IN RE CRYSTAL LYNN SUGGS MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of CRYSTAL LYNN SUGGS, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 227928
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 91-295331
CONNIE JO SUGGS,
Respondent,
and
LAWRENCE PAUL SUGGS, JR.,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Zahra and Owens, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the family court order terminating his
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (i) and (j); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g), (i) and (j). We affirm. This case is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The family court did not clearly err in finding that §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) were each
established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337;
445 NW2d 161 (1989). Although we find some merit to respondent-appellant’s claim that
§ 19b(3)(i) was not sufficiently proven, because only one statutory ground need be established in
order to terminate parental rights, In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 352; 612 NW2d 407
(2000), and because we conclude that §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j) were each sufficiently
established, we need not decide whether termination was warranted under § 19b(3)(i). Further,
the evidence did not show that termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights was clearly
not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo,
supra at 356-357.
-1-
Respondent also argues his due process rights were violated because he did not have
notice that termination was being sought under §§ 19b(3)(i) and (j), because those statutory
grounds were not cited in the petition for permanent custody. We disagree. We review
constitutional issues de novo as questions of law. Kampf v Kampf, 237 Mich App 377, 381; 603
NW2d 295 (1999). Contrary to what respondent-appellant asserts, § 19b(3)(i) was cited as a
basis for termination in the permanent custody petition. Although § 19b(3)(j) was not
specifically cited in the petition, the petition did specifically list all of the allegations that
comprised the factual basis for termination under § 19b(3)(j), and for which evidence was
presented at the termination hearing. Accordingly, this defect was technical and did not erode
the fact of actual notice. In re Slis, 144 Mich App 678, 684; 375 NW2d 788 (1985).
Furthermore, because the family court’s decision is independently supported by §§ 19b(3)(c)(i)
and (g), and because respondent-appellant does not allege any defect in notice with regard to
these subsections, any error in terminating under §§ 19b(3)(i) and (j) would not require reversal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Donald S. Owens
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
