BARBARA JONES V WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BARBARA JONES,
UNPUBLISHED
May 11, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 218251
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 93-325083-NO
WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Zahra and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendant. We affirm.
This case arises from plaintiff’s claim that defendant discriminated against her by
removing her from a director position in defendant’s law school financial aid office and
reassigning her to a position in defendant’s central financial aid office. Plaintiff alleges that the
reassignment was motivated by defendant’s administrators’ desire to assemble a staff of young,
Caucasian men. Plaintiff is a fifty-five-year-old African American woman.
I
On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her claims of age,
gender and race discrimination. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v
Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). In reviewing a motion for
summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10), this Court should consider the affidavits,
pleadings, depositions, admissions or any other documentary evidence submitted in a light most
favorable to the nonmoving party to decide whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.
Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597 NW2d 517 (1999); Rollert v Dep’t of
Civil Service, 228 Mich App 534, 536; 579 NW2d 118 (1998). The party opposing the motion
has the burden of showing by evidentiary materials that a genuine issue of disputed fact exists.
Smith v Globe Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). The disputed factual issue
must be material to the dispositive legal claims. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v Johnson, 187
Mich App 264, 267; 466 NW2d 287 (1990). All reasonable inferences are resolved in the
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nonmoving party’s favor. Hampton v Waste Mgt of MI, Inc, 236 Mich App 598, 602; 601 NW2d
172 (1999).
The Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et
seq., prohibits age, gender and race discrimination in employment decisions, providing:
(1) An employer shall not do any of the following:
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an
individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or
privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex,
height, weight, or marital status. [MCL 37.2202(1)(a); MSA 3.548(202)(1)(a).]
Absent direct evidence, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the
CRA by showing:
(1) that the plaintiff was a member of a protected class, (2) that an adverse
employment action was taken against the plaintiff, (3) that the plaintiff was
qualified for the position, and (4) that the plaintiff was replaced by one who was
not a member of the protected class. [Feick v Monroe Co, 229 Mich App 335,
338; 582 NW2d 207 (1998), citing Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 683;
385 NW2d 586 (1986).]
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises that
the defendant may rebut by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
employment decision. Town v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688, 695-696; 568 NW2d
64 (1997), citing McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668
(1973). If the employer rebuts the presumption of discrimination, the plaintiff must then raise a
triable issue that the stated reason for the adverse employment decision was merely pretext for
discriminatory animus. Id. at 696-697.
In the present case, plaintiff contends that a statement by defendant’s Vice President of
Student Affairs, William Markus, is direct evidence defendant discriminated against her based on
age. Plaintiff testified below that the director of defendant’s Office of Scholarships and Financial
Aid (OSFA), Terry Richards,
created a new management in his office, that they were mostly younger people,
mostly inexperienced people, and I didn’t fit that mode. That I was more
experienced, used to operating independently. I was stuck in a dead end job and
because of that [Markus], wanted offer [sic] me an opportunity to do something
else. And, he stressed that it was an opportunity.
Direct evidence is evidence that, if believed, requires the conclusion that discriminatory animus
was a motivating factor in the employment decision. Harrison v Olde Financial, 225 Mich App
601, 609-610; 572 NW2d 679 (1997), quoting Kresnak v Muskegon Heights, 956 F Supp 1327,
1335 (WD Mich, 1997). Markus’ alleged statement to plaintiff is not evidence of discriminatory
animus. Plaintiff’s testimony, at most, establishes that Markus observed that the OSFA was
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made up of young, inexperienced employees. There is no evidence that Markus stated it was
management’s goal to have the entire OSFA made up of young people or that management
specifically intended to discriminate against older employees. In fact, the above-cited testimony
suggests that plaintiff was identified as someone possessing greater qualifications and worthy of
opportunity where her skills could be best utilized. Plaintiff’s statement that “[Markus] stressed
that it was an opportunity” suggests Markus was not forcing her into a detrimental move.
Plaintiff has also failed to introduce sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove her
discrimination claims. The parties dispute whether plaintiff was subject to any adverse
employment action when she was reassigned to the central OSFA.
[A]n adverse employment action (1) must be materially adverse in that it is more
than "mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities," and (2) must
have an objective basis for demonstrating that the change is adverse, rather than
the mere subjective impressions of the plaintiff. [Meyer v Center Line, 242 Mich
App 560, 569; 619 NW2d 182 (2000), citing Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg
Co, 235 Mich App 347, 364, 597 NW2d 250 (1999).]
Plaintiff claims that her new duties in the central OSFA are menial compared to her prior
position. According to plaintiff, because her new position does not involve financial aid duties,
she could eventually lose tenure. Plaintiff has described her new position as a dead-end job.
Importantly, however, plaintiff has not presented any objective evidence that the reassignment
had a materially adverse effect on her employment status. Plaintiff’s subjective impressions of
the reassignment are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id.
