PEOPLE OF MI V TERENCE ANTHONY SLACK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 23, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 215419
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 98-159064-FC
TERENCE ANTHONY SLACK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from a jury trial conviction of assault with intent to rob
while armed, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284. Defendant was sentenced, as a third habitual offender,
MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083, to six to twenty years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the 911 audio
tape because there was no corroboration as required for a statement to be admissible under the
present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. We disagree.
This Court reviews the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of
discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). A present sense
impression is “[a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the
declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter.” MRE 803(1).
Defendant does not argue that the audio tape of the 911 call is not a present sense impression,
rather, he argues that the tape was inadmissible because it was not corroborated. Corroboration
is required to admit present sense impressions. People v Hendrickson, 459 Mich 229, 237-238;
586 NW2d 906 (1998). Corroboration is sufficient where it assures the reliability of the
statement. Id. In Hendrickson, the Michigan Supreme Court found that photographs depicting
the victim’s injuries were sufficient corroboration to establish the reliability of statements made
by the victim during a 911 call reporting that the defendant had assaulted her, where the
photographs were taken soon after the beating was alleged to have occurred, and the injuries
were consistent with a beating. Id. at 233, 239.
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The Hendrickson Court, in determining that corroboration was necessary for present
sense impressions, explained the reason for the exception:
Present sense impressions are presumed to be trustworthy because (1) the
simultaneous event and description leave no time for reflection, (2) the likelihood
for calculated misstatements is minimized, and (3) generally, the statement is
made in the presence of another witness who has the opportunity to observe and
verify its accuracy. [Id. at 235; footnote omitted.]
The Hendrickson Court noted that many 911 tapes lack the third component of trustworthiness
because the speaker is alone and the dispatcher is unable to observe and verify the statement’s
accuracy. Id. at 235 n 2. In order to admit these present sense impressions, corroborating
evidence is required to establish their reliability. Id. at 237-238.
In the present case, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence that establishes the
reliability of the gas station attendant’s statements to the 911 dispatcher. Officer Talrita1 testified
that she arrived at the scene, heard defendant say, “Give me the money,” and later observed that
the south door to the station was bent outward, glass was broken, and items in the store were in
disarray on the floor. Talrita’s testimony sufficiently corroborated the 911 report that the gas
station was being robbed. Although there was no independent corroboration of the attendant’s
statements regarding the gunman who allegedly abetted defendant, Hendrickson does not require
that every statement be independently corroborated. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
by admitting the audio tape of the 911 call.
II
Defendant next argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because
there was no evidence establishing that defendant was armed or that defendant could form the
specific intent necessary to commit the crime while he was intoxicated. We disagree. In
reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, this Court must determine if there was sufficient
evidence to justify a rational trier of fact in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Johnson, 460 Mich 720, 722-723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999). In doing so, this Court must view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Id. at 723.
The elements of assault with intent to commit armed robbery are: “(1) an assault with
force and violence; (2) an intent to rob or steal; and (3) the defendant’s being armed.” People v
Cotton, 191 Mich App 377, 391; 478 NW2d 681 (1991). This is a specific intent crime. Id.
Here, the prosecutor relied, in part, on an aiding and abetting theory. The elements of aiding and
abetting are: “(1) the crime charged was committed by the defendant or some other person, (2)
the defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime,
and (3) the defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal
intended its commission at the time he gave aid and encouragement.” People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
1
At the time of trial, Officer Talrita had married, and her name had changed to Marshall.
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A
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant
committed assault with intent to commit armed robbery, as he was unarmed. However, the
attendant’s testimony provided sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. The attendant testified that he saw defendant with a man, and the man was
holding a gun. Defendant said, “[o]pen the door and give us the money.” Defendant forced the
locked door open and entered the station, while the gunman waited outside. The gunman
remained outside, pointing the gun at the attendant through the window, while defendant tried to
open the door to the cashier’s office. The attendant testified that he thought he was going to lose
his life that night. Viewing this evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational
trier of fact could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant and the gunman aided and
abetted each other in assaulting the attendant with force or violence, that defendant had the intent
to rob, and that the man with defendant had a gun.
B
Defendant next argues that he was intoxicated, and therefore, could not form the requisite
intent to rob or steal. The voluntary intoxication defense is applicable only to specific intent
crimes. People v Henry, 239 Mich App 140, 146; 607 NW2d 767 (1999). Specific intent is
intent beyond the act done, whereas general intent is merely the intent to perform the physical act
itself. Id. at 144. “A defense of intoxication is only proper if the facts of the case could allow
the jury to conclude that the defendant’s intoxication was so great that the defendant was unable
to form the necessary intent.” People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 82; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod 450
Mich 1212 (1995).
Here, Talrita testified that defendant was on some type of alcohol or drugs, that defendant
was “zoned out.” Defendant did not appear confused, but did look like someone who was drunk.
