DELENER S MCCAMEY V DETROIT BD OF EDUC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DELENER S. McCAMEY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 2, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 216340
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 93-328176-NO
DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Jansen and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from the entry of a default judgment in favor of plaintiff in
the amount of $1,090,862.64. We affirm.
A default was initially entered by the trial court for plaintiff on November 1, 1995, with
judgment being entered in the amount of $80,000, and defendant appealed the entry of default to
this Court. Defendant argued at that time that the entry of the default had violated its right to due
process, that the Open Meetings Act, MCL 15.261 et seq.; MSA 4.1800(11) et seq., had excused
its violation of the trial court’s order requiring attendance of its members at a settlement
conference that led to the entry of default, and that the trial court improperly tried to pressure it
into settling the case. This Court, however, ruled that the trial court did not err in entering the
default, but that defendant willfully defied the trial court’s order based on its own
misinterpretation of the Open Meetings Act. McCamey v Detroit Bd of Educ, unpublished
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued April 22, 1997 (Docket No. 191671).
This Court did agree with defendant, however, that it should have been permitted to
present evidence regarding the actual amount of damages before a damage figure was determined
by the trial court. The case was remanded to the trial court for proceedings limited to a
determination of the amount of damages. The trial court received written submissions from the
parties and conducted an evidentiary hearing at which plaintiff was the only witness. Evidence
was presented regarding the amount of plaintiff’s lost income as a result of defendant’s failure to
promote her due to discrimination, her lost pension benefits, and her mental and emotional
damages. Defendant presented no evidence at the hearing, although it did present legal
arguments, contending that it was speculative to award front pay on the basis of plaintiff’s failure
to obtain a promotion, contending that plaintiff might obtain one in the future, and that plaintiff’s
evidence regarding mental and emotional damages, in the absence of tangible physical harm, was
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also speculative. It also argued that because plaintiff would have worked more weeks of the year
if she had been promoted to an administrative position than she was working as a classroom
teacher, any award of front pay should be discounted by the ratio of the length of the respective
work years.
The trial court awarded back pay and front pay and lost pension benefits, based on the
difference in what plaintiff was earning and what she would have earned if promoted had
defendant not discriminated against her. The trial court awarded mental and emotional damages
in a much smaller figure than plaintiff asked (one-sixth of the amount she sought) and it denied
damages for physical suffering. It also denied plaintiff’s request for attorney fees, but awarded
interest and mediation sanctions. The award was reduced to present value.
Defendant again appeals, raising the same arguments rejected in the previous appeal
regarding why the entry of default was improper, and presenting the arguments raised in the trial
court regarding why damages awarded were excessive.
Defendant’s arguments regarding the entry of default as being improper are precluded by
the law of the case doctrine. Kalamazoo v Dep’t of Corrections (After Remand), 229 Mich App
132, 135-136; 580 NW2d 475 (1998). Defendant states correctly that the law of the case
doctrine does not limit our power, but is a discretionary rule of practice. Id. We are not,
however, prepared to depart from that doctrine here, because we believe the matters were
correctly resolved in the prior appeal for the reasons stated in the prior opinion. Defendant
presents no new authority that inclines us to reconsider that decision.
Further, we find that the trial court’s damage award was proper. An award of front pay
based on the difference between what one is earning and what one would be earning but for
discrimination, reduced to present value, is proper. Goins v Ford Motor Co, 131 Mich App 185,
199; 347 NW2d 184 (1983).1 Far from being based on a speculative assumption that plaintiff
will receive no further promotions, this award is simply based on the facts as they stand at
present.
Nor was it improper to award mental and emotional damages, even in the absence of
physical harm. “It is well established that victims of discrimination may recover for humiliation,
embarrassment, outrage, disappointment and other forms of mental anguish which flow from the
discrimination.” Jenkins v Southeastern Michigan Chapter, American Red Cross, 141 Mich App
785, 799; 369 NW2d 223 (1985), accord Phillips v Butterball Farms Co, Inc (After Second
Remand), 448 Mich 239, 249-253; 531 NW2d 144 (1995).
The trial court carefully computed all the damages. It conducted an evidentiary hearing,
asked probing questions to ensure that all relevant issues were adequately addressed, and
excluded irrelevant matters. The amount the trial court awarded for mental and emotional
damages was far less than plaintiff asked, and plaintiff’s request for attorney fees was denied, so
1
We note that although the validity of Goins was questioned for a time, that question has been
resolved in favor of the continuing validity of the case. Dunbar v Dep’t of Mental Health, 197
Mich App 1, 10; 495 NW2d 152 (1992).
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it is clear that the trial court exercised independent judgment, and did not simply give plaintiff
what she asked. Defendant failed to present contrary evidence of its own on which the trial court
could have based a lower damage award. The trial court properly considered the evidence before
it, and based on that evidence, made a legally correct determination of damages. There was no
error.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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