PEOPLE OF MI V KEVIN J NICHOLS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 26, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217120
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 98-002968
KEVIN J. NICHOLS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Murphy, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL
750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct,
MCL 750.520c(1)(a); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(a). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the three
counts of first-degree CSC, but acquitted of the single count of second-degree CSC. The trial
court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of ten to twenty years’ imprisonment for each
conviction. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arose from allegations of sexual abuse made by the complainant,
who was ten years old at the time of trial. Defendant, who was forty years old at the time of trial,
was a friend of the complainant’s mother. The complainant alleged that several incidents of
sexual assault occurred in their apartment while defendant was spending the night.
First, defendant argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation
and his due process right to a fair trial by the court’s preclusion, pursuant to the rape-shield
statute, MCL 750.520j; MSA 28.788(10), of any reference in the medical records to a prior
incident of sexual abuse involving the complainant and three boys. This Court reviews a trial
court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under the rape-shield statute for an abuse of
discretion. People v Hackett, 421 Mich 338, 349; 365 NW2d 120 (1984).
In People v Morse, 231 Mich App 424, 436-437; 586 NW2d 555 (1998), this Court
identified several safeguard procedures that must be followed when determining whether
evidence of prior sexual abuse involving the victim and another person is admissible. First, the
defendant is obligated to make an offer of proof and demonstrate relevance. If this preliminary
hurdle is surmounted, the trial court must then conduct an in-camera evidentiary hearing to
determine whether (1) the proffered evidence is relevant, (2) the defendant can establish that
-1-
another person was convicted of criminal sexual conduct involving the complainant, and (3) the
facts underlying the previous conviction are significantly similar to be relevant to the
proceedings. Id. at 437.
Although the trial court did not conduct an in-camera hearing, defendant failed to file
written notice prior to trial as required by MCL 750.520j(2); MSA 28.788(10)(2) and failed to
make an offer of proof. Instead, the issue was raised by the prosecutor, who indicated that she
was having a dispute with defense counsel about questioning the medical doctor about his
interview with the complainant.1 The prosecutor stated that the information was barred by the
rape-shield statute and was irrelevant. Defense counsel responded that the issue was relevant to
show the complainant was being treated for mental “issues” and to show that the complainant
had made false allegations in the past. After some discussion, the trial court asked the prosecutor
to explain the prior incident; the prosecutor indicated that the mother caught the boys “messing
with [the complainant] and did not report that it happened.” Noting there was no evidence of a
false allegation, the trial court asked defense counsel if there was anything further to address.
Counsel stated that he wanted to introduce the statement as evidence used for medical treatment,
to which the court responded that the hearsay exception issue was separate from the rape-shield
inquiry and ruled that the evidence was inadmissible.
Clearly, defendant failed to properly raise the issue below by making an offer of proof
and demonstrating the relevance of the incident as required by Morse, supra. Therefore, the trial
court’s failure to conduct an in-camera hearing was inapposite. Moreover, the incident was
inadmissible because it did not result in a criminal conviction or appear to be similar to the
allegations made against defendant. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
prohibiting any reference to the prior incident.
We further note that defendant’s argument on appeal that the evidence was admissible to
demonstrate the complainant’s knowledge about sexual matters was not raised below. Defendant
also argues that the court’s ruling precluded him from recalling the complainant and engaging “in
any appropriate confrontation;” yet, defendant never indicated that he wished to recall the
complainant, who had already testified when the issue regarding the incident arose. Thus, these
arguments are not properly preserved for our review. See People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27,
44; 597 NW2d 176 (1999). Because defendant has not demonstrated or explained the particular
facts underlying the incident on appeal, we find that manifest injustice will not result by our
failure to address these arguments. Id.
Next, defendant raises several incidents of alleged prosecutorial misconduct during her
closing argument. The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether the defendant was denied a
fair and impartial trial. People v Green, 228 Mich App 684, 693; 580 NW2d 444 (1998); People
v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995).
1
The complainant apparently informed the doctor that she was in counseling because “three boys
touched her or messed with her” when she was five years old.
-2-
First, defendant contends the prosecutor improperly vouched for the complainant’s
credibility. While a prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of his or her witnesses to the
effect that he or she has some special knowledge concerning a witness’ truthfulness, People v
Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 275; 531 NW2d 659 (1995), we find that the prosecutor in this case
clearly did not make such a suggestion or otherwise improperly vouch for the complainant’s
testimony. Instead, she was appropriately responding to the defense’s position that the
complainant was lying about the sexual abuse. As noted in People v Schutte, 240 Mich App 713,
722; 613 NW2d 370 (2000), the prosecutor need not state her argument in the blandest possible
terms.
Defendant next claims the prosecutor misstated the law by suggesting there was no
obligation to prove “any form of intent” and that an accidental touching is still criminal.
Specifically, defendant takes exception to the prosecutor’s remarks that his claim of accident “is
not the issue” and that the issue was “did he do it?” However, because defendant failed to object
to the remarks, defendant must establish that any impropriety was outcome-determinative plain
error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Viewed in context, we
cannot say that the jury would have disregarded defendant’s accident defense as irrelevant by the
prosecutor’s fleeting remark. In light of the prosecutor’s continuing argument that it was
unlikely the defendant accidentally penetrated the complainant’s vagina with his finger, we
believe that defendant has failed to establish the remark was plain error.
Finally, defendant argues the prosecutor impermissibly injected the issue of penalty by
the following remarks:
You also can’t consider the penalty. That’s the Judge’s role. But you see
how the Judge conducted this trial and you see that he was incredibly fair and nice
to everybody. He has to try to do the right thing. If he is convicted he has to
sentence this man.
After defense counsel objected, the trial court instructed the jury that it was the duty of the judge
to impose the penalty and they were to “give no consideration whatsoever” to the issue of
penalty. Even if the remarks are deemed inappropriate, although they accurately stated the law,
we find that the trial court’s curative instruction cured any resulting prejudice. See People v
Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 56; 523 NW2d 830 (1994).
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant was not denied a fair and impartial trial due to
alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ William B. Murphy
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.