W FRANK TIMMONS V MT MORRIS TWP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
W. FRANK TIMMONS, d/b/a TIMMONS
LANDSCAPING,
UNPUBLISHED
January 26, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
MT. MORRIS TOWNSHIP and LARRY GREEN,
No. 213701
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 97-057773-CB
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Doctoroff and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition in favor of
defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). We remand for further proceedings.
This case arises out of the award of a contract by Mt. Morris Township for weed
abatement and trash removal in 1994. In the spring of 1994, the township requested bids for the
contract and opened the sealed bids on April 22, 1994, at a township meeting that was open to
the public. On May 23, 1994, at a regular public meeting of the township’s board, the board
voted to award the weed abatement and trash removal contract to James Trovillion. Plaintiff
averred in his affidavit that he contacted the township on or after July 4, 1994, and was told that
he was not the low bidder and that he did not receive the contract. Plaintiff then filed his lawsuit
against defendants on July 1, 1997, alleging racial discrimination pursuant to 42 USC 1981 and
42 USC 1983.
Plaintiff’s only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) to defendants, on the basis that plaintiff’s action was
barred by the statute of limitations. There is no dispute that the applicable statute of limitations
for claims based on violations of 42 USC 1981 and 42 USC 1983 is a state’s statute of
limitations governing personal injury, Goodman v Lukens Steel Co, 482 US 656, 676; 107 S Ct
2617; 96 L Ed 2d 572 (1987); Wilson v Garcia, 471 US 261, 276; 105 S Ct 1938; 85 L Ed 2d 254
(1985), which in this state is three years. MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8).
The question here is when the statute of limitations began to run. Under the general
accrual statute, a statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claim accrues, and a “claim
accrues at the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time
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when damage resulted.” MCL 600.5827; MSA 27A.5827. In a personal injury case, a claim
does not accrue until “all the elements of an action for personal injury, including the element of
damage, are present.” Connelly v Paul Ruddy’s Equipment Repair & Service Co, 388 Mich 146,
151; 200 NW2d 70 (1972).
The trial court ruled, consistent with defendants’ argument, that the statute of limitations
began to run on May 23, 1994, when the contract was awarded at the township’s meeting.1
Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations should not have begun to run until he was aware
that he did not receive the contract, which he claims occurred sometime after July 4, 1994. We
believe that both positions miss the mark and that the proper inquiry is when the township
actually entered into the contract with Trovillion. In other words, the statute of limitations in this
case began to run when the township entered into the contract with Trovillion, not when it merely
awarded the contract to him because the discriminatory act, if any, occurred when the contract
was entered into between the township and Trovillion. However, we are unable to determine
from the lower court record when this occurred. Consequently, we must remand this case to the
trial court for the parties to present evidence regarding the date that the township entered into a
written agreement with the successful bidder. The three-year statute of limitations will begin to
run from that date.2
We further find that plaintiff’s argument that the statute of limitations did not begin to run
until after July 4, 1994, because defendants were engaged in a continuing violation of plaintiff’s
rights is without merit. The decision of the township to enter into a contract with Trovillion and
that date of that contract is the discriminatory act. There were no continuing acts by defendants
following the making of the contract that resulted in a continuing violation. See generally,
Summer v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 427 Mich 505; 398 NW2d 368 (1986).
Remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
1
Defendants also assert on appeal that plaintiff must have had notice of the award of the contract
to Trovillion by no later than June 8, 1994, because the minutes of the May 23, 1994, board
meeting were published in the Genesee County Herald. The newspaper article attached to
defendants’ appellate brief, however, was not presented as an exhibit to the trial court and
defendants never made this argument below. Because this document was not part of the record
below, defendants have improperly attempted to expand the record on appeal and we will
disregard this newspaper article. See Isagholian v Transamerica Ins Corp, 208 Mich App 9, 18;
527 NW2d 13 (1994). In any event, we do not find this information to be dispositive of the
question when plaintiff’s cause of action accrued.
2
We note that if the three-year statute of limitations is found to not have expired on remand, then
the trial court should rule on the alternative arguments raised by defendants in their motion for
summary disposition.
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