PEOPLE OF MI V ANTHONY BATES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 19, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214684
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 97-003604
ANTHONY BATES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Jansen and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit murder,
MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than
murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was subsequently sentenced to thirty-five to seventy
years’ imprisonment for the assault with intent to murder conviction, six to ten years each for the
assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder convictions, and a consecutive
two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right and we affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court improperly indicated that defendant should not
have had a Walker1 hearing. In People v Neal, 182 Mich App 368, 371-327; 451 NW2d 639
(1990), this Court recognized that the issue of whether a statement has been made at all is distinct
from the issue of whether a statement is voluntary. Id. It further recognized that the issue of
whether a statement was made is one for the jury. Id. Nevertheless, it found that where a
defendant denies making a statement but alternatively raises the issue of voluntariness, the trial
court should resolve the voluntariness issue before trial. Id. Based on the rationale set forth in
Neal, the trial court incorrectly remarked that a Walker hearing was unnecessary under the
circumstances. Nevertheless, this issue is inconsequential because the trial court did hold a full
Walker hearing and decided that the statements at issue were voluntary.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in determining that the police statements
at issue were voluntarily made. In evaluating the admissibility of a police statement, the totality
1
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement is reviewed to determine whether it
was freely and voluntarily made. People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752; 609
NW2d 822 (2000). In People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988), the
Supreme Court stated:
In determining whether a statement is voluntary, the trial court should
consider, among other things, the following factors: the age of the accused; his
lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience
with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length
of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack
of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an
unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the
confession; whether the accused was injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill
health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food,
sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and
whether the suspect was threatened with abuse. . . .
The absence or presence of any one of these factors is not necessarily
conclusive on the issue of voluntariness. The ultimate test of admissibility is
whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the
confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made.
Viewing the factors in Cipriano, we conclude that defendant’s statements to the officers
after his polygraph test were freely and voluntary made under the totality of the circumstances.
Defendant was twenty years old at the time the statements were made. While it is unclear from
the record whether he finished the eighth grade or eleventh grade and whether he obtained his
G.E.D., it was undisputed that defendant could read and write. His educational level was not
such that he was unable to comprehend or understand his rights. Further, the record indicates
that defendant was not subjected to any repeated or prolonged questioning at any time.
The next factors, the length of the detention of the accused before giving the statement
and before being arraigned, are the crucial factors at issue. In this case, there was a clear delay
between the time defendant was arrested on April 8, 1997, the time he made his statements on
April 11, 1997, and the time of his arraignment on April 14, 1997. Prearraignment delay,
however, is not grounds by itself for the exclusion of a statement or confession.
Unnecessary delay is one factor to consider in reaching this conclusion, the focus
being not just on the length of delay, but rather on what occurred during the delay
and its effect on the accused.
In relegating prearraignment delay to its status as one of several factors to
be considered in judging the voluntariness of a confession, we do not condone the
failure of the police to comply with the statutes. An arrested suspect should not
be subjected to prolonged, unexplained delay prior to arraignment; and such delay
should be a signal to the trial court that the voluntariness of a confession obtained
during this period may have been impaired. However, we hold that an otherwise
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competent confession should not be excluded solely because of a delay in
arraignment. [Id. at 334-335.]
Here, the trial court found that the delay was not used as a tool to extract the confession.
Rather, it found that the delay occurred so that a proper polygraph could be obtained. On appeal,
defendant contends that the police wanted to extract a statement by using the polygraph and,
thus, the trial court’s attempt to distinguish between delay for the purpose of extracting a
statement and delay to obtain a polygraph is disingenuous.
The record indicates that, within forty-eight hours of defendant’s arrest, Agent Brian
Maloney contacted the polygraph unit to set up the polygraph examination. This occurred only
after another police officer suggested that defendant be given a polygraph and after defendant
stated that he wanted to take a polygraph. Nothing in the record reveals why a polygraph was
suggested, that is, whether police officers thought it may be exculpatory or whether they thought
it might lead to a confession. The polygraph examiner refused to perform the polygraph on April
10, 1997, when he was contacted. A fair polygraph could not be given at that time because
defendant had not adequately rested. The polygraph was then set for Friday, April 11, 1997. The
timing of the polygraph caused a delay in the securing of the warrants and in the arraignment in
this case, which took place the following Monday. We find valid the trial court’s reasoning that
there is a difference between delay for the purpose of obtaining a statement and delay for
purposes of scheduling a polygraph. A proper polygraph could have exculpated defendant. If the
only purpose of the delay was to extract a confession, there was no guarantee that the polygraph
would accomplish that objective. More importantly, defendant was not required to confess as
part of the polygraph examination and, it appears that his decision to do so after the results of the
polygraph examination were revealed to him was purely voluntary. The testimony indicates that,
after defendant was told that he failed the polygraph, he made his first statement with little
prompting. The warrants were thereafter secured and defendant was arraigned the following
Monday, April 14, 1997. Under the circumstances, where the polygraph may have exculpated
defendant and where there was no evidence to support a conclusion that the securing of a
confession was the main objective of the polygraph, we find that the trial court properly ruled
that the delay was not simply a tool used to extract a confession. Thus, like the trial court, we
find that the delays in this case do not weigh in favor of suppressing the post-polygraph
statements.
