TAMARA HARMON V CITY OF DETROIT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TAMARA HARMON,
UNPUBLISHED
March 9, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
CITY OF DETROIT, MAYOR OF DETROIT,
GLORIA ROBINSON, ED RAGO, and GARY
DENT,
No. 217820
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-711880-NZ
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Talbot, P.J., and O'Connell and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this discrimination case brought under the Michigan Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et
seq.; MSA 3.548 (101) et seq., and the Michigan and United States Constitutions, we affirm in
part and reverse in part the summary dismissal of plaintiff’s claim under MCR 2.116(C)(7).
Plaintiff, at all times relevant to this lawsuit, worked for defendant City of Detroit in the
Community Economic Development Department (CEDD). In 1994, defendant mayor proposed
the merger of the CEDD with the city’s planning department. Plaintiff’s job was eliminated as
part of the merger of these departments. Thereafter, plaintiff was offered, and accepted under
protest, a lower ranking position within the merged department and a large reduction in pay. She
later filed a grievance under her rights in the civil service rules. Her grievance progressed
through the administrative process, and after an adverse decision by the civil service commission
(commission), plaintiff brought the grievance before the Wayne Circuit Court as an action for
superintending control.
While the superintending control action was pending, plaintiff filed the instant action in
Wayne Circuit Court alleging race, gender, and age discrimination and violation of the Michigan
and United States Constitutions. Both the superintending control action (superintending action)
and the instant action arose out of the elimination of plaintiff’s job, her subsequent demotion, and
defendants’ failure to promote plaintiff into certain positions within and without the department
for which she was allegedly qualified.
On October 16, 1997, defendant filed a brief in support of its motion for summary
disposition, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), alleging that there were no genuine issues of
-1-
material fact. In that brief, defendant raised the issue of plaintiff’s impermissible failure to join
claims, MCR 2.203(A)(1). Defendant requested that the judgment in the superintending action
merge the claims presented in plaintiff’s second law suit.1
On December 17, 1997, the superintending action was summarily disposed of in a lengthy
opinion where the judge took note of the parallel claim. The trial court judge in that case went
on to query whether the judgment would operate as a bar to recovery in the separate action,
which is the subject of this appeal. However, in granting defendant’s MCR 2.116(C)(10) motion,
the judge necessarily incorporated the commission’s findings of fact into his decision. The
commission had previously found that plaintiff’s demotion was proper, was in accordance with
the city’s civil service rules, and that there was no evidence that promotions were being made for
improper reasons.
On November 20, 1998, the trial judge in the instant case granted defendants’ motion for
summary disposition. In its ruling, the court indicated that plaintiff would be unable to prove the
essential facts of her discrimination claim, based on the December 17, 1997 order, and that
summary disposition was appropriate. The court further indicated that res judicata barred the
instant claim and would preclude any of plaintiff’s claims which arose after the December 17,
1997 ruling. Plaintiff now appeals the lower court’s decision.
We review de novo the application of a preclusion doctrine because it represents a
question of law. Pierson Sand & Gravel, Inc v Keeler Brass Co, 460 Mich 372, 379; 596 NW2d
153 (1999). Res judicata bars a subsequent action between the same parties when evidence or
facts vital to the action are identical to those that were essential in a prior action. Dart v Dart,
460 Mich 573, 586; 597 NW2d 82 (1999), reh den 461 Mich 1205; 602 NW2d 576 (1999), cert
den __ US __; 120 S Ct 1418; 146 L Ed 2d 311 (2000). Michigan follows a broad rule of res
judicata and bars not only claims actually litigated but also those arising from the same
transaction that reasonably diligent parties could have raised but did not. Id. at 586. The
doctrine requires that: (1) the prior action was decided on the merits; (2) the decree in the prior
action was a final decision; (3) the matter contested in the instant case was or could have been
resolved in the first; and (4) both actions involved the same parties or their privies. Kosiel v
Arrow Liquors Corp, 446 Mich 374, 379; 521 NW2d 531 (1994), on remand 211 Mich App 550;
536 NW2d 567 (1995), lv den 452 Mich 853; 549 NW2d 343 (1996); Baraga County v State Tax
Comm, 243 Mich App 452, 455; __ NW2d __ (2000).
1
Moreover, prior to defendant’s motion for summary judgment in the superintending action,
defendants notified plaintiff in the instant action of their intent to argue that plaintiff’s claims
needed to be merged. Defendants provided this notification on May 27, 1997, in their answer to
plaintiff’s complaint and affirmative defenses. Plaintiff cites Rogers v Colonial Federal Savings
& Loan Assoc of Grosse Pointe Woods, 405 Mich 607, 624; 275 NW2d 499 (1970) in her brief
for the proposition that the “purpose [of the GCR 203.1 waiver provision] is to encourage a
defendant to assert, by motion, an objection to plaintiff's non-joinder in the first suit when the
defect can be cured.” However, it is at least noteworthy that defendants presented their
affirmative defenses in the instant action prior to their motion for summary disposition and
before the trial court’s ruling in the superintending action. Thus, the defect could still have been
cured.
