GUY LYNCH V CHURCH OF TODAY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GUY LYNCH,
UNPUBLISHED
January 26, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
CHURCH OF TODAY and ANDY ANDREWS,
No. 215936
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 98-003181-NZ
Defendants-Appellees,
and
MICHAEL BURSKEY, AL JOHNSON,
WILLIAM KLINK, TERRIE VOIGHT,
CAROLE MULLINS, GLEN RUETHER, and
HAROLD NEWTON,
Defendants.
Before: Doctoroff, P.J., and Cavanagh and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals of right from an order granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition. We affirm.
Defendants1 hired plaintiff as an associate minister in March 1991. Plaintiff was
promoted to senior minister in April 1994. As senior minister, plaintiff was responsible for
leading worship services, conducting classes for the congregation, furthering the teachings of the
church, and making annual reports regarding church activities to the Association of Unity
Churches.
1
Defendants Michael Burskey, Al Johnson, William Klink, Terrie Voight, Carole Mullins, Glen
Ruether, and Harold Newton are not parties to this appeal, and review of the lower court record
suggests that they were never properly served with the original complaint in this action. For
purposes of this appeal, the term “defendants” refers only to Church of Today and Andy
Andrews.
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Plaintiff remained employed by defendants as the church’s senior minister until July 24,
1997, when defendants terminated his employment. Plaintiff claimed that he was terminated
because he sought to have a relationship with a single female employee of the church. According
to plaintiff, the church had no policy or by-law prohibiting two single adult employees from
pursuing a consensual relationship.2 Plaintiff further alleged that a just cause employment
contract existed based on policies, statements, and representations of defendants.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendants claiming breach of an implied employment contract,
discharge against public policy, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion
of privacy, and conspiracy. Defendants’ moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(4). The trial court issued a written opinion and order granting defendants’ motion
because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed his claims against
defendants because civil courts have jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters involving property
rights, and a contract, including an employment contract, involves a property right. We review
rulings on motions for summary disposition de novo. Van v Zahorik, 460 Mich 320, 326; 597
NW2d 15 (1999).
When reviewing a motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4), this Court must determine
whether the pleadings demonstrate that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
or whether the affidavits and other proofs show that there was no genuine issue of material fact.
Cork v Applebee’s, 239 Mich App 311, 315; 608 NW2d 62 (2000). Whether the trial court had
subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. Rudolph Steiner School v Ann Arbor Charter
Twp, 237 Mich App 721, 730; 605 NW2d 18 (1999).
The free exercise of religion is guaranteed by both the United States and Michigan
Constitutions. US Const, Am I; Const 1963, art 1, § 4. The ecclesiastical abstention doctrine,
which derives from the constitutional free exercise clauses, prevents civil courts from
determining the correctness of an interpretation of canonical text or some decision relating to
government of the religious polity. Smith v Calvary Christian Church, 462 Mich 679, 684; 614
NW2d 590 (2000). Whenever a dispute involves questions of religious doctrine or organization
or government of the church, the court loses jurisdiction. Maciejewski v Breitenbeck, 162 Mich
App 410, 414; 413 NW2d 65 (1987).
In making its determination, the trial court in this case relied on Dlaikan v Roodbeen, 206
Mich App 591; 522 NW2d 719 (1994). In Dlaikan, the plaintiffs were families whose children
were not accepted at the defendants’ parochial school. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged
intentional misrepresentation, negligence, and breach of contract. The plaintiffs argued that
admission to the parochial school was a property right, and civil courts have jurisdiction to
determine property rights involving ecclesiastical organizations. This Court disagreed, finding
that the plaintiffs’ claims were so entangled in questions of religious doctrine or ecclesiastical
polity that the civil courts lack jurisdiction to hear them. Id. at 594.
2
It is undisputed that plaintiff was single at the time he was terminated.
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In reaching its conclusion in Dlaikan, this Court distinguished between contract rights
that involved ecclesiastical policies, such as governance of a church’s school, and contracts
entered into by ecclesiastical organizations with the secular world, such as a contract to fix the
church roof. Id. at 593-594. The courts may delve into contract disputes involving churches
only where the dispute may be resolved without reference to religious doctrine or ecclesiastical
polity. Id. at 594.