In so ruling, we note that during most of the delay between the arrest and confession,
defendant was in a detention area and was not with officers. He was not threatened or questioned
excessively or deprived of food or sleep. Thus, it cannot be said that the delay impacted
defendant’s decision to make the statements. In addition, there was testimony that after
defendant was returned to police headquarters from the polygraph testing facility, he had no
contacts with police before his arraignment. Although he disputed this and claimed that there
was one more contact on April 11, 1997, defendant admitted that he had no further police
contacts until the arraignment. Thus, as with the delay before the confession, the several-day
delay between the arrest and the arraignment had no detrimental effect on defendant.
With regard to the remaining factors, there were no irregularities that would weigh in
favor of suppression. It is undisputed that defendant was properly advised of his constitutional
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rights before the polygraph and again before he made further statements to investigating officers
after the polygraph. It is also undisputed that defendant was not injured, intoxicated, drugged, in
ill health, deprived of food, deprived of sleep, or deprived of medical attention before giving the
statements at issue. The statements all occurred within a short period of time immediately after
the polygraph examination. In addition, there was no evidence whatsoever that defendant was
physically abused or threatened with abuse when he made the statements. While defendant
claimed that, on the evening of April 9, 1997, and continuing into the early morning hours of
April 10, 1997, he was threatened, this fact, if believed, does not support finding that the
statements made on the morning of April 11, 1997, were the product of any threat.
Consequently, the totality of the circumstances supports the trial court’s determination
that the statements were freely and voluntarily made.
Defendant also argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated and that the error
is not harmless.2 The Fourth Amendment requires that a judicial determination of probable cause
be made within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest unless there is a bona fide emergency or
other extraordinary circumstance. People v Whitehead, 238 Mich App 1, 2; 604 NW2d 737
(1999), citing Riverside Co v McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 56; 111 S Ct 1661; 114 L Ed 2d 49
(1991).
In Whitehead, supra at 6, this Court held:
“Judicial expediency allows courts to address issues according to their
ease of resolution.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 479-480, n 2; 581 NW2d
229 (1998). Of the two questions presented by defendant’s argument—whether
the statement should have been suppressed and, if so, whether admission of the
statement was harmless error—we find the second to be easier to resolve.
Accordingly, assuming without deciding that it was error for the trial court to
allow the confession to be used against defendant at trial, we consider whether
that constituted harmless error. If any error that might have occurred was
harmless, we need not consider whether, in fact, there was error in admitting the
confession.
This Court further held that the erroneous admission of a confession into evidence is a
nonstructural, constitutional defect. Id. at 7. Constitutional errors that do not constitute
structural defects do not require automatic reversal. People v Anderson, 446 Mich 392, 405; 521
NW2d 538 (1994). Rather, those errors are subject to review to determine if the beneficiary of
the error can prove that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 405-406. In order
to demonstrate that an error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, it must be proved that there
was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction. Id. The error must be
assessed in the context of the other evidence presented at trial. Id.
2
Although defense counsel did not specifically raise the issue of a Fourth Amendment violation
in the trial court, the issue is preserved because a Walker hearing was held and the issue of delay
was raised at that hearing. People v Whitehead, 238 Mich App 1, 7, n 5; 604 NW2d 737 (1999).
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In Whitehead, supra at 9-10, this Court stated:
[T]he question before us is whether, absent the confession, “honest, fairminded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts.” . . . The
properly admitted evidence must be “quantitatively assessed” to determine
whether, had the improperly admitted evidence not been presented at trial, there is
any “reasonable possibility” that a factfinder would have acquitted. . . . As
recently explained by the United States Supreme Court in Neder [v United States,
527 US 1; 119 S Ct 1827, 1838; 144 L Ed 2d 35 (1999)]: “[A] reviewing court
[must] conduct a thorough examination of the record. If, at the end of that
examination, the court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
verdict would have been the same absent the error[,] . . . it should not find the
error harmless.”
***
If the proof against defendant was so overwhelming that all reasonable jurors
would have found guilt even without the confession being brought into evidence,
the conviction must stand.
