PEOPLE OF MI V DARRYL L HOWARD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 30, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214122
Wayne Circuit Court
LC Nos. 97-004716;
97-004718
DARRYL L. HOWARD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and White and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
The People charged defendant with two drug offenses in two separate cases and the trial
court consolidated the cases for trial before a single jury. In lower court number 97-004716, the
jury convicted defendant of possession of 650 or more grams of a mixture containing cocaine.
MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(i), and in lower court number 97-004718, the
jury convicted defendant of possession of more than twenty-five, but less than fifty, grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(iv). The court sentenced defendant to
a term of life imprisonment for the former conviction, and one to four years’ imprisonment for
the latter conviction, the sentences to be served consecutively. Defendant appeals as of right and
we affirm.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly urged the jury to consider as substantive
evidence testimony that was admissible only for impeachment purposes. Defendant failed to
object to the challenged testimony at trial, or to the prosecutor’s remarks concerning that
testimony during closing arguments. Because this issue was not preserved with an appropriate
objection, appellate relief is precluded absent a showing of plain error affecting defendant’s
substantial rights, i.e., a clear or obvious error that affected the outcome of the trial. People v
Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761-767; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Initially, because defendant did not object to the testimony at trial, it was not improper for
the prosecutor to argue the substantive use of that evidence in closing arguments. People v
Maciejewski, 68 Mich App 1, 3-4; 241 NW2d 736 (1976).
Defendant also says that, in lower court number 97-004716, the evidence was insufficient
to prove that he possessed the cocaine. Accordingly, we must decide whether the prosecutor
presented sufficient evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding the defendant guilty
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beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 513; 489 NW2d 748 (1992),
amended on other grounds 441 Mich 1201 (1992). The evidence must be reviewed in a light
most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 514-515.
To prove possession, proof of actual physical possession is unnecessary for a conviction.
Rather, constructive possession is sufficient. People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 271; 536 NW2d
517 (1995). "The essential question is whether the defendant had dominion or control over the
controlled substance." Id. "[C]onstructive possession exists when the totality of the
circumstances indicates a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the contraband." Wolfe,
supra at 521. However, the mere presence of the defendant at a location where drugs are found
is insufficient to establish constructive possession. Id. at 520. Circumstantial evidence and
reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence can be sufficient to establish possession. People
v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 515; 583 NW2d 199 (1998).
Here, the cocaine in question was found in a basement bedroom of a house on Lindsay
Street and there was sufficient circumstantial evidence linking defendant to that bedroom to
enable the jury to find that defendant was in constructive possession of the cocaine. See People v
Echavarria, 233 Mich App 356, 370-371; 592 NW2d 737 (1999); Fetterley, supra at 515-517.
Also, defendant alleges that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on aiding and
abetting. Because defendant did not object to the court’s aiding and abetting instruction at trial,
this issue is not preserved. MCR 2.516(C); People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 649; 601
NW2d 409 (1999). Regardless, a review of the record indicates that no error occurred. A court
may instruct on aiding and abetting when there is evidence that "(1) more than one person was
involved in committing a crime, and (2) the defendant's role in the crime may have been less than
direct participation in the wrongdoing." People v Bartlett, 231 Mich App 139, 157; 585 NW2d
341 (1998). The identity of the principal is not required to convict under an aiding and abetting
theory, so long as the guilt of the principal is shown. People v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604, 611;
493 NW2d 471 (1992). Because the facts demonstrate that more than one person was involved
in the possession, sale, and distribution of narcotics, the court properly instructed the jury on
aiding and abetting. Bartlett, supra at 157-158; People v Head, 211 Mich App 205, 211-212;
535 NW2d 563 (1995).
Defendant failed to object to the trial court’s admission of evidence of other bad acts or
crimes and, therefore, we review this issue to determine whether there is plain error affecting
defendant's substantial rights. Carines, supra. The evidence of defendant's drug-dealing
activities was properly admitted as part of the res gestae of the charged crimes, the evidence was
relevant to the issue of defendant’s intent, and the probative value of the evidence was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 740742; 556 NW2d 851 (1996); People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 5; 532 NW2d 885 (1995).
Therefore, no plain error is apparent from the admission of this evidence. Further, the record
does not support defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly suggested that defendant was
somehow involved in his brother's death.
Further, defendant claims that the prosecution violated his double jeopardy rights, US
Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15, by charging him with two separate crimes instead of a
single crime involving possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine. We disagree.
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The prosecutor was entitled to charge and try defendant for each act that constituted a
separate crime. People v Harding, 443 Mich 693, 714; 506 NW2d 482 (1993). Where two
crimes are legally distinguishable on the basis of the facts relied upon for each, there is no double
jeopardy violation. People v Wynn, 197 Mich App 509, 510; 496 NW2d 799 (1992). The intent
behind MCL 333.7403; MSA 14.14(7403) is to punish the illegal possession of controlled
substances. See People v Green, 196 Mich App 593, 595-596; 493 NW2d 478 (1992) (noting
that § 7403 was intended to punish based upon two separate factors: (1) the amount of a
controlled substance possessed; and (2) the type of controlled substance possessed). Where the
facts show that the quantities of drugs are separately possessed, separate offenses are shown.
