PEOPLE OF MI V MICHAEL R BELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 226527
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-012761
MICHAEL R. BELL,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: White, P.J., and Cavanagh and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; MSA
28.278, carjacking, MCL 750.529a; MSA 28.797(a), and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). At defendant’s jury trial, the trial
court granted defendant’s motion for a mistrial. The prosecution now appeals as of right from an
order granting defendant’s motion for dismissal, with prejudice, of the charges against him. We
reverse.
The prosecution argues on appeal that the trial court erred in dismissing the case on the
grounds of double jeopardy after the prosecution mentioned during its opening statement that
after the police stopped a stolen car, they talked to the codefendant driver, then found and
arrested defendant. We agree. Double jeopardy issues are reviewed de novo. People v Mackle,
241 Mich App 583, 592; 617 NW2d 339 (2000). A trial court’s determination that the
prosecutor “intended to goad the defendant into moving for a mistrial” is subject to appellate
review under the clearly erroneous standard. People v Dawson, 431 Mich 234, 258; 427 NW2d
886 (1988). In determining the prosecutor’s intent, the trial court should make its decision “on
the basis of the objective facts and circumstances of the particular case.” Id. at 257.
“The Michigan and federal constitutions provide that no person shall be put in jeopardy
twice for the same offense.” Dawson, supra at 250. See US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1,
§ 15. The purpose of the double jeopardy prohibition is to protect persons from repeated
prosecutions for the same crime. Dawson, supra at 250. Double jeopardy principles bar retrial
where a defendant’s motion for mistrial is prompted by intentional prosecutorial misconduct
intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial. People v Gaval, 202 Mich App 51,
53; 507 NW2d 786 (1993), quoting Dawson, supra at 253. However, “[w]here a mistrial results
from apparently innocent or even negligent prosecutorial error, or from factors beyond his
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control, the public interest in allowing a retrial outweighs the double jeopardy bar.” Dawson,
supra at 257.
We conclude that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion to dismiss. The
prosecutor’s remarks in his opening statement were innocent or at most negligent. After a careful
review of the facts and circumstances in this case, the prosecutor’s remarks do not appear to have
been intentional misconduct or intended to goad defendant into moving for a mistrial. The
prosecutor apparently acknowledged that introduction of the codefendant’s statements was
inadmissible hearsay and that he would not use them in his case-in-chief in order to avoid
provoking a mistrial. Furthermore, the alleged intentional misconduct occurred during the
prosecutor’s opening statement before any evidence was presented. The prosecutor’s remarks
were innocent or at most negligent as the prosecutor was merely trying to explain the sequence of
events as they happened and was willing to present case law supporting his position. Even if, as
the trial court appeared to believe, the prosecutor was trying to circumvent the hearsay rules by
implication, we believe that such conduct at most may have been negligent, but it was clearly not
intended to provoke a motion for mistrial from the defense. The prosecutor did not relate that
codefendant made a statement. The prosecutor did not discuss the content of the statement nor
did he allude to inadmissible hearsay.
Finally, the prosecutor appeared extremely surprised and angry by the judge’s decision to
grant a mistrial. In fact, he vehemently argued against the mistrial motion. There is simply no
evidence on the record to support the trial court’s finding that the prosecutor intended to provoke
a mistrial or committed prosecutorial misconduct in his opening statement, and therefore the trial
court clearly erred in finding intentional prosecutorial misconduct. Accordingly, the public
interest in allowing a retrial outweighs the double jeopardy bar and the trial court erred in
dismissing the case on the basis of this erroneous finding. See Dawson, supra at 257.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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