LARRY ROCKIND V TWP OF WEST BLOOMFIELD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
LARRY ROCKIND,
UNPUBLISHED
March 2, 2001
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 214620
Michigan Tax Tribunal
LC No. 00-237228
TOWNSHIP OF WEST BLOOMFIELD,
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Whitbeck, P.J., and Murphy and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Larry Rockind appeals by right the Tax Tribunal’s finding that respondent
West Bloomfield Township properly reassessed the taxable value of Rockind’s property for the
1996, 1997, and 1998 tax years to include property that had been omitted from the property
record card. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
Rockind owned a single family residence, built in 1978 in West Bloomfield, classified as
residential property. The 1995 valuation record stated that the taxable value of the property was
$78,890 for the 1995 tax year and that the house contained 1,419 square feet. The Township’s
appraiser went to Rockind’s home in early May 8, 1995. Although no one was at the house, the
appraiser noticed discrepancies between the square feet listed on the Township’s assessment and
what he could observe while standing outside the house. In late May 1995, the appraiser returned
to Rockind’s home and, again, was not able to enter the house. This time the appraiser observed
the lower level interior finish, the increased square footage, less unfinished interior basement,
more finished interior, and air conditioning. These observations, including the conclusion that
the house now had 1,829 square feet of living area, were incorporated in the 1996 assessment.
Another Township appraiser inspected the house in 1997 from the outside and determined that
the house was not a “walk-out,” but was a “quad level.” The appraiser concluded that the house
had 2,704 square feet for purposes of the 1998 property taxes.
A referee in the small claims division of the Tax Tribunal heard Rockind’s petition
challenging these changes. The Tax Tribunal entered an opinion and judgment in favor of the
Township in late January 1998, holding that the property was correctly categorized as “omitted
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real property.” Rockind requested rehearing, which was granted. Nine days before the rehearing,
Rockind filed a motion for leave to employ a court reporter, which the Tax Tribunal denied.
The rehearing occurred in late June 1998, at which time Rockind argued that the
Township unlawfully increased the taxable value of his home greater than the inflationary factor
because the property was incorrectly classified as omitted property. He also claimed that any
omission in the original assessment was a clerical error not correctable under the relevant law.
The Township countered that it had lawfully increased the taxable value of the home beyond the
inflationary rate because there was omitted real property correctly applied as an addition to the
taxable formula.
In mid-September 1998, the Tax Tribunal vacated the January 1998 opinion and
judgment, recalculated the property’s taxable value, and entered an opinion and judgment in
favor of the Township. The Tax Tribunal found the Township’s classification of the property
complied with the statutory definition of “omitted real property,” MCL 211.34d(1)(b)(i); MSA
7.52(4)(1)(b)(i), because the property had not been included in previous assessments. However,
the Tax Tribunal found that the taxable values from the previous years were incorrect. The Tax
Tribunal calculated the taxable value for 1996 as $107,650, not $114,630, $110,660 for 1997, not
$123,830, and $113,640 for 1998, not $129,450.
II. The Motion For Leave To Employ A Court Reporter
A. Standard Of Review
Rockind argues that the Tax Tribunal abused its discretion in denying his motion for
leave to employ a court reporter. “In the absence of fraud, review of a decision by the Tax
Tribunal is limited to determining whether the tribunal erred in applying the law or adopted a
wrong principle; its factual findings are conclusive if supported by competent, material, and
substantial evidence on the whole record.”1
B. Analysis
Under Tax Tribunal Rule 205.1283(5), proceedings in front of the entire Tax Tribunal
must “be recorded either electronically or stenographically, or both, in the discretion of the
tribunal.” The small claims division, however, has its own rules of practice and procedure. Rule
205.1305(1) provides that a “formal transcript shall not be taken for any proceeding commenced
and completed in the small claims division.” Subsection (2) of this same rule states that an
“informal transcript of a small claims proceeding prepared from a recording device or by a
stenographer is not a record of the proceeding.” These rules appear to ensure the less formal
nature of the proceedings in the small claims division.
1
Michigan Bell Telephone Co v Dep't of Treasury, 445 Mich 470, 476; 518 NW2d 808 (1994),
citing Const 1963, art 6, § 28 and Continental Cablevision v Roseville, 430 Mich 727, 735; 425
NW2d 53 (1988).
