DAVID C DOMINE V TOWNSHIP OF GROSSE ILE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DAVID C. DOMINE,
UNPUBLISHED
May 18, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217572
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-827966-AA
TOWNSHIP OF GROSSE ILE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted an order reversing the decision of the Grosse Ile
Township Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) and granting plaintiff’s request for a variance. We
reverse the decision of the circuit court and reinstate the decision of ZBA.
Plaintiff owns two parcels of property in the Elbamar County Subdivison. Plaintiff
acquired lot seventy-eight on July 13, 1972, and he resides in a home on this lot. On April 4,
1973, plaintiff purchased lot seventy-nine, an adjacent lot. In 1998, plaintiff decided to sell lot
seventy-nine to a buyer interested in building a single-family residence on the lot. Accordingly,
plaintiff applied for a zoning variance, because the lot does not meet current width or area
requirements.
The ZBA eventually ruled that plaintiff could not sell lot seventy-nine for purposes of
building a single-family residence because under defendant’s zoning ordinances, two contiguous
lots of nonconforming size owned by a single owner had to be treated as only one lot. The ZBA
denied plaintiff’s request for a variance, concluding that plaintiff’s hardship was self-created
because he was attempting to sell lot seventy-nine separately from lot seventy-eight.
Plaintiff appealed the ZBA’s decision to the circuit court. The circuit court agreed that
the current applicable ordinance prevented the building of a single-family home on lot seventynine without a variance. However, the court ruled that a variance was warranted because the
restrictions plaintiff faced regarding lot seventy-nine were not self-created. Accordingly, the
court reversed the ZBA’s decision. Defendant contends that the court erred in doing so.
We must first interpret the applicable township ordinance and determine if the ordinance
indeed prevented the building of a single-family residence on lot seventy-nine, as the circuit court
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found. This Court reviews de novo a circuit court’s interpretation of an ordinance. Brandon
Charter Twp v Tippett, 241 Mich App 417, 421; 616 NW2d 243 (2000). Moreover,
[t]he primary goal of statutory interpretation and, by implication, the
interpretation of ordinances, is to give effect to the intent of the legislative body.
The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language used by the
legislative body in the statute or ordinance. If the plain and ordinary language is
clear, then judicial construction is normally neither necessary nor permitted.
[Ballman v Borges, 226 Mich App 166, 167-168; 572 NW2d 47 (1997) (citations
omitted).]
The applicable ordinance in effect in 1998 stated, in part:
A. Use of Non-conforming Lots: Any non-conforming lot shall be used
only for a use permitted in the district in which it is located. In any district in
which single-family dwellings are permitted, notwithstanding limitations imposed
by other provisions of this ordinance, a single-family dwelling and customary
accessory buildings may be erected on any single lot of record at the effective date
of this ordinance. This provision shall apply even though such lot fails to meet
the requirements for area or width, or both, that are generally applicable in the
district, provided that the lot is in conformance with all other applicable yard
setback, minimum floor area and maximum height requirements for the district in
which it is located (see item C below).
***
C. To develop a non-conforming lot(s) . . . the applicant is required to
submit evidence that ownership of the lot was not under contiguous single
ownership with other lots which could have been combined into a conforming or
more conforming lot.
D. Non-conforming Contiguous Lots under the Same Ownership: The
following regulations apply to non-conforming contiguous lots under the same
ownership.
1. If two or more lots or combination of lots with continuous frontage are
or have been under single ownership are of record [sic] at the time of adoption or
amendment of this Ordinance, and if all or part of the individual lots do not meet
the requirements established for lot width and area, the lands involved shall be
considered to be an individual parcel for the purposes of this Ordinance. Any
altering of lot lines or combination of lots shall result in lots which conform to the
requirements of this Ordinance.
***
4. Once any combination which creates a conforming lot occurs, the
resulting lot shall not retain non-conforming lot of record status and will hereafter
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be required to comply with the lot requirements of this ordinance. [Grosse Ile
Ordinance, § 18.5.]
At the time this ordinance took effect, 1995, plaintiff owned lots seventy-eight and seventy-nine.