In the present action, the alleged employment contract was not one entered into with the
secular world, but was an internal contract between the church and plaintiff, a member and
minister of the church. The claimed contractual rights in this case were far more analogous to
the rights asserted by the plaintiffs in Dlaikan than the rights of a roofing contractor hired to
repair a church’s roof. Id. at 594.
Further, both this Court and our Supreme Court have held that a church’s decision
regarding assignment or employment of clergy is a matter of ecclesiastical polity in which the
courts may not interfere. Maciejewski, supra at 414; Borgman v Bultema, 213 Mich 684, 703;
182 NW 91 (1921); Assemany v Archdiocese of Detroit, 173 Mich App 752, 763; 434 NW2d 233
(1988). Similarly, the decision in this case to terminate plaintiff entailed ecclesiastical polity
because it was a determination regarding who would minister to defendants’ congregation. See
also Hutchison v Thomas, 789 F2d 392, 393 (CA 6, 1986).
We conclude that the trial court did not err when it determined that the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine prevented it from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff’s employment contract
claims, and dismissal of those claims pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) was proper.
Plaintiff next argues that if defendants’ board of directors acted outside its authority in
terminating plaintiff, as alleged, the constitutional protection is lost pursuant to Vincent v Raglin,
114 Mich App 242; 318 NW2d 629 (1982), and Brooks v January, 116 Mich App 15; 321 NW2d
823 (1982). Plaintiff’s reliance on Vincent and Brooks is misplaced. These cases merely
reinforce the principle that a civil court may determine whether a clergyman was in fact
terminated by a church, a principle that was also enunciated by our Supreme Court in Borgman,
supra. There is a distinction between determining whether a church took a certain course of
action and whether it exceeded its authority in so acting.
Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the case law is clear that the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine bars a court from determining whether a church violated its own policies or procedures.
Dlaikan, supra at 594; Lewis v Seventh Day Adventists Lake Region Conference, 978 F2d 940,
942-943 (CA 6, 1992); Serbian Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 US 696, 713-714; 96 S Ct
2372; 49 L Ed 2d 151 (1976). In this case, whether defendants acted within their authority in
terminating plaintiff would entail a determination whether defendants violated their policies and,
therefore, was not within the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Next, we address whether the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine applies to plaintiff’s tort
claims. In Dlaikan, supra, this Court held that we must look to the substance and effect of the
complaint as opposed to its form in determining whether the First Amendment bars an action.
We upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ negligence and intentional misrepresentation claims in
Dlaikan because to allow such actions would entail an excursion into ecclesiastical polity. Id. at
-3-
594. In this case, plaintiff alleged defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
invasion of privacy, false light. Review of the elements of these causes of action indicates that
plaintiff’s claims could not be resolved without inquiry into matters of religious doctrine and
subjective judgments made by religious officials. A review of that nature is clearly precluded by
the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. Maciejewski, supra at 414; Dlaikan, supra at 593.
Plaintiff also alleges that defendants actions constituted a conspiracy. A civil conspiracy
occurs where two or more persons, by some concerted action, accomplish a criminal or unlawful
purpose, or accomplish a lawful purpose by criminal means. Feaheny v Caldwell, 175 Mich App
291, 307; 437 NW2d 358 (1989). A claim for civil conspiracy may not exist in the air, and
unless the plaintiff proves a separate, actionable tort, the conspiracy claim must fail. Early
Detection Center, PC v New York Life Ins Co, 157 Mich App 618, 632; 403 NW2d 830 (1986).
In the present case, plaintiff failed to assert a separate tort claim that is within the jurisdiction of
the trial court. Therefore, the conspiracy claim fails as a matter of law.
Plaintiff’s final argument is that summary disposition was improper because discovery
had not yet occurred. However, summary disposition is appropriate if there is no reasonable
chance that further discovery will result in factual support for the party opposing the motion.
Mackey v Dep’t of Corrections, 205 Mich App 330, 333; 517 NW2d 303 (1994). Here,
discovery was not going to result in factual support for plaintiff’s position where the trial court
lacked jurisdiction and plaintiff’s claims were barred as a matter of law.
Affirmed.
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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