PEOPLE OF MI V DARRELL SIMPSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 20, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
DARRELL SIMPSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
No. 185484
Kent Circuit Court
LC No.
94-0205-FC
ON SECOND REMAND
Before: Saad, P.J., and Neff and Sawyer, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Our Supreme Court remanded this case for a second time for reconsideration in light of People v Sabin, 463
Mich 43; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). We now affirm.
1
On original submission, we affirmed defendant’s second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC II)
2
conviction, but reversed his first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I) conviction and remanded for a new trial,
concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting other acts evidence of sexual contact by defendant.
People v Simpson, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 18, 1997 (Docket No.
185484) (Simpson I). Our Supreme Court reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of People v Starr, 457
Mich 490; 577 NW2d 673 (1998) and People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376; 582 NW2d 785 (1998), in which the Court
clarified and explained its holding in People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445
Mich 1205 (1994). After considering those decisions, we reversed defendant’s CSC II conviction and remanded for
a new trial. People v Simpson, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued August 6, 1999
(Docket No. 185484) (Simpson II). In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court again remanded this case
for reconsideration following its decision in Sabin, supra. 463 Mich 925 (2000).
The facts and issues relevant to this appeal are set out in our previous opinion, Simpson II, supra. After
reconsidering this case in light of Sabin, supra, we hold that the trial court did not abuse it discretion in admitting the
other acts evidence as to both the CSC I and CSC II offenses. In so holding, we adopt the analysis set forth in the
3
dissent filed by Judge Markman in Simpson II, an analysis which we believe is in accord with the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Sabin, supra.
As Judge Markman concluded, the evidence was offered for a proper purpose, it was relevant to an issue of
fact of consequence at trial, it’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
and the trial court gave an appropriate limiting instruction. VanderVliet, supra, 444 Mich 74-75. We agree that the
evidence was, therefore, admissible to show modus operandi or a common plan, scheme or system of committing the
acts and did not constitute impermissible character to conduct or propensity evidence. While this is a close
1
MCL 750.520c(1)(b); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(b).
2
MCL 750.520b(1)(b); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(b).
3
Now Justice Markman.
evidentiary question in this case, reasonable minds could differ regarding whether the other acts evidence shared
enough common features to support an inference that the uncharged and charged acts showed a common scheme,
plan or system. Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in admitting the evidence under MRE 404(b). Sabin, supra, 463 Mich 67.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ David H. Sawyer
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