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Despite these rules concerning the record developed in the small claims division, Rockind
moved for leave to employ a court reporter pursuant to Rule 205.1305(2) He argued that a
reporter was necessary because the issues involved in the case, including the proper way to
calculate taxable value for the relevant tax years, were important. The Tax Tribunal denied the
motion, noting that the Township did not concur in the motion, the Township would incur
additional expense if the motion were granted, and, because of the late time at which it was filed,
the Township lacked an adequate opportunity to respond to the motion. Similarly, the Tax
Tribunal commented that it lacked adequate time to consider the motion. The Tax Tribunal also
observed that Rockind had failed to distinguish his case from the many other cases that pass
through the small claims division without a reporter to make a record. The Tax Tribunal
concluded that
absent a sufficient statement of cause, the Tribunal finds the request to be contrary
to preserving the simple, informal, and inexpensive nature of the Small Claims
Division. Parties wishing to have their appeals heard, where those cases are of
such complexity (as Petitioner appears to characterize its case) that additional
resources are required, may proceed in the Entire Tribunal. If Petitioner had need
of greater resources necessitated by the complexity of its case, a timely motion for
transfer was permitted under TTR 315(1).
The ruling on this motion complies with the rules of practice and procedure that apply to
the small claims division. In fact, the rule Rockind cited as the basis for his motion prevents
formal transcripts for these informal proceedings. Nowhere in their plain language do these rules
grant the Tax Tribunal the discretion to permit a reporter in a small claims division proceeding.
Even if the rules did permit the Tax Tribunal discretion to permit a party to hire a reporter to
make a transcript of the proceedings, it did not abuse any such discretion. The Tax Tribunal
considered a number of proper factors in its ruling, including its findings that it would be
improvident to grant the motion without a response by the Township, it lacked sufficient time to
consider the issue, and Rockind had failed to articulate a special need for this service. We add
that, even on appeal, Rockind has failed to articulate a special need or legal basis to have a court
reporter in the hearing in the small claims division. Further, as the Tax Tribunal noted, if there
were a pressing need for a reporter in this case, Rockind could have moved to have the matter
transferred out of the small claims division. Thus, the Tax Tribunal did not commit a legal error
in denying the motion.
III. “Additions” and “Omitted Real Property”
A. Standard Of Review
Rockind argues that the Tax Tribunal erroneously construed the term “additions” as used
in Const, 1963, art 9, § 3, that MCL 211.34d; MSA 7.52(4) is unconstitutional because it
conflicts with this constitutional provision, and that the Tax Tribunal erred by construing the
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term “omitted real property” to include his already-assessed residence. Constitutional issues and
statutory construction present questions of law that we review de novo.2
B. Constitutional And Statutory Construction
In People v Antkoviak,3 this Court outlined the methodology it applies when construing a
constitutional provision:
When interpreting [a section of the Michigan Constitution], this Court's
primary duty is to ascertain the provision's purpose and intent. See White v Ann
Arbor, 406 Mich 554, 562; 281 NW2d 283 (1979). By intent, we mean the intent
of the people who adopted the constitutional provision at issue. Straus v
Governor, 459 Mich 526, 533; 592 NW2d 53 (1999). As a result, our
interpretation should reflect the meaning that the people themselves would apply.
Bolt v Lansing, 459 Mich 152, 160; 587 NW2d 264 (1998). The clearest way to
ascertain this meaning is to look at the text's “natural, common, and most obvious
meaning, strictly construed and limited to the objects fairly within its terms, as
gathered both from the section of which it forms a part and a general purview of
the whole context.” Clearwater Twp v Board of Supervisors of Kalkaska Co, 187
Mich 516, 525; 153 NW 824 (1915).
Courts prefer not to construe constitutional provisions in a way that leads to an absurd result.4
When possible, courts also prefer “to avoid an interpretation that creates a constitutional
invalidity.”5
The rules that apply when this Court construes a statute are well-known and similar to
these rules of constitutional interpretation:
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the purpose and intent
of the Legislature in enacting the provision. Barr v Mt Brighton, Inc, 215 Mich
App 512, 516; 546 NW2d 273 (1996). Statutory language should be construed
reasonably and the purpose of the statute should be kept in mind. Id., citing Grieb
v Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc, 155 Mich App 484, 486; 400 NW2d 653 (1986).
The first criterion in determining intent is the specific language of the statute.
Barr, supra at 516-517, citing House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441
Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d 539 (1993). If the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, judicial construction is neither required nor permitted and courts
2
Oakland Co Bd of Rd Comm’rs v Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass’n, 456 Mich
590, 610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998); Mahaffey v Attorney General, 222 Mich App 325, 334; 564
NW2d 104 (1997).
3
People v Antkoviak, 242 Mich App 424, 435-436; 619 NW2d 18 (2000).
4
Carman v Secretary of State, 384 Mich 443, 451, n 3; 185 NW2d 1 (1971).
5
House Speaker v Governor, 443 Mich 560, 585; 506 NW2d 190 (1993).