***
The question before us requires consideration of the kind of case and argument the
prosecutor would have had without defendant’s confession. Putting defendant’s
confession aside, we must consider whether the other evidence adduced by the
prosecutor was such that no reasonable juror would have accepted defendant’s
trial testimony or otherwise acquitted him.
In this case, as in Whitehead, an assessment of the evidence against defendant, apart from
his confession, demonstrates that any error in the admission of the confession was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant’s defense was to attack the numerous identifications of
him as the shooter and to argue that the facts of the case did not make sense.
Ronald Lanning testified that he saw defendant at the party and later saw defendant shoot
the victims with a gun. Around the time of the shootings, Lanning described the shooter to
police as being five feet, ten inches tall and weighing approximately 180 pounds with short hair.
At trial, there was testimony that defendant was five feet, ten inches tall and heavy set at 190
pounds. Lanning later picked defendant out of some photographs and, subsequently, identified
defendant at a corporeal line-up. Lanning’s description of defendant to police was accurate and
his identification of defendant was consistent. Similarly, Franklin Ash testified that he saw
defendant shoot the victims and would never forget defendant’s face. Ash recognized defendant
in a photographic line-up, but he waited to positively identify defendant until he viewed
defendant in a corporeal line-up. Ash testified that he was one hundred percent sure that
defendant was the shooter. John Stickney, one of the victims, described the shooter to police as a
black male, approximately age twenty, who was about five feet, nine inches tall, weighed about
150 pounds, and had light facial hair. Although Stickney’s description was inaccurate with
regard to weight, Stickney tentatively picked defendant out of a photographic line-up several
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months later and, subsequently, positively selected defendant as the shooter at a corporeal lineup. Stickney testified at trial that the shooter was only ten to fifteen feet away when he shot at
Stickney. Stickney testified that there was no doubt in his mind that defendant was the shooter.
Chad Curtis, another victim, also testified at trial that there was no doubt in his mind that
defendant was the shooter. Curtis described the shooter to police as being a black male,
approximately age twenty, between five feet, seven inches tall to five feet, nine inches tall and
heavy set. Although Curtis failed to pick defendant out of a photographic line-up and was
somewhat inaccurate about defendant’s height, his trial testimony positively identified defendant.
Accordingly, the above testimony, considered as a whole, demonstrates that, though there were
some discrepancies in the description of the shooter at the time of the incident, several witnesses
positively identified defendant as the shooter before and during trial.
These identifications constituted overwhelming evidence against defendant. Viewing the
evidence in this case, without the confession, there is no possibility that a reasonable fact finder
would have acquitted defendant. Thus, we find that even if there was error, it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant next argues that a remand is necessary because the trial court failed to rule on
his argument that his alleged statements were made in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel. The trial court made a specific finding of fact that defendant never requested counsel.
At the end of the Walker hearing, the trial court stated:
[A]nd, finally, I do not find that there was any credible testimony on this
record that, in fact, a lawyer was requested especially in light of everything I have
before me.
The trial court’s specific finding of fact, that defendant did not ask for counsel, disposed of the
Fifth Amendment issue. Defendant’s statements could not have been made in violation of his
right to counsel if he never requested counsel. The Fifth Amendment right to counsel only
attaches where a defendant specifically requests counsel for subsequent custodial interrogations.
People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 277; 545 NW2d 18 (1996). Remand for further rulings
by the trial court on this issue is, therefore, unnecessary.
Lastly, defendant argues that his sentence for the conviction of assault with intent to
commit murder is disproportionate. Here, the sentencing guidelines range was ten to twenty-five
years or life. Sentencing courts are not required to adhere to the guidelines range, and the key
test of proportionality is whether the sentence reflects the seriousness of the matter. People v
Houston, 448 Mich 312, 320; 532 NW2d 508 (1995).
Defendant had one prior felony and was on probation at the time of the shootings.
Further, the trial court stated on the record and on the SIR departure form its reasons for
departure from the guidelines range. The trial court properly took into account the full factual
circumstances of the shootings. Moreover, contrary to defendant’s argument, the trial court
properly took into account that one victim died even though defendant was acquitted of the
charge with respect to that victim. People v Parr, 197 Mich App 41, 46; 494 NW2d 768 (1992)
(a sentencing court may consider the facts underlying uncharged offenses, pending charges, and
acquittals). The trial court also properly considered the seriousness of the injuries inflicted, the
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boldness of the assault, People v Castillo, 230 Mich App 442, 448; 584 NW2d 606 (1998), and
defendant’s total disregard for public safety, People v Watkins, 209 Mich App 1, 6; 530 NW2d
111 (1995), as legitimate factors when departing from the sentencing guidelines.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant because
the sentence is proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the background of the
offender.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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