PEOPLE OF MI V STEVEN GERMAINE ARMSTRONG
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 22, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 219690
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-159354-FH
STEVEN GERMAINE ARMSTRONG,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: McDonald, P.J., and Murphy and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW),
MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6),
resisting or obstructing a police officer, MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747, driving without an
operator's license or failure to display an operator's license to a police officer on demand, MCL
257.311; MSA 9.2011, and transporting or possessing alcoholic liquor in an open container in a
vehicle, MCL 257.624a; MSA 9.2324(1). Defendant was sentenced as a fourth habitual
offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084, to concurrent prison terms of eight to twenty years each
for the CCW and felon-in-possession convictions, five to fifteen years for the resisting or
obstructing conviction, and ninety days each for the two misdemeanor motor vehicle convictions.
His motion for a new trial was denied. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant first claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
evidence. We could decline to consider this claim because defendant has not briefed the trial
court's ruling, made when denying his motion for a new trial, that the search was valid as a search
incident to defendant's arrest. See People v Kent, 194 Mich App 206, 209-210; 486 NW2d 110
(1992) (failure to brief the merits of an allegation of error is deemed an abandonment of the
issue); Roberts & Son Contracting, Inc v North Oakland Development Corp, 163 Mich App 109,
113; 413 NW2d 744 (1987) (failure to address a necessary issue precludes appellate relief). In
any event, we conclude that defendant has not established any basis for disturbing the trial court's
initial ruling that the challenged evidence was admissible on the basis that a valid inventory
search was conducted. People v Kaslowski, 239 Mich App 320, 323; 608 NW2d 539 (2000); see
also People v Toohey, 438 Mich 265; 475 NW2d 16 (1991); People v Poole, 199 Mich App 261;
501 NW2d 265 (1993).
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Defendant next claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because
defense counsel made no attempt to exclude the felon-in-possession charge from the trial.
Specifically, defendant claims that defense counsel should have had him tender a conditional
plea to the felon-in-possession charge under MCR 6.301(C)(2). Our review of this issue is
limited to errors apparent from the record because defendant did not seek an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973); see also People v
Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 507; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). We note that the existing record is
factually silent with regard to whether there were any plea discussions between defense counsel
and defendant before trial. However, even without this factual development, defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel fails because MCR 6.301(C)(2) does not permit the type of
conditional plea suggested by defendant, that is, a plea to a felon-in-possession charge
conditioned on a jury finding him guilty of a separate CCW charge. MCR 6.301(C)(2) permits a
defendant to tender a plea conditioned on preserving for appeal a specified pretrial ruling or
rulings, with the consent of the court and prosecutor. Under MCR 6.302(A) and (D), the trial
court may not accept a plea unless it is accurate, that is, "the court, by questioning the defendant,
must establish support for a finding that the defendant is guilty of the offense charged or the
offense to which the defendant is pleading."
Because defendant does not claim that he would have given an accurate plea to the felonin-possession charge, conditioned on a specific pretrial or trial ruling, we find that defendant's
reliance on MCR 6.301(C)(2) is misplaced. Further, based on our review of the safeguards
undertaken at trial to prevent unfair prejudice and, in particular, the stipulation entered into by
defense counsel regarding defendant's felon status, we are satisfied that defendant has failed to
show either the requisite deficient performance or the prejudice required for a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Avant, supra at 507-508. The jury's finding that defendant was
not guilty of a cocaine possession charge and its related felony-firearm charge belies defendant's
claim that the jury made improper use of his felon status.
Defendant next claims that he was denied due process by the introduction of flight
evidence at trial. Because defendant did not timely object to the challenged evidence and has not
shown plain error, we find no basis for relief. MRE 103(a)(1) and (d); People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). In this regard, we note that it is plain from the record
that the challenged evidence of defendant's flight and apprehension by the police was admissible
because it formed the basis for the resisting or obstructing a police officer charge. Although
evidence admitted for one purpose may be inadmissible for another purpose, MRE 105, flight
evidence may also be relevant circumstantial evidence of an offense to show a defendant's
consciousness of guilt. See People v Cutchall, 200 Mich App 396; 504 NW2d 666 (1993).
Hence, the trial court's instruction to the jury, without objection, that flight evidence may be used
to show consciousness of guilt was not plain error.
Defendant next claims that the trial court's ruling to allow other acts evidence deprived
him of due process because the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value. We
review the trial court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. People v Lukity, 460 Mich
484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Although defendant claims a due process error, not all trial
errors present a constitutional violation. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 296; 613 NW2d 694
(2000). Having reviewed defendant's claim in the context of the evidentiary rules upon which it
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is based, we conclude that defendant has not established an abuse of discretion. MRE 404(b);
People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 55-56; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). The other acts
evidence was not unduly prejudicial in light of the precautions taken by the trial court to limit the
scope of the witnesses' testimony. MRE 403.
Finally, defendant claims that he was deprived of due process when his motion for a
directed verdict was denied. In reviewing this claim, we note that the specific arguments
presented by defense counsel when seeking a directed verdict at the trial were directed at the
cocaine and felon-in-possession charges, but that defendant's motion for a new trial, like
defendant's argument on appeal, was directed at the CCW charge. In any event, "when
determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a conviction, a court must
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), modified 441
Mich 1201 (1992).
The elements of CCW are, "(1) the presence of a weapon in a vehicle operated or
occupied by the defendant, (2) that the defendant knew or was aware of its presence, and (3) that
he was 'carrying' it." People v Nimeth, 236 Mich App 616, 622; 601 NW2d 393 (1999), quoting
People v Courier, 122 Mich App 88, 90; 332 NW2d 421 (1982). Relevant factors for deciding if
evidence was sufficient to establish a carrying include, but are not limited to: (1) awareness of
the weapon, (2) accessibility or proximity of the weapon, (3) possession of items connected to
the weapon, such as ammunition, (4) ownership or operation of the vehicle, and (5) length of
time during which the defendant drove or occupied the vehicle. People v Butler, 413 Mich 377,
390, n 11; 319 NW2d 540 (1982); People v Emery, 150 Mich App 657, 667; 389 NW2d 472
(1986).
Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence that defendant was the
sole occupant and driver of the vehicle, that the gun was found a couple of inches under the
driver's seat, together with the evidence of the prior act wherein defendant was placed in the
same vehicle and holding the same gun involved in the instant case, was sufficient circumstantial
evidence to find the elements of CCW beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, defendant's right to
due process was not violated. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 633-634; 576 NW2d 129
(1998). We note that these proofs are also sufficient to establish the possession of a firearm
element of the felon-in-possession charge, MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6).
Affirmed.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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