PEOPLE OF MI V JULIEANNE MINGE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 18, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 219595
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 98-010268
JULIEANNE MINGE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: White, P.J., and Cavanagh and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with possession of 50 grams or more but less then 225 grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(iii). She appeals by leave granted the
trial court order denying her motion to suppress the evidence. We affirm.
This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s decision regarding a motion to suppress
evidence, and reviews for clear error the trial court’s findings of fact. People v Stevens, 460
Mich 626, 631; 597 NW2d 53 (1999); People v Parker, 230 Mich App 337, 339; 584 NW2d 336
(1998).
Defendant argues that the police stop of her vehicle was unjustified in this case. We
disagree. In order for police officers to make a constitutionally proper investigatory stop, they
must have a particularized suspicion that “the individual being investigated has been, is, or is
about to be engaged in criminal activity. People v Nelson, 443 Mich 626, 632; 505 NW2d 266
(1993). That suspicion must arise as a result of “[t]he totality of the circumstances as understood
and interpreted by law enforcement officers, not legal scholars,” and must be reasonable and
articulable. Id., quoting United States v Cortez, 449 US 411, 418; 101 S Ct 690; 66 L Ed 2d 621
(1981). Police officers are permitted to consider the modes and patterns of certain kinds of
criminals, and “common sense and everyday life experiences predominate over uncompromising
standards.” Nelson, supra at 633. Although an officer is not permitted to rely on a mere hunch,
the officer is entitled to draw inferences from the facts in light of his experience. People v
LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496, 502; 556 NW2d 498 (1996).
In this case, defendant was observed going into the side door of a house where police
believed cocaine was being sold. While she was inside, a police officer saw another person
approach the same side door and exchange money for suspected cocaine with a man inside the
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house. A few minutes later, defendant came out the side door with a visible bulge under her
shirt. The bulge was “baseball size, maybe 4 or 5, 6 inches long and a couple inches wide.” On
the basis of his experience in narcotics enforcement, the police officer believed that defendant
was taking drugs from the suspected drug house where he had just observed a suspected drug
transaction. He notified other members of the arrest and surveillance team and, when defendant
drove away, her car was stopped by the police. The arresting officer also observed the bulge
under defendant’s shirt and asked defendant if she was armed with a weapon. She replied that
she was not but that she had cocaine.
These facts, viewed in the light of common sense, give rise to more than a hunch that
defendant was involved in criminal activity. LoCicero (After Remand), supra at 502; Nelson,
supra at 632-633. The trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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