It undisputed that these lots are contiguous. Accordingly, interpreting the statute as plainly
written, we find that the circuit court did not err in concluding that plaintiff’s lots must be treated
as one undivided parcel and that the building of a single-family home on lot seventy-nine could
not occur without a variance.
Next, we must determine whether the circuit court properly analyzed the ZBA’s denial of
a variance. As stated in Reenders v Parker, 217 Mich App 373, 378; 551 NW2d 474 (1996), a
court must affirm a decision of a zoning board of appeals unless the decision is “(1) contrary to
law, (2) based on improper procedure, (3) not supported by competent, material, and substantial
evidence on the record, or (4) an abuse of discretion.” See also Johnson v Robinson Twp, 420
Mich 115, 124; 359 NW2d 526 (1984).
Here, the court concluded that a variance was warranted because at the time plaintiff
purchased the lots in 1973, they were treated as separate parcels. Accordingly, the court found
that plaintiff’s current hardship was not self-created but was instead created by the enactment of
the 1995 ordinance and that a variance was necessary. The court looked to the following, prior
ordinance, adopted in 1958, in determining that the lots were treated as separate parcels upon
plaintiff’s purchase of lot seventy-nine in 1973:
In any district in which single-family dwellings are permitted, a singlefamily dwelling and customary accessory buildings may be erected on any single
lot of record at the effective date of adoption or amendment of this ordinance,
notwithstanding limitations imposed by other provisions of this ordinance. Such
lot must have been in separate ownership prior to November 20, 1958 [the date of
passage of the ordinance], and not of continuous frontage with other lots in the
same ownership. This provision shall apply even though such lot fails to meet the
requirements for area or width, or both, that are generally applicable in the district,
provided that yard dimensions and requirements other than these applying to area
or width, or both, of the lot shall conform to the regulations for the district in
which such lot is located. Variance of yard requirements shall be obtained only
through action of the Board of Appeals.
If two or more lots or combinations of lots and portions of lots with
continuous frontage in single ownership are of record at the time of passage or
amendment of this ordinance, and if all or part of the lots do not meet the
requirements established for lot width and area, the lands involved shall be
considered to be an undivided parcel for the purpose of this ordinance, and no
portion of said parcel shall be used or sold in a manner which diminishes
compliance with lot width and area requirements established by this ordinance,
nor shall any division of any parcel be made which creates a lot with width or area
below the requirements stated in this ordinance. [Grosse Ile Township Ordinance,
§ 11.20; emphasis added.]
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The court concluded that because the same individual did not own both lots on November 20,
1958, the lots did not have to be treated as one upon plaintiff’s purchase of lot seventy-nine.
Accordingly, the court ruled that a variance in the instant situation was necessary because
“[plaintiff’s] property did not become one parcel when he purchased lot 79, [so] he did not divide
his property [by attempting to sell lot seventy-nine in 1998] and thereby impose a hardship on
himself.”
Defendant contends that the 1958 ordinance did indeed make lots seventy-eight and
seventy-nine one parcel upon plaintiff’s purchase of lot seventy-nine in 1973. Defendant
contends that if an owner acquired two contiguous, nonconforming lots after the adoption of the
1958 ordinance, the lots had to be treated as one under the ordinance, regardless of whether the
lots were owned by one entity at the time of the ordinance’s adoption. Defendant’s contention
finds support in Kalinoff v Columbus Twp, 214 Mich App 7, 10; 542 NW2d 276 (1995), in which
this Court examined a materially identical ordinance and ruled that the ordinance “requires an
owner of two or more lots with continuous frontage to combine the lots to conform to the
township’s minimum lot size and frontage requirements.” Although the Kalinoff Court did not
specifically address the question of whether the combination requirement applied only if the two
lots were owned by a single owner at the time of the passage of the ordinance, the implication of
the Court’s ruling was that it did not matter whether this common ownership existed at the time
of passage. Indeed, the Court appeared to interpret the ordinance as meaning that any two
contiguous lots owned by a single owner had to be combined, regardless of the lots’ prior
ownership status. We question this interpretation, since the language at issue clearly refers to “. .
