TERRENCE P VANDAM V ELWIN E SPINK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
TERRENCE P. VAN DAM and STACEY M.
VAN DAM,
UNPUBLISHED
January 2, 2001
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
ELWIN E. SPINK, CLARE JORDON, and MARK
SEARS,
No. 220711
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 97-081226-NO
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Jansen and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from two orders of the Jackson Circuit Court granting
defendants’ motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm.
This case arises out of an injury that plaintiff Terrence Van Dam (plaintiff) suffered while
working on a farm machine, a forage wagon that is used to haul and blow silage into a silo. To
accomplish this function, the wagon has two chain conveyor belts that unload the silage by
pulling it forward where the silage is “grabbed” by a lower set of tines and moved up to two
upper sets of tines where it is eventually blown out of the wagon into the silo. The sets of tines
are commonly known as beater bars.
Two days before plaintiff’s accident, one of the chain conveyors broke. At the time the
conveyor broke, plaintiff was watching defendant Sears pitch silage into the wagon. Plaintiff
observed Sears get into the wagon and unload silage from the broken side of the wagon to the
operating side of the wagon. The chain conveyor was subsequently repaired.
However, on the day of plaintiff’s accident, and while plaintiff was using the wagon by
himself, the conveyor chain again broke. Like Sears did two days earlier, plaintiff climbed into
the wagon and attempted to move the silage.
Approximately five minutes later, the tines “grabbed” plaintiff and carried him over the
top of the other two rotating bars. Plaintiff was severely injured and, therefore, filed suit against
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defendants in circuit court. Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10) asserting that defendants owed no duty to protect or warn plaintiff of
the wagon’s dangerous condition because the danger that the wagon posed was open and obvious
and/or defendants had no special relationship with plaintiff. The circuit court agreed and granted
defendants summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
We review de novo a trial court’s grant of summary disposition based on MCR
2.116(C)(10). Clark v United Technologies Automotive, Inc, 459 Mich 681, 686; 594 NW2d 447
(1999). A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) will be granted if
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. This Court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, and other documentary evidence in
the same manner as the trial court and in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Clark,
supra, 459 Mich 686; see also MCR 2.116(G)(5).
On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that Jordon had a duty to keep his premises in a
reasonably safe condition for plaintiff’s use as well as to warn plaintiff of the wagon’s dangerous
condition and Jordon breached these duties.
As a general rule, an invitor owes his invitees a duty to maintain his premises in a
reasonably safe condition and to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe. Ellsworth v
Hotel Corp of America, 236 Mich App 185, 193; 600 NW2d 129 (1999). However, an invitor’s
duty to protect or to warn plaintiff of potential dangers does not extend to open and obvious
conditions unless the condition, by its character, location, or surrounding conditions, is such that
a reasonably prudent person would not expect to see it. Bertrand v Alan Ford, Inc, 449 Mich
606, 614-615; 537 NW2d 185 (1995); Riddle v McLouth Steel Products, 440 Mich 85, 90-95;
485 NW2d 676 (1992); Millikin v Walton Manor Mobile Home Park, Inc, 234 Mich App 490;
595 NW2d 152 (1999). Whether a danger is open and obvious depends upon whether it is
reasonable to expect an average user with ordinary intelligence to discover the danger upon
casual inspection. Weakley v Dearborn Hts, 240 Mich App 382, 385; 612 NW2d 428 (2000).
Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court to decide. Johnson v Turner
Construction, 198 Mich App 478, 480; 499 NW2d 27 (1993).
The wagon at issue, with its rapidly moving beater bars and chain conveyors, clearly
presented an open and obvious danger. Additionally, the wagon’s condition was not
unreasonably dangerous because the wagon’s character, location, or surrounding conditions were
not such that a reasonably prudent person would not expect to see the dangerous condition.
Instead, not only would a reasonably prudent person expect to see the wagon’s dangerous
condition, the evidence established that plaintiff did in fact see the dangerous condition and knew
that he could be injured if he came into contact with the beater bars. Thus, Jordon’s duty to
protect or warn plaintiff of the wagon’s dangerous condition was eliminated because the wagon’s
dangerous condition was open and obvious.
Second, plaintiffs argue that defendant Spink had a duty to warn plaintiff of the wagon’s
dangerous condition. As a general rule, there is no duty which obligates one person to aid or
protect another unless there is a special relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.
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Dykema v Gus Macker Enterprises, Inc, 196 Mich App 6, 8; 492 NW2d 472 (1992). In a special
relationship, “one person entrusts himself to the control and protection of another, with a
consequent loss of control to protect himself.” Id. Commonly recognized special relationships
include “common carrier-passenger, innkeeper-guest, employer-employee, landlord-tenant, and
invitor-invitee.” Id.
Although plaintiffs asserted that Spink supplied plaintiff with “defective, unsafe, and
improper tools,” plaintiff was not under Spink’s control or protection. The forage wagon was
loaned to defendant Jordon by Spink. Plaintiff was not Spink’s employee or obligated to use
Spink’s machine. Plaintiff was simply on Jordon’s property helping Jordon with various farm
tasks.
Moreover, plaintiff had no consequent loss of control to protect himself. As stated above,
the evidence established that plaintiff saw the wagon’s dangerous condition and understood that
if he came into contact with the beater bars they would cause him personal injury. At this point,
plaintiff could have easily stopped using the wagon or asked Spink or Jordon how to unload the
rest of the silage in a safe manner. Because plaintiff failed to establish a special relationship
between himself and Spink, Spink had no duty to warn plaintiff of the wagon’s dangerous
condition.
Last, plaintiffs argue that Sears had a duty to protect plaintiff from harm because plaintiff
was a business invitee of Sears’ employer Jordon and because a special relationship existed
between plaintiff and Sears; and Sears breached his duty to protect plaintiff. Additionally,
plaintiffs argue that Jordon is vicariously liable for Sears’ negligent conduct.
Sears did not have a duty to protect plaintiff from harm based on the fact that plaintiff
was a business invitee of Sears’ employer Jordon. Michigan case law clearly states that it is the
possessor and one in control of the land who has the duty to maintain his premises in a
reasonably safe condition and to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises safe. Orel v UniRak Sales Co, Inc, 454 Mich 564, 568; 563 NW2d 241 (1997). In this case, Sears was not in
possession or control of the premises where plaintiff was injured. Instead, the record is clear that
it was Jordon who was in possession and control of the farm where plaintiff was injured. Sears
was merely Jordon’s employee hired to help bring in Jordon’s crop for the year.
Additionally, plaintiff did not entrust himself to the control and protection of Sears with a
consequent loss of control to protect himself. The record clearly established that plaintiff simply
observed Sears unload the silage from the broken side of the wagon to the operating side of the
wagon—Sears never gave plaintiff instructions on how to unload the wagon when it was broken.
Additionally, Sears was Jordon’s employee and did not have authority to prescribe plaintiff’s
tasks.
Moreover, plaintiff had no consequent loss of control to protect himself. Plaintiff
testified that he did in fact see the dangerous condition and understood that if he came into
contact with the beater bars, such contact would cause him personal injury.
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Because Sears owed no duty to plaintiff and thus could not have been negligent, we need
not review plaintiffs’ claims of gross negligence and vicarious liability.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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