PATRICIA MEXICOTTE V UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICIA MEXICOTTE,
UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 221660
Court of Claims
LC No. 98-016917-CM
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Hood and Griffin, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right an order granting summary disposition to defendant under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
Plaintiff was a clinical nurse in defendant’s hospital from 1988 until 1995. Plaintiff
claimed that as of 1995 she could no longer perform her duties as a clinical nurse due to the
effects of numerous medical conditions. For a while, plaintiff worked for defendant in a couple
of different office positions. However, in December 1995 plaintiff stopped working altogether
for defendant. Plaintiff applied for benefits under her long-term disability plan several times
between 1995 and 1998, and each time defendant determined that plaintiff was not disabled.
Defendant cited reports by physicians who evaluated plaintiff and found no objective evidence
that she could not perform sedentary work.
This Court reviews decisions on motions for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t
of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
A motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual basis underlying a
plaintiff’s claim. MCR 2.116(C)(10) permits summary disposition when, except
for the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to damages as a matter of law. A court reviewing
such a motion must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions,
and any other evidence in favor of the opposing party and grant the benefit of any
reasonable doubt to the opposing party. [Stehlik v Johnson (On Rehearing), 206
Mich App 83, 85; 520 NW2d 633 (1994).]
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Plaintiff presents a number of interwoven arguments on appeal. For the sake of clarity,
we will address these arguments in an order different than that in which they were presented.
Plaintiff argues that defendant’s conclusion that plaintiff was not totally disabled is not
supported by substantial evidence on the record. Harris v New Haven Foundry, Inc, 120 Mich
App 629, 630-631; 327 NW2d 540 (1982). We disagree. The record is replete with medical
evidence, including that from plaintiff’s own treating physician, F. John Brinley III, MD, as well
as a number of independent medical examinations, that plaintiff’s medical condition did not
prevent her from performing sedentary nursing duties.
Plaintiff notes that Dr. Brinley indicated in a letter dated April 11, 1995 that plaintiff is
“currently significantly impaired by her medical problems and unable to perform certain types of
activities. Specifically, I do not think she can perform any job which requires a significant
amount of physical exertion.” Dr. Brinley also requested that defendant help plaintiff “in finding
alternative types of employment.” However, on a form entitled “ATTENDING PHYSICIAN’S
STATEMENT OF DISABILITY,” dated May 16, 1995, Dr. Brinley noted that plaintiff’s
progress had improved. Under the section of the form entitled “Physical Impairment,” Dr.
Brinley indicated that plaintiff had “[m]oderate limitation of functional capacity: capable of
clerical/administrative (sedentary) activity.” Then in a handwritten letter dated September 19,
1995, Dr. Brinley wrote that plaintiff’s “medical condition has improved and she is available
now to work a full 40 hr. week. It is my understanding that she has applied for an office nursing
position. My medical opinion is that she would be able to physically perform the tasks required
at this job.” (Emphasis in original.)
An independent medical examination performed by Jerold W. Shagrin, MD, also supports
defendant’s position. Dr. Shagrin concluded in a report dated February 8, 1996, that he could
“not find any objective evidence to support any contention that [plaintiff] . . . cannot hold a
sedentary job.” Mary K. Kneiser, MD., concluded in her October 30, 1997 report that she had
“no objective findings that would preclude [plaintiff] . . . from engaging in sedentary work.”
Quentin R. McMullen, MD, concluded in his October 31, 1997 report that “there is no cardiac or
pulmonary reason why [plaintiff] could not begin a sedentary occupation for a minimum of two
hours daily.” Dr. McMullen opined that a return to work should be deferred until plaintiff
received “a more recent cardiac, pulmonary and rheumatologic evaluation.” A subsequent
evaluation was done by Gerald J. Levinson, DO, who concluded in his February 2, 1998 report
“that based on the patients’ history, physical examination, review of extensive medical records,
resting EKG and chest x-ray that [plaintiff] . . . is not medically disabled on the basis of
cardiopulmonary disease and could return to her position as a registered nurse, but only on a
sedentary basis.” Two independent psychiatric evaluation both concluded that plaintiff does not
have a psychiatric disability.
Plaintiff also asserts that defendant’s denial of long-term disability benefits was
arbitrarily and capriciously in two ways. First, she argues that defendant improperly ignored the
Social Security Administration’s (SSA) approval of her application for disability benefits and the
medical reports on which that conclusion was based. Second, plaintiff argues that defendant’s
decision was arbitrary or capricious because defendant did not consider plaintiff’s education,
training, and experience when it determined that plaintiff could work. We reject both of these
arguments.
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A decision is said to be arbitrary if it “was fixed or arrived at through an exercise of will
or by caprice, without giving consideration to principles, circumstances, or significance.” Blank
v Dep’t of Corrections, 222 Mich App 385, 407; 564 NW2d 130 (1997). Accord United States v
Carmack 230, 243; 67 S Ct 252; 91 L Ed 209 (1946). A decision is capricious “if it is apt to
change suddenly or is freakish or whimsical.” Blank, supra at 407. Accord Carmack, supra at
243.
Regarding plaintiff’s first argument, we note that defendant was under no duty to adopt
the SSA’s findings. This is especially so given that the SSA was not presented with the very
medical reports on which defendant based its denial of long-term benefits. We also reject
plaintiff’s contention that defendant acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by failing to
consider the additional medical reports she submitted to the SSA. Plaintiff does not argue that
defendant simply disregarded the additional medical reports after being presented with them.1
Indeed, there appears to be no dispute over the fact that defendant never submitted these reports
to defendant. Rather, plaintiff argues that defendant had a duty under the disability plan to
request these additional medical reports once it had been notified of the SSA’s actions.