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must apply the statute as written. Barr, supra at 517, citing Turner v Auto Club
Ins Ass'n, 448 Mich 22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995).[6]
Nevertheless, “[s]tatutes should be construed so as to prevent absurd results, injustice, or
prejudice to the public interest.”7 Additionally, courts presume that statutes are constitutional
unless the contrary is obvious.8
C. Constitutional and Statutory Conflict
Following amendments to Const 1963, art 9, § 3 in 1994, known as Proposal A, this
constitutional provision now states:
The legislature shall provide for the uniform general ad valorem taxation
of real and tangible personal property not exempt by law except for taxes levied
for school operating purposes. The legislature shall provide for the determination
of true cash value of such property; the proportion of true cash value at which
such property shall be uniformly assessed, which shall not, after January 1, 1966,
exceed 50 percent; and for a system of equalization of assessments. For taxes
levied in 1995 and each year thereafter, the legislature shall provide that the
taxable value of each parcel of property adjusted for additions and losses, shall
not increase each year by more than the increase in the immediately preceding
year in the general price level, as defined in section 33 of this article, or 5
percent, whichever is less until ownership of the parcel of property is transferred.
When ownership of the parcel of property is transferred as defined by law, the
parcel shall be assessed at the applicable proportion of current true cash value.
The legislature may provide for alternative means of taxation of designated real
and tangible personal property in lieu of general ad valorem taxation. Every tax
other than the general ad valorem property tax shall be uniform upon the class or
classes on which it operates.
A law that increases the statutory limits in effect as of February 1, 1994 on
the maximum amount of ad valorem property taxes that may be levied for school
district operating purposes requires the approval of 3/4 of the members elected to
and serving in the senate and in the house of representatives.[9]
The Legislature then defined the word “additions,” as it appears in this constitutional provision,
in MCL 211.34d(1); MSA 7.52(4)(1), which provides in relevant part:
(a) For taxes levied before 1995, “additions” means all increases in value
caused by new construction or a physical addition of equipment or furnishings,
6
Kent v Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc, 240 Mich App 731, 736; 613 NW2d 383 (2000).
7
McAuley v General Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 282 (1998).
8
Lowe v Dep't of Corrections (On Rehearing), 206 Mich App 128, 137; 521 NW2d 336 (1994).
9
Emphasis added.
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and the value of property that was exempt from taxes or not included on the
assessment unit's immediately preceding year's assessment roll.
(b) For taxes levied after 1994, “additions” means, except as provided in
subdivision (c), all of the following:
(i) Omitted real property. As used in this subparagraph, “omitted real
property” means previously existing tangible real property not included in the
assessment. Omitted real property shall not increase taxable value as an addition
unless the assessing jurisdiction has a property record card or other documentation
showing that the omitted real property was not previously included in the
assessment. The assessing jurisdiction has the burden of proof in establishing
whether the omitted real property is included in the assessment. Omitted real
property for the current and the 2 immediately preceding years, discovered after
the assessment roll has been completed, shall be added to the tax roll pursuant to
the procedures established in section 154. For purposes of determining the taxable
value of real property under section 27a, the value of omitted real property is
based on the value and the ratio of taxable value to true cash value the omitted
real property would have had if the property had not been omitted.
Although Rockind claims that this definition of “additions” including “omitted real
property” is in conflict with Const 1963, art 9, § 3, the Township argues that Proposal A applies
to property that has been assessed fully. In other words, from the Township’s perspective, the
constitutional language limiting assessment increases that resulted from Proposal A only applies
once the property has been assessed in its entirety and a property that was assessed without
including the value of omitted real property cannot be considered assessed fully.
The Township’s reasoning is not only reasonable, the constitutional language and the
rules of constitutional construction support this interpretation. Before the voters adopted
Proposal A, the Legislature had already defined the word “additions” in the same manner as it is
currently defined in MCL 211.34d(1)(a); MSA 7.52(4)(1)(a). Consequently, the drafters must
have known10 that the Legislature had taken on the responsibility of defining this term of art11 as
it applied to tax valuations. Without attempting to define this word in the constitution itself, the
drafters and voters intended to permit the Legislature to continue to define the word “additions,”
a conclusion this Court reached recently in WPW Acquisition Co v City of Troy.12 In fact, the
10
We must presume that the individuals who drafted the provision at issue did so in light of
existing laws. Bingo Coalition v Bd of State Canvassers, 215 Mich App 405, 412; 546 NW2d
637 (1996).
11
Rockind claims that the word “additions” is a common word. However, taxation is a
specialized area of the law that lends itself to using terms of art and we infer from the fact that
the Legislature took the initiative to define this word in a statute before Proposal A that
“additions” in this context is a term of art. Thus, we attempt to ascertain and apply its
specialized meaning to carry out the intent of the people who adopted Proposal A. Straus, supra.
