PEOPLE OF MI V DORAN RUSSELL COLLINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 16, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 219145
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 94-002712-FH
DORAN RUSSELL COLLINS, a/k/a DAVE
MINSER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Jansen and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of breaking and entering a building with intent to
commit larceny, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305, and possession of a burglar’s tools, MCL 750.116;
MSA 28.311. He was originally sentenced to twenty to forty years’ imprisonment as a fourth
habitual offender, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. In a prior appeal, this Court affirmed
defendant’s convictions for breaking and entering and possession of burglar’s tools, but reversed
his conviction for fourth habitual offender and remanded for resentencing for a conviction of
third habitual offender, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. People v Collins, unpublished opinion per
curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 6, 1998 (Docket No. 188080). On remand,
defendant was sentenced to a term of twelve to twenty years. Defendant appeals as of right,
raising several issues challenging his sentence. We affirm.
As a general rule, sentences are reviewed under the principle of proportionality to
determine whether they are proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the
offense and the offender. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). The
judicially created sentencing guidelines do not apply to habitual offender convictions. People v
Cervantes, 448 Mich 620, 625; 532 NW2d 831 (1995). Habitual offender sentences are,
therefore, reviewed to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 626-627.
In this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to a term of
twelve to twenty years as a third habitual offender. Defendant’s sentence is within the statutory
framework for his conviction, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. Defendant has a lengthy criminal
record and was on parole at the time of the offense. Although defendant had done well in the
prison environment, he had failed at previous attempts to rehabilitate him through probation, jail
terms, and parole. The trial court was clearly aware of defendant’s behavior while in prison, the
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prison warden’s letter on defendant’s behalf, and defendant’s military record. Indeed, the trial
court was convinced by these factors to impose a lower sentence than it might have otherwise.
The trial court was not required to sentence defendant in accord with either public policy
or the Department of Corrections’ institutional policies. Nor was the trial court required to
consider the statutory guidelines. The statutory guidelines apply to crimes committed on or after
January 1, 1999, MCL 769.34(1), (2); MSA 28.1097(3.4)(1), (2), and defendant’s crime was
committed on October 28, 1994. Because the statutory guidelines do not apply, they need not be
considered by either the trial court or this Court. People v Alexander, 234 Mich App 665, 679, n
3; 599 NW2d 749 (1999).
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the trial court improperly considered
defendant’s age. People v Fleming, 428 Mich 408, 423-424 n 17; 410 NW2d 266 (1987). Nor is
there any evidence of bias. The trial court’s recognition of the burglary’s effect on its victims
was not inappropriate. The protection of society is a legitimate sentencing concern. People v
Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 446; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
Defendant’s double jeopardy argument is not entirely clear. To the extent, however, that
defendant is arguing that his sentence for third habitual offender violates his constitutional
protections against double jeopardy, there is no merit to his claim. The habitual offender statute
does not violate a defendant’s right against double jeopardy. People v Anderson, 210 Mich App
295, 298; 532 NW2d 918 (1995). Further, to the extent that defendant is arguing that he is being
punished a second time for the underlying crimes, there likewise is no merit to his claim.
Because his original conviction and sentence were deemed invalid by this Court, resentencing is
not prohibited by double jeopardy concerns. People v Thenghkam, 240 Mich App 29, 69-70; 610
NW2d 571 (2000).
Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing its sentence,
defendant’s request for resentencing before a different judge is moot and need not be addressed.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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