PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY DWAYNE WASHINGTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 15, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 211409
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 94-012339
ANTHONY DWAYNE WASHINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra C.J., and Wilder and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, MCL
750.321; MSA 28.553, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felonyfirearm), MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was sentenced as a second habitual offender,
MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, to fifteen to twenty two and a half years’ imprisonment for the
manslaughter conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant was charged with first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316; MSA
28.548, in the shooting death of John Holland, and assault with intent to murder MCL 750.83;
MSA 28.278, in connection with the attempted shooting of John’s brother, Ernest Holland, and
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2).
While defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony, the jury acquitted defendant of the assault with intent to murder
charge and first-degree murder.
Defendant’s competency to stand trial was questioned several times before trial. On
March 1, 1996, following a competency hearing, defendant was declared incompetent to stand
trial and committed to the Department of Mental Health for a period of up to fifteen months to
undergo treatment in an effort to render him competent. Following treatment, defendant was
found competent to stand trial on June 3, 1997, by stipulation of the parties. However, on
September 22, 1997, the trial court granted defense counsel’s request for the appointment of an
independent psychologist, John Stryker, to examine defendant both for competency and criminal
responsibility. At a competency hearing held on October 31, 1997, defendant was again found
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competent to stand trial. This finding has not been appealed by defendant. The court set
December 15, 1997 as defendant’s trial date.
On December 12, 1997, defense counsel requested an adjournment based on the claim
that defendant was not competent to stand trial. This belief arose out of defendant’s sessions
with Stryker on November 29 and December 9, 1997, in which Stryker developed the opinion
that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. The trial judge referred the matter to the presiding
judge of the criminal division pursuant to a docket control initiative, and defendant and defense
counsel appeared before the presiding judge on December 15, 1997. The presiding judge ordered
an immediate competency examination, and took testimony later that day from the director of the
criminal division of the circuit court’s psychiatric clinic. Based on the psychologist’s evaluation
and testimony, the presiding judge found defendant competent and ordered him to stand trial.
I
Defendant first contends that the presiding judge abused her discretion in ordering a
competency hearing without first obtaining a written report from the examiner and without
giving defense counsel adequate time to prepare. We disagree.
The determination of a defendant’s competence is within the trial court's discretion.
People v Harris, 185 Mich App 100, 102; 460 NW2d 239 (1990). However, the trial court has a
duty to raise the issue of incompetence “where facts are brought to its attention which raise a
‘bona fide doubt’ as to the defendant's competence.” Id., quoting People v Johnson, 58 Mich
App 473, 475; 228 NW2d 429 (1975). Whether a “bona fide doubt” exists is also within the
discretion of the trial court. Id.
A criminal defendant is “presumed competent to stand trial” and will be determined
incompetent “only if he is incapable because of his mental condition of understanding the nature
and object of the proceedings against him or of assisting in his defense in a rational manner.”
MCL 330.2020(1); MSA 14.800(1020)(1). The trial court “shall determine the capacity of a
defendant to assist in his defense by his ability to perform the tasks reasonably necessary for him
to perform in the preparation of his defense and during his trial.” Id.; MSA 14.800(1020)(1)
Unless the issue of a defendant’s competence arises during the course of proceedings, a motion
raising the issue must be in writing. MCR 6.125(B). The trial court must order the defendant to
undergo an examination by personnel of a facility officially certified by the department of mental
health to perform competency examinations whenever it is determined that the defendant may
not be competent to stand trial. MCL 330.2026; MSA 14.800(1026). See also MCR
6.125(C)(1). The psychiatric facility must examine the defendant and consult with defense
counsel, may consult with the prosecutor or other persons, and must submit a written report to
the court, prosecuting attorney, and defense counsel within sixty days of the order. MCL
330.2028(1); MSA 14.800(1028)(1). After receiving the written report, the court must hold a
hearing to determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial. MCL 330.2030; MSA
14.800(1030); MCR 6.125(E).
In People v James, 87 Mich App 412; 274 NW2d 801 (1978), defense counsel moved for
a competency examination on the date set for trial. The trial court scheduled an examination in
the court’s psychiatric clinic that morning and held a competency hearing in the afternoon. The
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trial court heard the testimony of the clinic’s psychologist and, based on her testimony, found the
defendant competent to stand trial and impaneled a jury. Id. at 414-415. On appeal, this Court
determined that “it was not reversible error for the court to rest a finding of competency upon the
testimony of a qualified psychologist” and, while the clinic clearly erred in not submitting a
written report, the clinic’s error did not require reversal of the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 418419.
In the present case, the presiding judge took testimony from the examining psychologist,
and defense counsel was allowed the opportunity to cross-examine the witness. The
psychologist, who had interviewed defendant that day, opined that defendant was able to
articulate what was happening in the court proceedings and assist his attorney. Accordingly, we
find that the presiding judge did not abuse her discretion in ordering an immediate examination
and competency hearing when defendant appeared before her on the date set for his trial. James,
supra at 414-415.
