IN RE KRYSTA ROSE LAKE MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of KRYSTA ROSE LAKE, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 26, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 225770
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 98-370442
JENNIFER LAKE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
LYONELL JOHNSON,
Respondent,
and
DUNNIE BOOTH,
Respondent-Nonparty.
Before: Hoekstra, PJ, and Whitbeck and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals by right from the family court order terminating her
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA
27A.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.
Respondent argues that the order terminating her parental rights should be reversed
because the trial court violated the time restrictions in MCR 5.973(A)(2) and (B)(2) and MCL
712A.19(3); MSA 27.3178(598.19)(3). Although the trial court did not strictly adhere to these
time restrictions, these provisions do not provide any sanction and violation of them does not
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require reversal. See In re Kirkwood, 187 Mich App 542, 545-546; 468 NW2d 280 (1991).
Further, respondent can show no prejudice where her circumstances did not change throughout
the entire process that resulted in the termination of her parental rights. Rather than prejudice
respondent, the delay afforded her an opportunity to improve her compliance with the court’s
orders and thus benefited her. In re Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 28; 501 NW2d 182 (1993).
Furthermore, respondent was provided a full hearing and an opportunity to be heard before the
termination of her parental rights, and thus her due process rights were not violated. Kirkwood,
supra.
Respondent next argues that the trial court erred in admitting and relying on evidence that
respondent had been a permanent ward of a probate court because her parents’ parental rights
were terminated. Regardless of the admissibility of the evidence, respondent cannot show
prejudice. A review of the record demonstrates that aside from this evidence, clear and
convincing evidence existed in the record to terminate respondent’s parental rights under MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA 27A.3178(598.19b)(3)(b)(ii), (c)(i), (g) and (j), and
thus the error, if any, was harmless. MCR 2.613.
Finally, respondent argues that the trial court erred in failing to make any “best interests”
findings. This argument is without merit because the trial court found that termination was in the
best interests of the child and the record revealed sufficient factual findings to support this
conclusion. In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 354-356, 364-365; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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