DARNELLA ANCHRUM V AIRTOUCH CELLULAR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DARNELLA ANCHRUM,
UNPUBLISHED
May 25, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
AIRTOUCH CELLULAR and GLYNIS MCBAIN,
No. 215455
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-002072-NZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Smolenski and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
In November 1995, plaintiff, an African American woman, began employment with
defendant Airtouch Cellular as a Customer Care Supervisor. Defendant McBain was plaintiff’s
supervisor. Plaintiff’s duties involved the supervision of several Customer Care Representatives.
On February 10, 1997, defendant McBain informed plaintiff that she was terminated because she
failed to provide documentation of coaching sessions that plaintiff was required to perform with
her direct employees. Specifically, defendant McBain claimed she was unable to confirm that
the coaching sessions took place. Plaintiff filed this suit, alleging race discrimination, wrongful
interference and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Only plaintiff’s claims of race
discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress are at issue on appeal.
I
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her race discrimination claim.
We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v
Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). In reviewing a motion for
summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court should consider the affidavits,
pleadings, depositions, admissions or any other documentary evidence submitted in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party to decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999); Rollert v Dep’t of
Civil Service, 228 Mich App 534, 536; 579 NW2d 118 (1998). The party opposing the motion
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has the burden of showing by evidentiary materials that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists.
Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). The disputed factual issue
must be material to the dispositive legal claims. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v Johnson, 187
Mich App 264, 267; 466 NW2d 287 (1990). All reasonable inferences are resolved in the
nonmoving party’s favor. Hampton v Waste Mgt of MI, Inc, 236 Mich App 598, 602; 601 NW2d
172 (1999).
The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et
seq., prohibits race discrimination in employment decisions, providing:
(1) An employer shall not do any of the following:
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an
individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or
privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex,
height, weight, or marital status. [MCL 37.2202(1)(a); MSA 3.548(202)(1)(a).]
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the CRA by showing that she
was:
(1) a member of a protected class, (2) subject to an adverse employment action,
(3) qualified for the position, and that (4) others, similarly situated and outside the
protected class, were unaffected by the employer’s adverse conduct. [Town v
Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688, 695; 568 NW2d 64 (1997), citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668
(1973).]
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises that the
defendant may rebut by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment
decision. Town, supra at 695-696. If the employer rebuts the presumption of discrimination, the
plaintiff must then raise a triable issue that the stated reason for the adverse employment decision
was merely pretext for discriminatory animus. Id. at 696-697.
In the present case, the parties dispute whether plaintiff has presented evidence that she
was treated less favorably than any similarly situated, non-African-American employee who
engaged in the same or similar conduct. Plaintiff asserts that none of the other five Customer
Care Supervisors were discharged. She notes that one Caucasian supervisor was merely writtenup for failing to coach her employees. Significantly, however, there is no evidence that any of
the other five supervisors were ever believed to have falsified coaching reports. Conduct that
defendant McBain claimed warranted immediate dismissal. Plaintiff admits that McBain
requested her coaching reports in January 1997 and acknowledges that she did not provide
McBain with reports for each of her employees. To show that an employee was similarly
situated, the plaintiff must prove that “‘all of the relevant aspects’ of his employment situation
were ‘nearly identical’ to those of [another employee’s] employment situation.” Town, supra at
699-700. Having failed to present evidence suggesting that any similarly situated, non-AfricanAmerican employee was treated differently for the same or similar conduct, plaintiff’s claim fails
as a matter of law.
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Furthermore, even assuming plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of discrimination,
she failed to present evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether defendants’
nondiscriminatory reason for discharging plaintiff was mere pretext for discrimination.
Defendants met their burden of presenting a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s
discharge when they asserted that plaintiff was terminated because she was believed to have
falsified coaching reports. Town, supra at 695-696. Plaintiff has not presented sufficient
evidence to rebut that claim. See id. at 696. Plaintiff claims that statements made by her cosupervisors during meetings were evidence of discriminatory animus.1 Defendant McBain’s
single alleged comment that employees might avoid jury duty by claiming they are “prejudiced”
is not evidence that race was a motivating factor in plaintiff’s discharge. Moreover, there is no
evidence that the other alleged comments were made by individuals with any authority to affect
plaintiff’s discharge. Plaintiff’s proofs regarding her performance show, at most, that defendants
perhaps made a poor business judgment in discharging plaintiff. “[P]laintiff cannot simply show
that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether
discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd,
prudent, or competent.” Town, supra at 704, quoting Fuentes v Perskie, 32 F3d 759, 765 (CA 6,
1994). Under these circumstances, the trial court properly granted summary disposition for
defendants.
II
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Again, we disagree.
In order to establish a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
establish (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent or recklessness; (3) causation; and (4)
severe emotional distress. Graham v Ford, 237 Mich App 670, 674; 604 NW2d 713 (1999).
Liability may be found only where the conduct complained of has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community and does not extend to
mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. Id. The test
is whether an average member of the community would find the facts so resentful to exclaim,
“Outrageous!” Id. at 675.
In this case, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the facts do not
satisfy the test for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Plaintiff has failed to
show defendants’ conduct to be extreme and outrageous. As discussed supra, the evidence does
not suggest that defendants’ actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. Furthermore,
1
Plaintiff alleges that the following statements were made by co-supervisors during her
employment at Airtouch. While referring to a trainee, one co-supervisor allegedly stated: “Well
you know she lives with a black man.” Another co-supervisor allegedly asked plaintiff how she
could deal with hearing gunshots on a continuous basis, referring to plaintiff’s residence in
Detroit. Another time, a co-supervisor allegedly stated that she did not “understand the big deal”
over Martin Luther King Jr.’s, birthday. Plaintiff also alleges that defendant McBain advised
employees to claim they were “prejudiced” in order to avoid jury duty.
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while the alleged comments made by co-supervisors may be said to demonstrate ignorance, they
do not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct. Accordingly, this claim fails as a
matter of law.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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