Additionally, plaintiff’s discriminatory replacement arguments based on gender and race
discrimination fail because she was not replaced by a nonmember of the protected class. It is
undisputed that plaintiff was replaced by an African American woman. Also, plaintiff has not
shown that she was treated differently than similarly situated employees. To show that an
employee was similarly situated, the plaintiff must prove that “‘all of the relevant aspects’ of his
employment situation were ‘nearly identical’ to those of [another employee’s] employment
situation.” Town, supra at 699-700. Plaintiff claims that several under-qualified, Caucasian
employees were promoted quickly within the OSFA once Richards took over. She cites a series
of events that she claims establish a pattern of disfavoring older, African American women.
However, plaintiff has not introduced evidence of any employee whose employment situation
was nearly identical to her own. Plaintiff was in a unique situation as an assistant director not
required to report to the central OSFA. Plaintiff has not shown that any other employee had a
similar line of reporting and was treated differently.
Even assuming plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of age, gender or race
discrimination, she has failed to present evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether
defendant’s nondiscriminatory reasons for her reassignment were pretext. Defendant met its
burden of presenting a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged adverse employment
decisions when it asserted that plaintiff’s reassignment was the result of her “difficult” personal
nature and audits that suggested defendant’s OSFA must be entirely centralized. Town, supra at
695-696. Plaintiff argues that defendant’s stated reasons for her reassignment were not
legitimate, but has not cited any documentary evidence supporting her claim. A party’s
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speculation and conjecture are insufficient to establish an issue of fact for trial. Detroit v GMC,
233 Mich App 132, 139; 592 NW2d 732 (1998).
To the extent that plaintiff claims defendant discriminated against her based on a
combination of her age, gender and race, that claim also lacks merit. The elements of a mixed
motive claim of discrimination include:
(1) the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class, (2) an adverse employment
action, (3) the defendant was predisposed to discriminating against members of
the plaintiff’s protected class, and (4) the defendant actually acted on that
predisposition in visiting the adverse employment action on the plaintiff.
[Wilcoxon, supra at 360-361.]
If the plaintiff meets the initial burden of proving that the illegal conduct was more likely than
not a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s decision, the defendant may show by a
preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision without considering
the protected characteristics. Id. at 361, quoting Harrison, supra at 611.
In the present case, as discussed supra, plaintiff has failed to introduce objective evidence
that she was subject to an adverse employment action. Moreover, even assuming that plaintiff’s
evidence shows a pattern of discrimination and that defendant was predisposed to discriminate
against older, African American women, plaintiff has not introduced evidence that defendant
actually acted on that predisposition in regard to plaintiff. See Wilcoxon, supra at 360-361.
Plaintiff claims that defendant’s administrators’ conduct of subjecting her to job evaluations,
accusing her of having a poor attitude and reassigning her evidence an intent to discriminate.
However, such incidents do not require the conclusion that defendant acted with discriminatory
animus. See id. at 368. Plaintiff has not introduced evidence to establish that an intent to
discriminate was more likely than not a substantial or motivating factor in defendant’s decisions.
Id.
II
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her retaliation claim. We
disagree.
The CRA prohibits an employer from retaliating against an employee, providing:
Two or more persons shall not conspire to, or a person shall not:
(a) Retaliate or discriminate against a person because the person has
opposed a violation of this act, or because the person has made a charge, filed a
complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this act. [MCL 37.2701(a); MSA 3.548(701)(a).]
To prove a prima face case of retaliation under the CRA, a plaintiff must show:
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1) that he or she engaged in a protected activity, 2) that this was known by the
defendant, 3) that the defendant took an employment action adverse to the
plaintiff, and 4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity
and the adverse employment action. [Meyer, supra at 568-569, citing DeFlaviis v
Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App 432, 436; 566 NW2d 661 (1997).]
To establish the necessary causation, the plaintiff must show that his participation in protected
activity under the CRA was a “significant factor” in the employer’s adverse employment action,
not just that there was a causal link between the two. Barrett v Kirtland Community College, __
Mich App __; __ NW2d __ (Docket No. 217040, issued 4/10/01), slip op p 5, citing Jacklyn v
Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp, 176 F3d 921, 929 (CA 6, 1999); Polk v
Yellow Freight System, Inc, 801 F2d 190, 199 (CA 6, 1986).
Plaintiff claims that she was reassigned to the central OSFA as a direct result of her
complaints of discrimination. As discussed supra, plaintiff has not provided objective evidence
that she suffered any adverse employment action. Moreover, plaintiff has not shown a causal
connection between any protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action. It is
undisputed that defendant’s administrators decided to relocate plaintiff to the central OSFA
before plaintiff requested a hearing on her discrimination claims or filed a formal discrimination
complaint. Consequently, plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.1
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
1
Plaintiff’s final issue on appeal, asserting that the trial court’s opinion granting summary
disposition for defendant is replete with findings of fact and erroneous conclusions of law, also
lacks merit. Whether the trial court was, indeed, confused about the applicable discrimination
law and misapplied necessary standards is not dispositive of the present appeal given that we
have reviewed this case de novo, Spiek, supra, under the correct and applicable standards.
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