Defendant counters that it was plaintiff’s responsibility under the plan to prove her claim of
disability, and thus was her responsibility to provide the additional reports.
Resolution of this question turn on how the disability plan is interpreted, which is an
issue of law we review de novo. Morley v Automobile Club of Michigan, 458 Mich 459, 465;
581 NW2d 237 (1998). Our primary goal in interpreting this plan is to determine the intent of
the parties. Conagra v Farmers State Bank, 237 Mich App 109, 132; 602 NW2d 390 (1999).
Accordingly, we read the disability plan “as a whole and give meaning to all its terms.” AutoOwners Ins Co v Churchman, 440 Mich 560, 566; 489 NW2d 431 (1992).
The plan plainly states that applicants for disability benefits must submit all the medical
information necessary to support their disability claim. For example, under the heading, “What
Is The Basis For Determining Disability?”, the plan states that it is the applicant who “must
provide medical information that the Claims Administrator, in his or her sole discretion, accepts
as evidence of your total disability . . . .” Then, under the heading “Will I Be Required to
Provide Medical Evidence?”, the plan states in unequivocal language:
You are responsible for providing proof of your disability. To do so, you must
provide medical evidence satisfactory to the Claims Administrator that shows the
disability prevents you from engaging in any occupation or employment for which
you are reasonably qualified by education, training or experience . . . and qualifies
you for benefits according to the terms of this Plan. [Ellipses in original.]
Plaintiff cites the following language from the plan as support for her position: “The
Benefits Office has all the necessary forms for, and can provide help with, Plan benefits. Also,
see the last page for a checklist that shows the steps you should follow in claiming disability
benefits.” Plaintiff’s argument on how this passage supports her position is somewhat unclear.
1
Thus, plaintiff’s reliance on Beggs v Mullins, 499 F Supp 916 (SD W Va, 1980), is misplaced.
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She appears to be arguing that this language imposes a duty on defendant to request any-and-all
medical information on which defendant will base its decision regarding long-term disability
benefits. We fail to see how informing an applicant where he or she can pick up any necessary
forms and receive assistance imposes such a duty.
As for the mentioned checklist, we find nothing in it that imposes a duty on defendant to
request such records. The checklist does tell an applicant to submit a “Physician’s Statement of
Disability,” and does state that an applicant “[p]rovide any additional medical evidence requested
by the Benefits Office.” However, the mentioning of a form that must be submitted, and the
reminder that an applicant must comply with Benefits Office requests for information, does not
release an applicant of the plainly stated responsibility to provide proof, satisfactory to the
Claims Administrator, of the applicant’s disability.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the plan’s definition of “disabled” imposes on defendant the
duty to provide a list of occupations an applicant could perform before denying long-term
disability benefits. In pertinent part, the plan defines disabled as follows:
The University’s Claims Administrators have determined, in their sole discretion,
you are completely unable, except during periods of rehabilitative employment, by
reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment to engage in
any occupation or employment for wages or profit for which you are reasonably
fitted by education, training or experience. . . . [Emphasis added.]
Plaintiff argues that the highlighted words require defendant to specifically identify alternative
occupations for which plaintiff was reasonably fitted by education, training or experience. We
disagree.
In support of this proposition, plaintiff cites to Perez v Aetna Life Insurance Co, 96 F 3d
813 (CA 6, 1996). Perez is distinguishable, however, because the plaintiff in that case had
provided evidence from a vocational expert that the claimant was not employable that was not
refuted by any contrary vocational evidence. Id. at 828. This situation is not present in the case
at hand.
Plaintiff also cites to an unpublished memorandum opinion from the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Bonner v FMC Long-Term Disability Plan, 21 F 3d 1111, 1994
WL 14953 (CA 9, 1994). The Bonner Court critically observed that the appellee had “provided
no suggestions as to what type of work would be available to” the claimant. Id. at **2.
However, this observation was made in the context of the court’s conclusion that the evidence
clearly established that the claimant was totally disabled.2 That is not the case in the present
appeal.
2
After having concluded that the medical evidence established the claimant’s disability, the
Bonner Court turned to the fact that the appellee had not provided any suggested alternative
employment. This, the court reasoned, was evidence that undermined the appellee’s contention
that the claimant’s severely physical limitations did not disqualify her from every job. Id. (“The
absence of even one suggestion demonstrates the extreme difficulties [the claimant] . . . would
(continued…)
-4-
In Chalmers v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 86 Mich App 25, 30; 272 NW2d 188 (1978),
this Court observed that, “[i]n general, there are three views relating to the interpretation of ‘total
disability’ provisions in insurance policies.” These three views are: (1) the liberal view (“total
disability exists whenever the insured is unable to perform the duties of his particular
occupation;” (2) the strict view (“total disability exists only when there is incapacity to pursue
any occupation whatever;” and (3) the intermediate view (“which regards total disability as a
relative term, which rejects both of the two extreme views and which employs differing language
to explain the degree of incapacity.” Id. at 30-31. Michigan case law, the Court observed,
“follow[s] the so-called intermediate view.” Id. at 31.
As authority for its definition of the intermediate view, the Chalmers Court cited to 21
ALR3d 1383. Chalmers, supra at 31, n 3. 21 ALR 1383 further defines the intermediate view as
follows: “the inability to work in the insured’s particular occupation or other occupations for
which he is fitted or qualified.” Id. at 1393 (emphasis added). In the case at hand, the evidence
showed that there were, at the very least, other sedentary nursing positions for which plaintiff
was qualified that she could work. Thus, there was substantial evidence that plaintiff was not
disabled, as that term is defined in the plan.
Affirmed.
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
(…continued)
face in pursuing employment opportunities.”).
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