PEOPLE OF MI V MARTINEZ WADE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 26, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217122
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 98-001307
MARTINEZ E. WADE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of involuntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321; MSA
28.553, receiving or concealing stolen property over $100, MCL 750.535; MSA 28.803, and
leaving the scene of a serious accident, MCL 257.617; MSA 9.2317. He was sentenced as a third
habitual offender, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083, to a term of ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
He appeals as of right. We affirm.
On December 13, 1996, while driving a stolen Chevrolet Camaro, defendant was stopped
by police officers for running a red light. When the officers approached his vehicle, defendant
sped off at a high rate of speed and almost immediately struck another vehicle, resulting in the
death of the other driver. Defendant fled from the scene of the accident and eluded the police
until June 3, 1997, when he again tried to flee but was apprehended and arrested.
Defendant claims that he was denied his right to a fair trial by the prosecution’s
introduction of irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial evidence and improper arguments. Because
defendant failed to timely and specifically object to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial,
appellate review is precluded unless a curative instruction could not have eliminated the
prejudice or the failure to consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v
Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 638; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
Defendant alleges several instances of prosecutorial misconduct, including (1)
introducing evidence that prosecution witness Jason Franklin1 was shot shortly after defendant’s
1
Franklin was a passenger in the stolen Camaro and identified defendant as the driver of the
vehicle at the time of the fatal accident.
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arrest, (2) presenting evidence that defendant attempted to flee from the police and arguing that
defendant’s flight implied guilt, (3) injecting evidence that defendant had a criminal history
through testimony regarding defendant’s “mug shot,” and (4) eliciting testimony that blood found
in the Camaro was Franklin’s blood. Defendant also argues that the cumulative effect of the
misconduct denied him a fair trial.
The test for prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal of the conviction is whether
defendant was denied his right to a fair and impartial trial. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App
336, 342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995). We examine the pertinent portions of the record and evaluate
the alleged misconduct in context. People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 721; 613 NW2d 370
(2000). A defendant may be denied his right to a fair trial when the prosecution interjects issues
broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App
429, 438; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
Here, we find no errors that resulted in manifest injustice or that could not have been
corrected by a curative instruction. The prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by introducing
evidence that defendant shot a key prosecution witness prior to trial because it was probative of
defendant’s consciousness of guilt. See People v Sholl, 453 Mich 730, 740; 556 NW2d 851
(1996) (a defendant’s threat against a witness is admissible as conduct demonstrating
consciousness of guilt). Further, the evidence regarding Franklin’s shooting was necessary to
respond to arguments of defense counsel implying that Franklin had something to gain by
naming defendant as the Camaro’s driver. Schutte, supra at 721. Likewise, the prosecutor’s
argument that defendant would benefit from Franklin’s disappearance was not improper.
Although the prosecutor could not make statements of fact that were unsupported by the
evidence, the prosecutor was free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from
it. Id.
Similarly, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by presenting evidence of
defendant’s flight from the police, both at the scene of the fatal accident and six months later at
his arrest. Evidence of flight is generally admissible to show consciousness of guilt. People v
Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 4; 532 NW2d 885 (1995).
Further, defendant was not denied a fair trial by references to a mug shot. We have held
that admission of a mug shot was not prejudicial where the photograph was edited to prevent
inference of a prior conviction. People v Heller, 47 Mich App 408, 411; 209 NW2d 439 (1973).
Here, there was a reference during a police officer’s testimony to a mug shot of defendant,
however, there was no evidence introduced that defendant had prior convictions. Further,
defendant invited the challenged testimony by repeatedly questioning the police officer’s ability
to recognize the defendant, knowing that the identification was made through use of a mug shot.
People v Embry, 68 Mich App 667, 670-671; 243 NW2d 711 (1976).
Contrary to defendant’s last assertion of misconduct, the prosecutor did not vouch for
defendant’s guilt by eliciting a police officer’s testimony that he “believed” that the blood found
in the Camaro came from Franklin. The prosecutor merely asked the officer to explain why he
did not have DNA tests performed to see if the blood found in the Camaro belonged to Franklin
and why he waited until over a year after the fatal accident to have any DNA testing performed
on the blood samples. The prosecutor’s questioning and the officer’s testimony in this regard
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were responsive to issues raised by defense counsel and did not constitute misconduct. Schutte,
supra at 721. Moreover, the officer was entitled to state his opinion that the blood was
Franklin’s where that opinion was rationally based upon his observations and investigation, and
his opinion was helpful in explaining his actions. MRE 701; People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47,
57; 523 NW2d 830 (1994).
Defendant also claims that the cumulative prejudicial effect of misconduct by the
prosecutor denied him a fair trial. Because we find no misconduct by the prosecutor, there can
be no cumulative effect warranting a new trial in this case. People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App
112, 128; 600 NW2d 370 (1999).
Defendant’s final claim, that his trial counsel was ineffective, is also without merit.
When claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel, defendant has the burden of showing that
his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. People v Hoag, 460 Mich 1, 5-6; 594 NW2d 57 (1999). Here, defendant
claims that his counsel was ineffective by failing to object to the alleged prosecutorial
misconduct. However, because there was no misconduct by the prosecutor, counsel’s failure to
object was not objectively unreasonable.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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