While defendant correctly notes that the competency hearing held by the presiding judge
occurred before the filing of a formal report, we reject defendant’s contention that defense
counsel did not have an opportunity to adequately prepare for the hearing. The record indicates
that the trial court had previously determined, on October 31, 1997, based on the testimony and
report of a forensic psychologist, that defendant was competent to stand trial. Defense counsel
had access to all the reports filed in this case and did not move in writing for another
determination of competency as required by MCR 6.125(B). Therefore, since defense counsel
did not move in writing for another competency hearing and there was no evidence presented that
the October 31, 1997 determination was no longer valid, the question of defendant’s competence
was a matter within the discretion of the presiding judge, Harris, supra at 102, and we find no
abuse of discretion under these circumstances.
II
Defendant next contends that he was denied a fair trial because of negative and hostile
remarks made, during jury voir dire, by the court, to prospective jurors who expressed an
inability to be impartial. We disagree.
Generally, a party must exhaust its peremptory challenges to preserve a question
regarding jury selection for appeal. People v Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich 495, 515 n 19 (1997);
People v Taylor, 195 Mich App 57, 59-60; 489 NW2d 99 (1992). Here, defendant exercised
only seven of his twelve peremptory challenges and expressed his satisfaction with the jury.
Further, defendant did not object to the challenged comments of the trial court. Thus, this issue
has not been preserved for appellate review. Moreover, the trial court allowed both attorneys the
opportunity to question all jurors. The challenged comments of the trial court, while at times
strong, were plainly intended to remind the jurors that they could not be dismissed because they
found the crime distasteful or because jury service was inconvenient. Nonetheless, some
prospective jurors were indeed dismissed. The jurors who indicated that they could not be
impartial and the juror who proclaimed to be ill were excused for cause. The juror who stated he
could not judge based on his religious beliefs was excused through the prosecutor’s peremptory
challenge. Under these circumstances, defendant was not denied a fair trial.
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III
Defendant also contends that he was denied his due process right to present a defense
when the presiding judge denied his motion for a continuance to secure an independent
examination on the issue of criminal responsibility. We disagree.
This Court reviews the grant or denial of an adjournment for an abuse of discretion.
People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 421; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). In addition, a defendant must
show prejudice as a result of the trial court's abuse of discretion. Id. This Court reviews claims
of due process violations de novo. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 108; 605 NW2d 28 (1999).
In order to offer testimony of legal insanity at the time of the charged offense, a defendant
must file with the court, and serve on the prosecuting attorney, written notice of his intention to
assert an insanity defense at least thirty days before the trial date. MCL 768.20a(1); MSA
28.1043(1)(1). After receipt of this notice, the court must order the defendant to undergo an
examination related to his or her claim of insanity. MCL 768.20a(2); MSA 28.1043(1)(2). “The
examination for determining criminal responsibility is concerned with the defendant’s mental
state at the time the defendant committed the offense.” People v Dobben, 440 Mich 679, 682, n
3; 488 NW2d 726 (1992), citing Boyle & Baughman, The mental state of the accused: Through
a glass darkly, 65 Mich B J 78 (1986). The focus of the examination is on the defendant’s
“blameworthiness.” Id. The examination is undertaken for purposes of establishing an insanity
defense at a criminal trial. Id.
The victim in this case was shot to death on April 10, 1994. At that time, MCL 768.21a;
MSA 28.1044(1)1 provided that a person was “legally insane if, as a result of mental illness . . .
or as a result of mental retardation . . . that person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” The
burden of proof was governed by common law, which provided that once a defendant had
presented evidence of insanity, “the prosecutor then must go forward and produce evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane at the time the crime was committed.”
People v McRunels, 237 Mich App 168, 172; 603 NW2d 95 (1999), quoting In re Certified
Question, 425 Mich 457, 465-466; 390 NW2d 620 (1986).
While it is true defendant’s independent examiner did not reach any conclusions
regarding defendant’s criminal responsibility, the forensic psychologist who testified at the
October 31 hearing, noted in a report dated October 17, 1997, that “[n]othing described by the
defendant or in the police report indicates that he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.” Under
these circumstances, the presiding judge did not abuse her discretion in denying defendant an
adjournment for further examination on the issue of criminal responsibility, and there was no due
process violation. See People v Smith 103 Mich App 209, 211; 303 NW2d 9 (1981) (“It was not
error for the trial court to deny the request for an independent evaluation when compliance with
1
The statute was amended effective October 1, 1994. The primary change was to allocate the
burden of proving the defense of insanity by a preponderance of the evidence to the defendant.
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the statute would have required a postponement of the trial for at least five days where the
defense counsel could have made the request at an earlier time to avoid a delay of the trial.”)
IV
Defendant further contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because
his trial counsel failed to object to the presiding judge’s decision to order an immediate
competency hearing without a written report, did not have adequate time to prepare, and failed to
call witnesses on his behalf at the competency hearing. We disagree.