12
WPW Acquisition Co v City of Troy, 243 Mich App 260, 267; ___ NW2d ___ (2000).
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second sentence of this constitutional provision expressly charges the Legislature with the duty to
make laws “for the determination of true cash value of [real and personal] . . . property . . . .” In
other words, the Legislature had to adopt a meaning for the word “additions” so that the taxes
levied after 1994 could rely on equalized assessments. We see no statute-constitution conflict in
the Legislature’s decision to discharge its duty and create this definition.
Further, because the constitutional provision refers to the Legislature establishing the
taxable value of land “adjusted for additions and losses” in the same sentence discussing a cap on
taxation, we infer that the voters did not consider an assessment that excluded factors relevant to
valuation as the property value subject to the cap. The Legislature acted in accordance with this
constitutional mandate by amending MCL 211.34d(1); MSA 7.52(4)(1) to include subsection (b),
which accounts for factors that contribute to property value that, by definition, were not included
in an assessment. By applying the taxation cap to property values that had been adjusted, this
constitutional provision furthers a taxation system that relies on equalized property value
assessments. To interpret Const 1963, art 9, § 3, to mean that taxes could be assessed based on
incomplete or erroneously information concerning property value would be an absurd result in
light of this plain meaning, and so we must avoid it.13 Thus, the term “additions” found in MCL
211.24d(1)(b)(i); MSA 7.52(4)(1)(b)(i) does not conflict with Const 1963, art 9, § 3, because it
complies with the constitutional limit on taxation for property that has been assessed fully rather
than, as here, property that was only partially assessed.
D. New Construction
Petitioner next asserts that even if the term “additions,” as defined by MCL 211.34d(1);
MSA 7.52(4)(1), is constitutional, the Legislature could not place “omitted real property” under
this category in subsection (b)(i) because the only types of property intended to be classified as
“additions” under Proposal A were new construction and new improvements to property made
after it had been assessed. While new construction and new improvements have been considered
“additions” before and after Proposal A was adopted, we find no evidence in the language of the
constitution to support this argument that the Legislature acted outside its authority by giving
“additions” a comprehensive, albeit expanded, meaning.14 Again, the adjustment language in
Const 1963, art 9, § 3, creates a taxation cap for property that has been assessed in its entirety.
Property value that is determined without the benefit of considering omitted real property does
not lead to this sort of full and accurate assessment. To permit some property owners to benefit
from an incomplete property assessment until the property is transferred would lead to unequal
and unfair real property taxation, not the equalized system of assessments envisioned by the
constitution. The Legislature discharged is constitutional duty to govern this area by defining the
word “additions.” Rockind has failed to present an argument that would overcome our
presumption that this statute is constitutional.15
13
Carman, supra at 451, n 3.
14
WPW Acquisition Co, supra at 267-268.
15
Mahaffey, supra at 344.
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IV. Factual Support For The Tax Tribunal’s Decision
A. Standard Of Review
Rockind argues that the Tax Tribunal committed an error of law because its findings of
fact were not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record when the
Tribunal construed “omitted property” to include previously assessed property. The factual
findings of the Tax Tribunal are final, provided they are supported by competent, material, and
substantial evidence.16
B. Competent, Material And Substantial Evidence
The Tax Tribunal applies its expertise to the facts of each case when determining the
appropriate method of arriving at the cash value, or fair market value, of the property at issue.17
In order for this evidence to reach the constitutional18 threshold for sufficiency, the evidence
must be that “which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. While
it consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence it may be substantially less than a
preponderance of the evidence.”19
C. The Evidence
Here, the original living space assessment for Rockind’s home in the 1995 tax year was
approximately 1,419 square feet. The appraiser conducted an exterior inspection of the residence
and found an additional 410 square feet of living area, plus air conditioning, neither of which had
been previously recorded or taxed. These revisions were noted in the 1996 valuation record,
which stated that the house had 1,829 feet of living space. Another appraiser inspected the
property in 1997 and found that an additional 875 square feet of living area should be added to
the assessment. Consequently, the valuation for the living area for 1998 was 2,704 square feet.
This was substantial evidence from which the Tax Tribunal could find that the square footage
had been omitted from the previous assessment of 1,419 square feet. Thus, the Tax Tribunal
correctly classified the additional square footage, which had been excluded from previous
assessments, as “omitted property.”
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
16
See Michigan Bell Telephone Co, supra.
17
See Antisdale v City of Galesburg, 420 Mich 265, 277; 362 NW2d 632 (1984).
18
Const 1963, art 6, § 28.
19
Russo v Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 119 Mich App 624, 631; 326 NW2d 583 (1982).
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