Thus, in People v Bartlett, 197 Mich App 15, 17-18; 494 NW2d 776 (1992), this Court held that
the double jeopardy protection against multiple punishments did not bar two convictions under
§ 7401 where the facts showed that two different deliveries were separately bargained and paid
for, and both transactions occurred at different times. The Court concluded that each delivery
constituted a separate offense. Id. at 18. See also People v Hadley, 199 Mich App 96, 103-104;
501 NW2d 219 (1993), aff'd 450 Mich 316 (1995).
Here, the facts reveal that defendant possessed separate quantities of cocaine at two
separate locations. Under these circumstances, defendant was properly convicted of two separate
possession offenses.
Additionally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on
his alibi defense. We disagree. An alibi defense consists of testimony that places the defendant
somewhere other than the scene of the crime. People v McGinnis, 402 Mich 343, 345; 262
NW2d 669 (1978). Thus, if the facts show that the defendant's presence was required at the time
the crime occurred and the alibi defense is raised, the court must instruct on the defense. People
v Matthews, 163 Mich App 244, 247-248; 413 NW2d 755 (1987). However, here, defendant's
presence at the location where the drugs were found is not necessary to prove the elements of the
offense. Because defendant’s presence is not required, the defense of alibi was inapplicable and
the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on that defense. People v Lemons, 454 Mich 234,
250; 562 NW2d 447 (1997). For these reasons, we also conclude that defense counsel was not
ineffective for declining an alibi instruction. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 338; 521 NW2d
797 (1994).
Defendant further avers that the prosecutor made improper remarks during his closing
and rebuttal arguments. However, because defendant did not object to the challenged remarks at
trial, this issue is not preserved. Further, defendant has not demonstrated that the remarks
amounted to plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra. The prosecutor did not
improperly shift the burden of proof through his arguments on rebuttal, inasmuch as the
challenged remarks were responsive to defense counsel’s closing remarks. People v Kennebrew,
220 Mich App 601, 608; 560 NW2d 354 (1996). Further, any error arising from the prosecutor’s
conduct of holding up a search warrant for the jury to observe and remarking that the warrant
existed, even though the warrant itself was never admitted into evidence, does not merit reversal
because there was substantial evidence that a warrant was legitimately issued.
The record does not support defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly injected his
personal opinion, nor did the prosecutor improperly vouch for the credibility of his witnesses.
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People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 722; 613 NW2d 370 (2000). Finally, the prosecutor was
free to argue to the jury that defendant was not worthy of belief. People v Launsburry, 217 Mich
App 358, 361; 551 NW2d 460 (1996).
Also, defendant has not established plain error arising from the court's rereading to the
jury of the instructions on aiding and abetting. Cooper, supra. Defendant does not sufficiently
explain how the instruction was unbalanced. Furthermore, the court reminded the jury in those
instructions that the burden of proof was on the prosecution. In addition, this Court has held that
"[i]t is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to fail to repeat instructions addressing areas not
covered by a jury's specific request." People v Parker, 230 Mich App 677, 681; 584 NW2d 753
(1998). Here, the court limited its instructions to only aiding and abetting because that was what
the jury asked to hear.
Defendant also argues that he was improperly convicted in L Ct. No. 97-004718, because
the information did not properly reflect the charge upon which he was convicted. However,
where defendant was convicted of a necessarily lesser included offense, he was not prejudiced by
the failure to specifically set forth that offense in the information. People v Torres (On Remand),
222 Mich App 411, 416-417, 421-422; 564 NW2d 149 (1997); People v Gridiron, 185 Mich App
395, 400-401; 460 NW2d 908 (1990), conviction vacated on rehearing on other grounds 190
Mich App 366 (1991), modified in part on other grounds 439 Mich 880 (1991). See also MCL
768.32(2); MSA 28.1055(2).
To the extent defendant argues that the charge set forth in the information varied from the
charge at the time of trial, we find that defendant was not prejudiced by the amendment. MCR
6.112(G); People v Weathersby, 204 Mich App 98, 103-104; 514 NW2d 493 (1994); MCL
767.76; MSA 28.1016. At the time of the preliminary examination, defense counsel
acknowledged that the charge had been changed from one alleging delivery to one alleging
possession with intent to deliver. Thus, defendant had proper notice of the charge against him in
lower court number 97-004718.
Further, defendant claims that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel
because counsel failed to address the foregoing errors. To warrant reversal due to ineffective
assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, and that the representation so prejudiced him that he was denied his
right to a fair trial. Pickens, supra at 338. Defendant must overcome the presumption that the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. People v Tommolino, 187 Mich App
14, 17; 466 NW2d 315 (1991). To establish prejudice, defendant must show that there was a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. People v Johnnie Johnson, Jr, 451 Mich 115, 124; 545 NW2d 637 (1996). The burden
is on the defendant to produce factual support for his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999).
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While counsel may have erred in not properly preserving many of the foregoing issues,
after reviewing the merits, we are satisfied that defendant has not identified any err that affected
the result of the proceedings.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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