IN RE WEDDINGTON MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of In the Matter of LARRY
CHARLES WEDDINGTON, JENNIFER SHEENA
WEDDINGTON, SARAH MARIE
WEDDINGTON, BRITTANY DANIELLE
WEDDINGTON, and ANGELA KATIE IDEL
WEDDINGTON, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 227922
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 86-255400
CHRISTINE VELVET WEDDINGTON, a/k/a
CHRISTINE VELVET HAMILTON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
LARRY JOHN WEDDINGTON,
Respondent.
In the Matter of LARRY CHARLES
WEDDINGTON, JENNIFER SHEENA
WEDDINGTON, SARAH MARIE
WEDDINGTON, BRITTANY DANIELLE
WEDDINGTON, and ANGELA KATIE IDEL
WEDDINGTON, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No.
-1-
228203
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 86-255400
CHRISTINE VELVET WEDDINGTON, a/k/a
CHRISTINE VELVET HAMILTON,,
Respondent,
and
LARRY JOHN WEDDINGTON,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Zahra and Owens, JJ
MEMORANDUM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents appeal as of right from the family court order
terminating their parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c),1 (g) and (j);
MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c), (g) and (j). We affirm. This case is being decided without oral
argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The family court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law comport with MCR 5.974(G),
and are sufficient to show that the court was aware of the issues in the case and correctly applied
the law, and to enable this Court to conduct appellate review. People v Armstrong, 175 Mich
App; 437 NW2d 343 (1989); DeVoe v C A Hull, Inc, 169 Mich App 569, 576; 426 NW2d 709
(1988). The family court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence.2 MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331,
337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondents’
parental rights was clearly not in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Thus, the
family court did not err in terminating respondents’ parental rights to the children.
1
In its written findings of fact and decision, and in reciting those findings and decision on the
record, the trial court stated that it was terminating respondents’ parental rights pursuant to
§ 19b(3)(c)(ii).
However, the permanent custody petition requested termination under
§ 19b(3)(c)(i), not subsection (c)(ii). On appeal, both respondents address the court’s decision as
though the court had actually relied on subsection (c)(i), while petitioner and the minor children
address the court’s decision as though it was based on subsection (c)(ii), as stated.
2
We conclude that, regardless of whether the court intended to terminate under § 19b(3)(c)(i) or
§ 19b(3)(c)(ii), clear and convincing evidence was presented to support both statutory grounds.
-2-
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Peter M. Meter
-3-
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