IN RE KERSHAW MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KOLOREAN CHANNEL
KERSHAW, TANISHA LESHAY DANELLE
KERSHAW, ELIZABETH PATRIECE
KERSHAW, and KATRINA YEVETTE
KERSHAW, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 13, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 223759
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-368137
DELVINN LEMAR SILVER,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
TRACEY DIONNE KERSHAW, BYRON
CLEMENS, and LESTER ZEAK LARKINS,
Respondents.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Griffin and Collins, JJ.
BANDSTRA, C.J., (dissenting).
I would reverse the decision of the family court terminating respondent-appellant’s
parental rights and remand this matter for further proceedings to determine whether respondentappellant has been released from prison and whether, on the basis of that determination, his
parental rights should be terminated.
Respondent-appellant’s rights were terminated under subsections (c)(i), (g), (h) and (j) of
the statute. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), (h), (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g), (h), (j).
Subsections (c)(i), (g) and (h) require that petitioner show that conditions justifying termination
will not be rectified “within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” The record shows
that the family court relied, at least in part, upon respondent-appellant’s continuing imprisonment
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in determining that this statutory requirement was satisfied. However, petitioner did not contact
the Department of Corrections to find out when respondent-appellant was due to be released.
According to respondent-appellant’s attorney, his earliest possible release date was to be May,
2000, only some seven or eight months after the termination of parental rights hearing. On
appeal, petitioner-appellee’s attorney states that “upon information and belief, the AppellantFather has been released from prison.”
Thus, I conclude that there was no clear and convincing evidence that subsections (c)(i),
(g) or (h) of the statute were established. Further, there is simply no evidence whatsoever to
establish that the child would be harmed if she were returned to respondent-appellant’s home, as
required under subsection (j) of the statute.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
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