THEODORE J NELSON V VILLAGE OF MILFORD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THEODORE J. NELSON and JEANNE NELSON,
UNPUBLISHED
April 20, 2001
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 220627
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-005148-NO
VILLAGE OF MILFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and Sawyer and F. L. Borchard*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from a circuit court order denying its motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). We reverse. This appeal is being
decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiffs’ complaint sought damages under a theory of trespass-nuisance. The alleged
nuisance was a broken tree limb dangling in a tree on the public right-of-way outside plaintiffs’
house. Plaintiffs asserted that defendant was responsible because it had control over the tree
and/or the property, it had notice of the broken limb, and failed to remove the limb in a timely
manner.
The trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Gibson
v Neelis, 227 Mich App 187, 189; 575 NW2d 313 (1997). When reviewing a motion decided
under MCR 2.116(C)(8), the Court accepts as true all factual allegations and any reasonable
inferences drawn from them in support of the claim. Summary disposition for failure to state a
claim should be upheld only when the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that no
factual development could establish the claim and thus justify recovery. Stott v Wayne Co, 224
Mich App 422, 426; 569 NW2d 633 (1997), aff’d 459 Mich 999 (1999).
A motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for a claim. In
ruling on such a motion, the trial court must consider not only the pleadings, but also depositions,
affidavits, admissions and other documentary evidence, MCR 2.116(G)(5), and must give the
benefit of any reasonable doubt to the nonmoving party, being liberal in finding a genuine issue
of material fact. Summary disposition is appropriate only if the opposing party fails to present
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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documentary evidence establishing the existence of a material factual dispute. Smith v Globe
Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999).
At present, Michigan recognizes “a limited trespass-nuisance exception to governmental
immunity.” Continental Paper & Supply Co, Inc v Detroit, 451 Mich 162, 164; 545 NW2d 657
(1996). A trespass-nuisance is a “trespass or interference with the use or enjoyment of land
caused by a physical intrusion that is set in motion by the government or its agents and result[s]
in personal or property damage.” The elements of trespass nuisance are “condition (nuisance or
trespass); cause (physical intrusion); and causation or control (by government).” Hadfield v
Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich 139, 169; 422 NW2d 205 (1988) (Brickley, J.). Accord
Peterman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 446 Mich 177, 205; 521 NW2d 499 (1994). Absent
proof that the defendant physically invaded the plaintiff’s property by adding something to it, or
allowed something from its own property to invade that of the plaintiff, there is no trespass. Id.
at 205-207.
It is not disputed that defendant did not cause or create the nuisance or set it in motion.
The plaintiffs admit that the storm caused the nuisance. While plaintiffs contend that defendant
had control over the tree, the control element pertains to control over the intrusion itself or the
property whence it came. Continental, supra at 164; Peterman, supra at 205. There has been no
showing that defendant owned the tree or caused it to be placed on the property. Plaintiffs also
contend that defendant had control over the property itself. Control may be found where the
defendant owns the property where the nuisance arose or had absolute control over the property.
Continental, supra at 165-166. Defendant contends that plaintiffs own the property and plaintiffs
do not dispute that. They contend that defendant’s easement rights over the property were
sufficient to establish control. However, the Continental Court made clear that the owner of the
land must “turn[ ] over the entire charge of the land” to the defendant, such that the defendant has
control of the property “to the exclusion of all others” in order for the defendant “to be liable
under a theory of trespass-nuisance for property it does not own or possess.” Id. at 166, 168.
Plaintiffs did not allege, nor have they presented any proofs to show, that defendant had that
element of control over the property. Therefore, we find that the trial court erred in denying
defendant’s motion for summary disposition.
Reversed.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Fred L. Borchard
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