal source of income. The foster
care worker testified that, with the exception of the required psychological evaluation, respondent
failed to complete any of the portions of the parent agency agreement. Respondent failed to
complete random drug screens and another drug screen tested positive for cocaine and marijuana.
Respondent herself admitted to using illegal drugs within two weeks of the permanent custody
hearing. Respondent was discharged from the life skills class due to erratic attendance. She
never obtained any employment and was without income at the time of trial. The foster care
worker opined that due to respondent’s instability, as manifested in her psychological state and
inability to function in a consistent manner, she was unable at the time of the permanent custody
hearing to parent the children alone. A second foster care worker who testified at trial reached a
similar conclusion with regard to respondent’s ability to assume custody of her children. In fact,
respondent admitted that the representations of the foster care workers were true.
Although respondent commendably turned to her relatives when she realized that she was
unable to provide for her children, and the children remained in the care of respondent’s chosen
caretakers at the time of trial with the approval of petitioner, we conclude on the basis of the
above record that the family court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s
parental rights pursuant to § 19b(3)(g) was warranted by clear and convincing evidence.
Moreover, respondent’s contention that the family court did not adequately specify the authority
for termination is without merit. In its bench opinion, the court articulated and set forth in detail
the relevant considerations supporting its decision to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
Further, in light of the available evidence, we cannot conclude that termination was not in the
children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo, supra at
354.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
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