-2-
Plaintiff first contends that the defense of res judicata is unavailable to defendants in this
case because they did not object to plaintiff’s failure to join her claims in the superintending
action. Plaintiff argues that under MCR 2.203(A)(2)2, defendants were required to object to
plaintiff’s failure to join her claims in order to preserve the defense of res judicata in the later
suit. However, plaintiff’s argument is unsupported in the record.
In the brief in support of defendant’s motion for summary disposition in the
superintending action, dated October 16, 1997, defendant stated:
In addition, plaintiff has ingeniously filed a second lawsuit arising out of the
plaintiff’s demotion in which she alleges violations of the Elliott-Larsen Civil
Rights Act and the U.S. and Michigan Constitutions. Plaintiff’s second lawsuit
violates MCR 2.203(A)(1) as an impermissible failure to join claims. Therefore,
pursuant to MCR 2.203(A)(2) the judgment issued in the instant complaint shall
merge the claims presented in plaintiff’s second lawsuit.3
By its plain language, MCR 2.203(A)(2) allowed a defendant to raise the failure to join all claims
“in a pleading, by motion, or at a pretrial conference.” Moreover, defendants are not required to
actively seek to have a plaintiff’s claims joined under this rule. Rather, it is the plaintiff’s
responsibility to “join every claim that the pleader has against that opposing party” which arises
out of the same transaction or occurrence. MCR 2.203(A). A defendant’s obligation is simply to
object to the failure to join “in a pleading, by motion, or at a pretrial conference.” MCR
2.203(A)(2). Thus, we find that because defendant city adequately objected to plaintiff’s failure
to join her claims, defendants did not waive the defense of res judicata.
We are further convinced that res judicata properly applies to this case. Although
plaintiff contends that the same parties were not involved in both cases, we find that the
defendant city in the superintending case, the City of Detroit, was in privity with the named
parties in the instant action. Privity may be found where a relationship such as principal and
agent, master and servant, or indemnitor and indemnitee exists. Baraga County, supra, 243
Mich App at 456; Viele v DCMA, 167 Mich App 571, 580; 423 NW2d 270, mod 431 Mich 898
(1988). Defendant city, being the employer of all the named parties in this suit, has the same
2
MCR 2.203(A)(2) was eliminated from the court rules by an amendment which took effect on
June 1, 1999. The comments to the current rule indicate that part of the reason the rule was
modified was to “facilitate operation of the common law doctrine of res judicata….”
3
In a response to plaintiff’s complaint in the instant action, dated May 27, 1997, defendant’s
affirmative defenses stated:
Plaintiff’s claims are barred in whole or in part due to failure to join them in a
related civil matter.…Defendant’s hereby give notice that, should discovery
support them, Defendants intend to rely on such other Affirmative and Special
Defenses as may appear applicable including, but not limited to…that Plaintiff’s
claims are barred by the doctrine of…res judicata….
-3-
interests and relationship to plaintiff in the superintending action as defendants have in the
instant action. Thus, we conclude that privity exists.
Moreover, we believe that the December 17, 1997 order in the superintending action was
a final decision on the merits of plaintiff’s first claim. An order granting summary disposition
can operate to bar a subsequent claim on the ground of res judicata because summary disposition
operates as a judgment on the merits of a plaintiff’s claim. Capital Mortgage Corp v Coopers &
Lybrand, 142 Mich App 531, 536; 369 NW2d 922 (1985). The December 17, 1997 grant of
summary disposition to defendant city was therefore a final decision on the merits of plaintiff’s
superintending control claim.
We also conclude that plaintiff could have brought the instant claim when she brought her
claim for superintending control. This Court has stated that an action for superintending control
is not an appeal. Fort v Detroit, 146 Mich App 499, 503; 381 NW2d 754 (1985). Further, our
Supreme Court has noted that “[b]ecause the Legislature has not provided for appeal from
municipal civil service boards, review is by complaint for superintending control.” In re Payne,
444 Mich 679, 687; 514 NW2d 121 (1994) (citations omitted). Also in Payne, our Supreme
Court opined that “[d]ecisions of municipal civil service commissions are reviewed through
original actions for superintending control.” Id. The implication in the above cases supports our
conclusion that multiple claims could have been brought. Given that a superintending control
action is an original action commenced by filing a complaint, there is no impediment to joining
all of plaintiff’s claims in one complaint. Thus, plaintiff’s claims could have been brought in the
superintending action.
In finding that plaintiff’s claims could have been brought in the superintending action,
this Court notes that plaintiff did not have an opportunity to present claims arising after the
December 17, 1997 order. Res judicata does not serve as a bar to these subsequent claims. See
Pierson Sand & Gravel, supra, 460 Mich at 380. However, we conclude that plaintiff’s claims,
prior to the December 17, 1997 order, arose out of the same transaction and are therefore barred
by the doctrine of res judicata. Indeed, plaintiff does not contend that her discrimination claims,
which are based on the elimination of her job, her subsequent demotion, and the failure to
promote her, arise out of different occurrences than her civil service grievance. Rather, plaintiff
asserts that res judicata cannot apply to this case because the parties were not the same in both
cases and the defense was not preserved. As previously discussed, these arguments are without
merit and do not preclude the operation of res judicata in this case. Thus, we affirm the dismissal
of plaintiff’s claims arising before December 17, 1997 and remand the case for consideration of
plaintiff’s claims arising after that date.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.