. two or more lots or combinations of lots with continuous frontage in single ownership . . . of
record at the time of passage or amendment of this ordinance. . . .” Here, the lots in question
were not under single ownership on November 20, 1958.
Nonetheless, we need not even address whether the 1958 ordinance essentially combined
lots seventy-eight and seventy-nine upon plaintiff’s purchase of lot seventy-nine in 1973. Indeed,
even assuming, arguendo, that the 1958 ordinance did not apply and that the parcels remained
separate until the enactment of the 1994 ordinance, the circuit court still erred in reversing the
ZBA’s decision to deny a variance.
MCL 125.293; MSA 5.2963(23) gives authority to a township’s zoning board of appeals
to grant a variance and provides, in part:
Where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in the way of
carrying out the strict letter of the zoning ordinance, the board of appeals in
passing on appeals may vary or modify any of its rules or provisions so that the
spirit of the ordinance is observed, public safety secured, and substantial justice
done.
The hardships justifying a variance cannot be self-created, and the plight of the landowner must
be due to the unique circumstances of the property. Johnson, supra at 126.
In this case, plaintiff’s property does not conform to the zoning ordinance because it fails
to meet the lot size requirements. Admittedly, this is a practical difficulty inherent in the
property itself. However, this practical difficulty could have been avoided if plaintiff had not
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decided to sell lot seventy-nine separately. Thus, plaintiff, and not the zoning ordinance, can
reasonably be deemed to have caused the practical difficulty. Additionally, the zoning officer
opined that “[g]ranting approval of this request would be affording special consideration to the
applicant not afforded to other property owners in the area.” This was a permissible
consideration in denying the variance, given Johnson, supra at 126, in which the Court stated
that “[t]he Zoning Board of Appeals was surely correct in foreseeing that, if these plaintiffs could
obtain the requested variance, there would be little basis to ever deny a subsequent similar
request.” Indeed, consideration of the effect of the variance on others and on the character of the
subdivision is appropriate.
Accordingly, even if plaintiff did have the right to build a single-family residence on lot
seventy-nine at the time he purchased the lot, the ZBA’s decision to deny a variance was
nonetheless supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. Id. at 124; Parker,
supra at 378. As stated in Mich Education Ass’n Political Action Committee v Secretary of
State, 241 Mich App 432, 444-445; 616 NW2d 234 (2000):
Substantial evidence is any evidence that reasonable minds would accept
as adequate to support the decision; it is more than a mere scintilla of evidence
but may be less than a preponderance of the evidence. See Korzowski v. Pollack
Industries, 213 Mich App 223, 228, 539 NW2d 741 (1995).
***
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 1345, defines "scintilla" as "the least
particle." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997), p. 1159, defines
"scintilla" as "a minute particle; spark; [or] trace."
Here, there was more than a “minute particle” of evidence supporting the ZBA’s decision. Even
if the circuit court’s reasoning was plausible, or if the circuit court would have arrived at a
contrary conclusion if it had been in the ZBA’s place, the court was nonetheless bound to affirm
the decision as long as the decision was sufficiently supported. See, e.g., Kotmar, Ltd v Liquor
Control Comm, 207 Mich App 687, 689-690, 525 NW2d 921 (1994). Accordingly, the court
clearly erred in reversing the ZBA’s decision.
Finally, we note that plaintiff argues that if he is not granted a variance, defendant has
effectuated a taking of plaintiff’s property. We disagree. Indeed, plaintiff has not shown that the
zoning precludes his use of the property for any purpose for which it is adapted. Bell River Assoc
v China Charter Twp, 223 Mich App 124, 134; 565 NW2d 695 (1997). Moreover, according to
the record, plaintiff did not attempt to use lot seventy-nine for purposes of a single-family
residence until after the relevant zoning ordinances were adopted; accordingly, no taking
occurred. Bevan v Brandon Twp, 438 Mich 385, 401; 475 NW2d 37 (1991).
Reversed; the decision of the ZBA is reinstated.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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