PEOPLE OF MI V RONALD B JORDAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 11, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 219279
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-10345
RONALD B. JORDAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Doctoroff and K.F Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of voluntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321; MSA
28.553, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA
28.424(2). He was sentenced to seventeen to twenty-five years for the voluntary manslaughter
conviction and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. He appeals as of
right. We reverse and remand.
Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecution elicited
testimony from a police officer who stated his opinion that another suspect was not involved in
the killing. Defendant claims he was unduly prejudiced because the testimony of the officer
placed the prestige of the police department behind another suspect’s innocence, in direct conflict
with the defendant’s theory of the case. We agree.
Defendant’s fundamental theory at trial was that an individual by the name of Stanley
Harper shot and killed the decedent; not defendant. Consistent with this theory, defendant
established that the police originally had three suspects: Stanley Harper, an unidentified male
suspect, and defendant. However, during direct examination, Officer David Moore testified that
although Stanley Harper was originally a suspect and indeed questioned by Officer Moore, as a
result of further investigation, he conclusively determined that Stanley Moore was not involved
in the act resulting in the victim’s death. Defendant’s trial counsel objected to the prosecutor’s
line of questioning. The trial court permitted the prosecutor to continue despite defense
counsel’s objections. The jury ultimately convicted the defendant. The defendant claims that the
trial court deprived him of a fair trial. We agree.
The following is the essence of the objected to exchange between the prosecutor and
Officer Moore that defendant claims constitutes reversible error:
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[By the Prosecutor]:
Q.
And after you took the statement from [Stanley Harper] was
he charged?
[By Officer Moore]
A:
No he wasn’t.
Q:
How come?
A:
Because he was not involved. He was not involved with the
act of which included the fatal shooting of [decedent]. [Emphasis
added].
Q:
And that was your professional opinion?
A:
Exactly.
Q:
Based on what?
A:
On my investigation.
Q:
And based on what witnesses? [Emphasis added.]
A.
What the witnesses said, the entire investigation with the
witnesses had already told me what happened. His statement was
consistent with what the people that have appeared on the witness
stand today and testified. [Emphasis added.]
Q:
Who do you believe was responsible for the killing of
Cedric ----The Court:
Wait a minute.
Defense Counsel:
Objection.
Q:
Who did you arrest for it? I won’t ask it then, withdraw the
question.
Issues pertaining to the admissibility of evidence lay within the sound discretion
of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v
Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). And, it is equally clear that, “[a]s trier
of fact, the jury is the final judge of credibility.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 637;
576 NW2d 129 (1998) (citation omitted).
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In the case at bar, the trial court permitted testimony concerning Officer Moore’s
professional opinion that based on the witnesses’ interviewed throughout the course of
“[t]he entire investigation” that one of the original suspects, namely Stanley Harper, was
“[n]ot involved.” Just because Officer Moore believed the witnesses’ he interviewed
during the course of his investigation does not mean that the ultimate finder of fact, i.e.
the jury, would also believe that they were credible witnesses. By eliciting Officer
Moore’s professional opinion that the witnesses interviewed were so credible that Officer
Moore could thereby conclude that Stanley Harper was not at all involved in the fatal
shooting, the prosecutor effectively denied the defendant the ability to put forth a viable
defense, especially in light of the defendant’s theory of the case.
The instant case is much like the situation presented in People v Lucas, 138 Mich
App 212; 360 NW2d 162 (1984), wherein our court stated:
Appellant contends that the testimony of Officer Sanborn, that he has
investigated George Thompson’s alibi and had not sought a warrant for that
reason, was inadmissible hearsay. We believe it was. The sole purpose of the
question was to place before the jury the fact that the alibi of Mr. Thompson had
been verified by the witnesses. The officer would not have been permitted to
testify to what the witnesses had said directly and the effect of this series of
questions was to place that information before the jury, buttressed by the
conclusions of the police officer that he believed Thompson’s alibi. [Lucas, supra
at 220.]
Thus, the court recognized that “[t]he right of the defendant to have the jury
determine the credibility of [the other suspect’s] alibi witnesses, uninfluenced by the
opinions of the deputy sheriff, was a very substantial right.” Lucas, at 223. [Emphasis
added]. The court held that the deputy sheriff’s determination as to the alibi witness’s
ultimate veracity which effectively deprived defendant of a fair trial and similarly
deprived the defendant’s right to confront the witnesses brought against him, constituted
“[c]lear error requiring reversal.” Id. at 224.
Similarly, in the case at bar, defendant has a right to have the jury scrutinize the
witnesses’ demeanor and independently determine whether those witnesses are credible
uninfluenced by Officer Moore’s professional opinion as to the veracity of their
statements. Having Officer Moore deliver his professional opinion as to the credibility of
the witnesses involved in the investigation usurps the jury’s entire function and
constitutes plain error requiring reversal. See Lucas, at 223.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it
permitted Officer Moore to testify as to the witnesses’ ultimate credibility which
effectively deprived defendant of a fair trial by an unbiased and impartial decision maker.
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In light of this result, it is not necessary to address the other two issues raised by
defendant.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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