CLARENCE G ARCHAMBO III V LAWYERS TITLE INS CORP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CLARENCE G. ARCHAMBO, III,
UNPUBLISHED
January 9, 2001
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 202289
Cheboygan Circuit Court
LC No. 95-005318-CK
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE
CORPORATION and CHEBOYGAN TITLE
COMPANY,
Defendants-Appellants.
ON REMAND
Before: Griffin, P.J., and McDonald and White, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case returns to us on remand as on rehearing granted to consider plaintiff’s argument
“that, in light of paragraph 15 of the policy of title insurance, the court erred in relying on the title
commitment.” Archambo v Lawyers Title Ins Corp, 463 Mich 888 (2000).
Paragraph fifteen of the proposed policy of title insurance is its integration clause. Were
the policy of title insurance to become effective, paragraph fifteen would provide:
15. LIABILITY IMITED TO THIS POLICY; POLICY ENTIRE
L
CONTRACT.
(a) This policy together with all endorsements, if any, attached hereto by
the Company is the entire policy and contract between the insured and the
Company. In interpreting any provision of this policy, this policy shall be
construed as a whole.
(b) Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence, and
which arises out of the status of the title to the estate or interest covered hereby or
by any action asserting such claim, shall be restricted to this policy.
(c) No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made except by
a writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by either the President, a Vice
President, the Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validating officer or authorized
signatory of the Company.
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However, paragraph fifteen of the proposed title insurance policy never became effective
between the parties because the policy was “null and void” as a result of plaintiff’s breach of the
conditions applicable to the title commitment. Specifically, the title commitment provided, in
pertinent part:
CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL COMMITMENTS:
***
This commitment is delivered and accepted upon the understanding that
the party to be insured has no personal knowledge or intimation of any defect,
objection, lien or encumbrance affecting subject land other than those set forth
herein and in the title insurance application. Failure to disclose such information
shall render this commitment, and any policy issued pursuant thereto, null and
void as to such defect, objection, lien or encumbrance. [Emphasis added.]
In our prior opinion, we held as follows:
In the instant case, the title insurance commitment contained a specific
reservation of rights to void the policy if plaintiff failed to disclose the existence
of a lien. Plaintiff acknowledged at trial that he did not disclose the federal tax
lien to his insurers. Therefore, pursuant to the explicit language of the title
commitment, the resulting policy was void with regard to the federal lien. In light
of the express language of the title commitment placing a duty on plaintiff to
disclose the tax lien and his failure to disclose the lien, the trial court erred when it
found that plaintiff was entitled to coverage under the policy.
Plaintiff previously argued that the rights of the parties are governed by the integration
clause of the title insurance policy. However, the policy is “null and void” because of plaintiff’s
breach of the conditions of the title commitment. The terms “null and void” are defined by
Black’s Law Dictionary as follows:
Null and void. Naught; of no validity or effect. . . . “Null and void”
means that which binds no one or is incapable of giving rise to any rights or
obligations under any circumstances, or that which is of no effect.
See also Fox v Univ of Michigan Bd of Regents, 375 Mich 238, 242; 134 NW2d 146 (1965) (“of
no force or validity, and are a mere nullity and void”), Dull v Royal Ins Co, 159 Mich 671, 673;
124 NW 533 (1910) (“[w]e are of opinion that the policy in question must be held to have been
void at the time of its issuance”), Clark v John Hancock Ins Co,180 Mich App 695; 447 NW2d
783 (1989), and Consolidated Mortgage Corp v American Security Ins Co, 69 Mich App 251,
256; 244 NW2d 434 (1976) (a null and void insurance contract is “inoperative”). Simply put,
because the policy of title insurance was null and void, its integration clause does not govern the
rights of the parties.
We recognize that the federal district court in Lawyers Title Ins Corp v First Federal
Savings Bank & Trust, 744 F Supp 778 (1990), in its attempt to construe Michigan law, came to
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a contrary conclusion. There, the district court held that the integration clause of the title
insurance contract superseded the conditions of a title commitment but only
where the parties to an existing contract enter into a new agreement, completely
covering the same subject matter, but containing terms which are inconsistent
with those of the earlier contract, so that the two cannot stand together, the effect
is to supersede and rescind the earlier contract, leaving the latter agreement as the
only agreement of the parties on the subject. [Id. at 783, quoting with approval
Joseph v Rottschafer, 248 Mich 606, 610; 227 NW 784 (1929).]
Our disagreement with the federal district court lies with its assumption that the parties entered
into an effective title insurance policy contract. In our view, such a contract never came into
existence because it was rendered “null and void” by plaintiff’s breach of the conditions
precedent contained in the title insurance commitment. The federal district court did not address
this issue. In any event, we choose not to follow its decision.
Reversed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
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