Defendant looked at Talrita as though he did not know what to do. Officer Wood testified that
defendant did not respond to anything he said, even when Wood had his weapon drawn.
Defendant testified that he had been smoking marijuana, had drunk five forty-ounce beers, and
was intoxicated. However, defendant admitted that he yanked and bent the door to enter the
building and that he told the attendant to give him the money. Defendant’s own testimony
established that defendant had more than the general intent to perform the physical act of
entering the building.
Defendant’s testimony of intoxication is also contradicted by Marshall’s testimony that
defendant was able to run and hop fences and defendant’s own testimony that he ran and eluded
Marshall. While there is evidence that defendant was intoxicated, viewing this evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant’s intoxication was so great that defendant was unable to form the necessary
intent. Id.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact
could find that defendant committed assault with intent to commit armed robbery by aiding and
abetting a gunman in the attempted commission of the robbery, and that defendant’s intoxication
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was not so great that it rendered him unable to form the specific intent required for assault with
intent to rob while armed.
III
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to sua sponte give the standard
jury instruction regarding intoxication where the facts of the case supported such an instruction.
Defendant did not request the intoxication instruction and expressed his satisfaction with the jury
instructions. “The failure of the court to instruct on any point of law shall not be ground for
setting aside the verdict of the jury unless such instruction is requested by the accused.” MCL
768.29; MSA 28.1052; see People v Gomez, 229 Mich App 329, 332; 581 NW2d 289 (1998).
An appellate court is obligated to review only issues which are properly raised and
preserved. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 694; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). This issue is not
preserved. Because defendant did not request the intoxication instruction, the trial court could
not have plainly erred in not, sua sponte, giving the instruction. Carines, supra at 763; Gomez,
supra at 332. Further, as discussed above, while there was some evidence of intoxication, the
evidence was not so conclusive that a rational trier of fact could not have found that defendant
had the specific intent to assault and rob. See id. at 332-334.
IV
Defendant also argues that he was denied his fundamental right to a fair trial by the
prosecution’s misconduct in arguing facts not in evidence and asking defendant to comment on
the credibility of his booking report. We disagree. Again, this issue is unpreserved because
defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s argument or questioning during trial. Review of
improper prosecutorial remarks is generally precluded where the defendant did not object.
People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713, 720; 613 NW2d 370 (2000). This Court will only review
defendant’s claim for plain error. Id. No error requiring reversal will be found where the
prosecutor’s comments could have been cured by timely instruction. Id at 720-721.
This Court examines prosecutorial remarks in context to determine whether they denied a
defendant a fair and impartial trial. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 267; 531 NW2d 659
(1995); People v Rice, 235 Mich App 429, 435; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). A prosecutor may not
argue facts or evidence not admitted at trial. Stanaway, supra at 686. However, prosecutors may
argue the evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Bahoda, supra at 282.
A
Defendant contends that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence when he stated that
defendant had two packs of cigarettes on him and that the Rite Aid store was closer to defendant
and open. Defendant is correct. There was no evidence that defendant had two packs of
cigarettes. Defendant specifically denied having any cigarettes and the booking report was not
introduced into evidence. There was also no evidence that defendant was closer to the Rite Aid
store or that the Rite Aid store was open. Defendant testified that he was at a park and not at
home, and there was no evidence of the Rite Aid store’s hours. Further, these statements were
not reasonable inferences from the evidence presented at trial. However, had defendant objected
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to the prosecutor’s statements, the trial court could have instructed the jury to disregard them and
thereby avoided any prejudicial effect. Because the prejudicial effect of the misconduct could
have been cured had defendant objected, this Court will not reverse. Schutte, supra at 721.
B
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct in asking defendant to
comment on the credibility of the booking report. While it is improper for the prosecutor to ask a
defendant to comment on the credibility of prosecution witnesses, there was no witness who
testified to the information contained in the booking report. People v Buckey, 424 Mich 1, 17;
378 NW2d 432 (1985); People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 180; 561 NW2d 463 (1997).
Nevertheless, the prosecutor is precluded from asking a defendant to comment on credibility of
prosecution witnesses because matters of credibility are to be determined by the trier of fact.
Buckey, supra. That same reasoning would extend to a booking report, because it is the role of
the jury to determine the accuracy of and weight given to the booking report. However,
defendant would have suffered no prejudice had he properly and timely objected to the
questioning regarding the booking report. Because any prejudicial effect of the misconduct could
have been cured had defendant objected, this Court will not reverse. Schutte, supra at 720-721.
V
Finally, defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the above errors denied defendant
his fundamental due process right to a fair trial. We disagree. This Court evaluates the
cumulative effect of errors in determining whether the defendant received a fair trial. Bahoda,
supra at 292 n 64. Only actual errors are aggregated to determine their cumulative effect. Id.
Because this Court found no error as alleged by defendant, or any error was of minor
consequence, defendant was not denied a fair trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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