IN RE DARYL LEE LEWIS II
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DARYL LEE LEWIS II, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 12, 2001
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 226434
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-379651
DARYL LEE LEWIS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
NAKIA SHARELLE WHITE,
Respondent.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from an order of the circuit court terminating his parental
rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j); MSA
27.3178(598.19b)(3)(c)(i), (g) and (j). We affirm.1
Once a trial court determines that one or more grounds for termination has been
established by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must terminate parental rights unless
“there exists clear evidence, on the whole record, that termination is not in the child’s best
interests.” In re Trejo Minors, 462 Mich 341, 354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Respondent argues that the family court erred in finding that the statutory grounds for
termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 5.974(I); In re Miller, 433
Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). We disagree. We review the family court’s findings
1
Respondent White has not appealed the termination of her parental rights.
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under the clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 358. “A finding is clearly erroneous where the
reviewing court is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re
Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 25; 501 NW2d 182 (1993).
After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in
finding that the statutory grounds for termination had been established by clear and convincing
evidence. The record clearly establishes that when his parental rights were terminated, the
problems in respondent’s living conditions, including respondent’s history of domestic violence,
persisted. Contrary to respondent’s assertions, evidence presented at the February 14, 2000
dispositional review hearing showed that respondent was not in substantial compliance with his
parent-agency treatment plan. Most importantly, in the seven months since he had signed the
treatment plan, respondent had done almost nothing toward addressing his domestic violence
problems. Respondent repeatedly missed appointments for both domestic counseling assessment
and psychological evaluation. While he had finally completed the first part of the two-part
domestic counseling assessment one week before the February 14 hearing, he failed to attend the
second part of the assessment on the following day. As of February 14, 2000, respondent had not
completed, nor had he rescheduled the second-part of the assessment. As for the psychological
evaluation, respondent failed to make any of his scheduled appointments despite petitioner’s
efforts to provide him with transportation.
Further, even if respondent had begun domestic violence counseling in February 2000,
the evidence established that he would not complete the program until November or December
2000. By this time, the minor child would have been in foster care for approximately one and
one-half years. Had respondent begun domestic violence counseling either in July 1999 (when
the treatment plan was signed), or after the initial dispositional hearing in early November 1999,
he would have been well on his way to completing the program as of February 14, 2000.
We also reject respondent’s assertion that the family court acted improperly during the
course of the dispositional review hearing. The record shows that the trial court neither abused
its discretion when questioning various witnesses, MCR 5.923(A), nor did it display a
prosecutorial bias in its administration of the proceedings.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ William B. Murphy
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