Because there was no Ginther2 hearing, this Court’s review of this issue is confined to
whether the record contains sufficient detail to support defendant’s claim. People v Sabin (On
Second Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 659; ___ NW2d ___ (2000). To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that defense counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and that a reasonable
probability exists that, but for counsel’s unprofessional error, the result of the proceedings would
have been different. Snider, supra at 424; People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 444;
597 NW2d 843 (1999). Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and a defendant bears a
heavy burden of proving otherwise. People v Plummer, 229 Mich App 293, 308; 581 NW2d 753
(1998).
As stated previously, the trial court found defendant competent to stand trial on October
31, 1997, and defendant does not challenge that finding on appeal. Defense counsel again raised
the issue of defendant’s competence on the eve of trial, apparently just after an independent
examiner declared in a report that defendant was not competent to stand trial. However, the
presiding judge had the discretion to determine defendant’s competence and to determine
whether a bona fide doubt about defendant’s competence had arisen. Harris, supra at 102. It is
not reasonably probable that testimony from the independent examiner that defendant was not
competent to stand trial would have changed the result of the competency hearing, in light of the
earlier finding of competency and the testimony from the clinic’s psychologist who interviewed
defendant that day and found that he was able to articulate what was going on, understood the
nature of the proceedings, and could assist his attorney in preparing a defense. While the defense
might have presented a stronger argument that defendant was incompetent had the testimony of
the independent examiner been introduced at the December 15, 1997 competency hearing,
defendant has not established that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different or
that he was otherwise prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged error.
V
Defendant also argues that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed
to timely investigate and pursue an insanity defense. A criminal defendant is denied the effective
assistance of counsel by his attorney's failure to properly prepare a meritorious insanity defense.
People v Newton (On Remand), 179 Mich App 484, 491; 446 NW 487 (1989); People v Hunt,
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 442-444; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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170 Mich App 1, 13; 427 NW2d 907 (1988). The defendant is entitled to a new trial if this
omission by counsel deprives him of a reasonably likely chance for acquittal. Hunt, supra at 13.
The lower court record contains no evidence that defendant lacked the substantial
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law. MCL 768.21a; MSA 28.1044(1). At trial, defendant testified that he
was carrying a weapon for protection as he walked with friends down the street to use a pay
telephone. When he returned, he was upset because his house had been torn up from fighting
that took place at a party, and he displayed the weapon. Defendant asserted that a friend grabbed
his arm and, when defendant shoved back the gun went off, hitting the victim in the back and
killing him. Thus, defendant presented a defense to the charged offense of first-degree
premeditated murder, which was apparently believed by the jury because defendant was
convicted only of involuntary manslaughter. Defendant was also acquitted of the assault with
intent to murder charge involving the victim’s brother. Defendant has not shown that his
counsel’s failure to present an insanity defense deprived defendant of a reasonable chance of
acquittal; nor did defendant overcome the presumption that counsel’s decision making
constituted sound trial strategy. Indeed, testimony about defendant’s mental state, including
defendant’s claim to the psychologist that he could not recall the shooting, may have caused the
jury to disbelieve defendant’s trial testimony and convict him of a more serious offense. Since
there is no evidence on the existing record that defendant was criminally insane at the time of the
instant offense and because there is no reasonable probability that defense counsel’s failure to
present an insanity defense deprived defendant of a chance to be acquitted, defendant has not
shown that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
VI
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied due process because the police coerced a
prosecution witness into signing a false statement, and the prosecutor impeached the witness with
that statement at trial. We disagree.
Defendant failed to raise this issue for the trial court’s consideration; therefore, it has not
been preserved for appellate review. People v Layher, 238 Mich App 573, 587; 607 NW2d 91
(1999. However, this Court may consider unpreserved issues where failure to do so would result
in manifest injustice. People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 44; 597 NW2d 176 (1999). Attempts
by the prosecution to intimidate witnesses from testifying, if successful, amount to a denial of a
criminal defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law. People v Pena, 383 Mich 402;
406; 175 NW2d 767 (1970); People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 569; 496 NW2d 336 (1992).
Threats from law enforcement officers may be attributed to the prosecution. People v Stacy, 193
Mich App 19, 25; 484 NW2d 675 (1992).
In the instant case, the jury heard the witness testify that she the police coerced her into
signing an incomplete statement and that her trial testimony was true. Additionally, the trial
court instructed the jury that they were not to consider previous unsworn testimony except to
judge the truthfulness of the witness’ trial testimony. Based on this record, we do not find that
defendant was denied due process by the prosecutor’s introduction of statements the witness
made to the police. Further, because defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter rather
than the charged offense of first-degree murder, the jury apparently believed the witness’ trial
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testimony that someone touched defendant’s hand from behind just before the fatal shots were
fired. Accordingly, we find no manifest injustice.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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