IN RE PETER STACILAUSKAS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of AS, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 1, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 228233
Delta Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-000063-NA
AARON MICHAEL STACILAUSKAS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MEGAN SPRIKS,
Respondent.
In the Matter of PS, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 228234
Delta Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-000064-NA
AARON MICHAEL STACILAUSKAS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MEGAN SPRIKS,
Respondent.
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Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Whitbeck and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant Aaron Stacilauskas (hereinafter “respondent”) appeals as of right
from the family court’s order terminating his parental rights to the minor children under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i) and (g). We affirm.
Respondent claims that petitioner should have been estopped from initiating termination
proceedings on the basis of its alleged failure to follow a court-ordered reunification plan.
Because respondent did not present this estoppel argument to the family court, our review of this
issue is limited to determining whether respondent has shown a plain error affecting his
substantial rights. Cf. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); In re
Snyder, 223 Mich App 85, 92; 566 NW2d 18 (1997). Although respondent asks this Court to
consider the "structure of the statute" and the "entire statutory scheme in child neglect cases," he
neither argues nor identifies any specific statutory violation. Thus, respondent has failed to show
that the supplemental petition requesting termination was filed contrary to law. In re JS & SM,
231 Mich App 92, 98; 585 NW2d 326 (1998). Accordingly, considered in this context,
respondent has not established any plain basis for applying the principle of equitable estoppel.
Furthermore, the statutory scheme with regard to termination proceedings is intended to
protect children. In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 108; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). Also, while increasing
emphasis has been provided by our Legislature to prevent children from drifting in the juvenile
system without permanent placement, In re Marin, 198 Mich App 560, 567; 499 NW2d 400
(1993), the comprehensive statutory scheme also contemplates judicial oversight of services
provided to a respondent during child protection proceedings. See Martin v Children's Aid
Society, 215 Mich App 88, 98; 544 NW2d 651 (1996). An evaluation of those services would
also be relevant in determining whether the petitioner has meet its burden of proving a statutory
ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re Newman, 189 Mich App 61, 6667; 472 NW2d 38 (1991). In this context, absent our Legislature's recognition of an estoppel
theory, we find no plain basis for concluding that petitioner was estopped from seeking a judicial
determination on whether respondent’s parental rights should be terminated. Cf. Van v Zahorik,
460 Mich 320, 336; 597 NW2d 15 (1999).
Respondent also challenges the family court's dispositional ruling at the permanency
planning hearing, whereby it ordered petitioner to initiate termination proceedings pursuant to
MCL 712A.19a; MSA 27.3178(598.19a). We conclude, however, that this issue is moot because
it does not afford respondent any basis for relief. The family court's ultimate authority to
consider whether respondent’s parental rights should be terminated was not dependent on a
permanency planning hearing but, rather, was limited by the requirement that a request for
termination be made in an original, amended or supplemental petition. MCR 5.974(A)(2); see
also In re Marin, supra at 567-568. Because respondent has not demonstrated any basis for
attacking the validity of the supplemental petition requesting termination in this case, the
material question before us concerns the propriety of the family court's ultimate decision to
terminate respondent’s parental right. Keeping in mind that child protection proceedings are
viewed as one continuous proceeding, In the Matter of LaFlure, 48 Mich App 377, 391; 210
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NW2d 482 (1973), we conclude that the prior dispositional ruling directing petitioner to file a
petition requesting termination is moot and, therefore, decline to address it. City of Jackson v
Thompson-McCully Co, LLC, 239 Mich App 482, 493; 608 NW2d 531 (2000).
Next, respondent argues that the family court erred in finding that subsections
19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) were both established. Having considered respondent’s various arguments
regarding the case service plan, the doctrine of anticipatory neglect, see In the Matter of LaFlure,
supra at 392, and the family court's findings, we are not persuaded that the family court clearly
erred in finding that § 19b(3)(g) was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR
5.974(I); In re Sours Minors, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999); In re Miller, 433 Mich
331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). See also In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582; 528 NW2d 799
(1995). While it is unclear from the family court's decision whether the court properly limited its
analysis of § 19b(3)(c)(i) to the conditions that led to adjudication, because only one statutory
ground for termination is required, In re Sours Minors, supra at 641, and because the court did
not err in finding that § 19b(3)(g) was established, it is unnecessary to determine whether
termination was proper under § 19b(3)(c)(i).
Finally, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent’s parental rights was
clearly not in the children’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5); In re
Trejo, 462 Mich 341; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). Therefore, the family court did not err in
terminating respondent’s parental rights to both children. Id.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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