DR CHARLES HANDLEY V JOSEPH SEXTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DR. CHARLES HANDLEY, d/b/a DR.
HANDLEY AND ASSOCIATES,
UNPUBLISHED
January 26, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 216156
Lapeer Circuit Court
LC No. 96-023500-CK
JOSEPH SEXTON and SHERRY SEXTON,
Defendants-Counter-Plaintiffs/
Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
AMERISURE COMPANY and HRM CLAIM
MANAGEMENT,
Third-Party Defendants.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Doctoroff and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case involves a billing dispute between plaintiff, a chiropractor, and defendants, the
patients. Plaintiff sued defendants for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit
for unpaid chiropractic services performed on defendants’ minor son after a car accident.
Defendants countersued, alleging fraud, abuse of process, and violation of the Michigan
Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), MCL 445.901; MSA 19.418(1).1 Following a bench trial,
the trial court found no cause of action on plaintiff’s claims. The trial court also found no cause
1
Defendants also filed a third-party complaint against Amerisure Company, their no-fault
automobile insurance carrier, and HRM Claim Management, Inc., Joseph Sexton’s medical
insurer, for indemnification of payments to plaintiff for services rendered. The trial court
subsequently granted HRM’s and Amerisure’s motions for summary disposition on the basis that
the patient’s last treatment was in September 1994, no request for benefits was filed by
defendants until 1996, and the explanation of benefits stated that no lawsuits can be brought to
cover benefits more than one year from the date of proof of claim. Defendants have not appealed
the trial court’s ruling and Amerisure and HRM are not parties to this appeal.
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of action on defendants’ fraud and abuse of process counterclaims, but awarded a judgment in
favor of defendants on their MCPA claim. Plaintiff appeals by right and we affirm.
Plaintiff first contends that the judgment should be set aside because it was based on the
perjured testimony of defendant Sherry Sexton. However, we are unable to find any evidence in
the record to substantiate plaintiff’s allegation of perjury. Rather, we interpret defendant’s
argument as a challenge to the trial court’s finding that Sexton did not discover the existence of
any outstanding bills from plaintiff until 1996. To this end, we find no clear error in the trial
court’s finding. MCR 2.613(C); Walters v Snyder, 239 Mich App 453, 456; 608 NW2d 97
(2000). Sexton testified that she first became aware that defendants had an outstanding bill with
plaintiff for her son’s medical treatments in 1996. She further testified that she did not believe
she owed plaintiff any money because she had all the check stubs verifying the bills paid by the
insurance company and when she contacted the insurance company, she was informed that
plaintiff had been paid everything he was owed. This Court affords great deference to the trial
court’s determination of credibility. Sullivan Industries, Inc v Double Seal Glass Co, 192 Mich
App 333, 349; 480 NW2d 623 (1991). The trial court reasonably found on the entire record that
Sexton’s testimony that she was unaware of any outstanding bills until 1996 was credible. Thus,
the trial court’s finding was not clearly erroneous. Snyder, supra.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by admitting defense exhibit 6, a summary
of plaintiff’s billings and payments received, pursuant to MRE 1006 because it was not prepared
by a qualified individual, and because it was misleading and unduly prejudicial under MRE 403.
We disagree.
To oppose on appeal the admission of evidence at trial, a party must timely object at trial
and specify the same ground for objection that it asserts on appeal. MRE 103(a)(1); Anton v
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 238 Mich App 673, 688; 607 NW2d 123 (1999). Here,
defendant failed to timely object to the admission of the bill summary at trial on the grounds that
it was not prepared by a qualified individual or that it was misleading and thus prejudicial.
Rather, plaintiff merely objected to some highlighting on the exhibit and then, after closely
examining the summary during a break in the proceeding, stated that it appeared to be factually
accurate. Therefore, because the substantial rights of plaintiff were not affected, this issue was
not preserved for appeal. MRE 103(a)(1); Anton, supra.
In any event, we are not convinced that admission of the exhibit was improper. As noted
above, plaintiff reviewed the chart and admitted on the record that it was factually accurate. See
Northwest Acceptance Corp v Almont Gravel, Inc, 162 Mich App 294, 306; 412 NW2d 719
(1987). Further, given the large number of bills issued in this case (both incorrect and corrected
bills), the exhibit was helpful in illustrating the billing charges and the amounts paid, and did not
grossly confuse the issue whether plaintiff was fully paid by defendants’ insurers for services
rendered. Plaintiff was claiming unjust enrichment; thus, whether he received payment from the
insurance companies, and how much, was highly probative on this issue. The summary was
neither misleading nor highly prejudicial, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence.
Lastly, plaintiff argues that defense counsel’s verbal and nonverbal coaching of the
witnesses requires reversal. We disagree. Control of trial proceedings is within the trial court’s
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discretion. People v Jeske, 128 Mich App 596, 602; 341 NW2d 778 (1983). The record reveals
that when defense counsel interrupted plaintiff’s counsel’s questioning of Sexton on crossexamination, the trial court immediately confronted the issue by instructing defense counsel to
address any inconsistencies or errors in the testimony on redirect examination. Further, after
reviewing Sexton’s later testimony, it is clear that defense counsel’s interruption did not
influence her testimony. Likewise, when plaintiff again objected to defense counsel’s alleged
coaching of the witness, the trial court promptly instructed counsel not to coach his client.2
Accordingly, we find no error.
We deny defendants’ request for sanctions on appeal pursuant to MCR 7.216(C).
Although we find no merit to the issues raised on appeal, the matter was not so lacking in merit
as to be vexatious.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
2
The record is unclear whether defense counsel was in fact coaching the witness when plaintiff
lodged the complaint and defense counsel took exception to the allegation.
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