JAMES MARTINEZ V CITY OF PONTIAC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES MARTINEZ,
UNPUBLISHED
December 26, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 215571
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 97-000106-CZ
CITY OF PONTIAC, PONTIAC POLICE
DEPARTMENT, RONALD GRACEY, and
TREVOR HAMPTON,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Jansen and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendants’ motion for summary
disposition in this employment discrimination action. We affirm.
Plaintiff, an Hispanic-American, contends that the trial court erred by granting summary
disposition to defendants because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether he
received disparate treatment as compared to similarly situated officers, and whether the reasons
given for the disparate treatment were pretextual. We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a
motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337;
572 NW2d 201 (1998). When reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10), we consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary
evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Morales v
Auto-Owners Ins, 458 Mich 288, 294; 582 NW2d 776, (1998). A motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is properly granted if there is no genuine issue of material
fact, entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
A claim of disparate treatment in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MCL
37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., may be proven by either direct or indirect evidence.
Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601, 606; 572 NW2d 679 (1997). Under the
indirect evidence method of proving discrimination, otherwise known as the McDonnell
Douglas1 method, a plaintiff must first state a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 607;
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McDonnel Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973).
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Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 710-711; 565 NW2d 401 (1997). To establish
a prima facie case, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he
suffered an adverse employment action, (3) he was qualified for the position, and (4) the
circumstances gave rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Lytle v Malady, 458 Mich
153, 172-173; 579 NW2d 906 (1998). If the court finds that the plaintiff has established a prima
facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the defendant, and the defendant
must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Harrison, supra at 608;
Meagher, supra at 711. The plaintiff must then show by a preponderance of the evidence that the
legitimate reason proffered by the defendant was not the true reason, but was a mere pretext for
discrimination. Harrison, supra at 608; Meagher, supra at 711. The evidence must be sufficient
to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor for the
adverse action taken against the plaintiff. Lytle, supra at 176.
Regarding his suspension from the police department and his re-suspension, plaintiff
established a prima facie case of discrimination. It is not disputed that plaintiff is a member of a
protected class, that the suspensions constituted adverse employment actions, and that plaintiff
was qualified for his position. Id. In addition, plaintiff alleged that he received harsher
discipline than two Caucasian police officers for having committed less egregious conduct and
that the EEOC determined that defendants’ treatment of him was unfair. Therefore, plaintiff
produced sufficient evidence to create a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. Harrison,
supra at 607-608; Meagher, supra at 710-711. The burden of production then shifted to
defendants to articulate legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for their actions. Harrison, supra
at 608; Meagher, supra at 711. Defendants argued that plaintiff was charged with significantly
different misconduct than were Officers Robert Miller and Todd Hunt and that plaintiff’s
conduct was excessive when no excessive force was necessary in the booking process.
Defendants also contended that plaintiff’s conduct was more egregious than that of Miller and
Hunt because plaintiff falsified the sick slip. Therefore, defendants presented sufficient evidence
to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they discriminated against plaintiff, thereby
rebutting the presumption of discrimination. Lytle, supra at 173-174.
The burden then shifted back to plaintiff to show that the legitimate reasons offered by
defendants constituted a mere pretext for discrimination. Id. at 174. In making this showing,
plaintiff was required to prove that he was treated differently from similarly situated officers. Id.
at 178; Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Mfg Co, 235 Mich App 347, 369; 597 NW2d 250
(1999). Miller and Hunt were not similarly situated to plaintiff because they were charged with
less misconduct than was plaintiff. Plaintiff was disciplined for the same conduct as were Hunt
and Miller, as well as for falsifying the sick slip, using unnecessary force during the booking
procedure, including picking up Ronnie Conley by his ears, and for not being entirely truthful in
explaining his actions. Interim Police Chief Ronald Gracey’s determination that no excessive
force was necessary in the booking procedure was a primary factor in his determination of
plaintiff’s nine-month suspension. Furthermore, contrary to plaintiff’s argument, Conley did not
maintain that plaintiff was not a cause of his injuries. In fact, plaintiff was the only officer who
Conley was able to specifically identify as having assaulted him. Therefore, plaintiff was not
similarly situated to Hunt and Miller.
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Moreover, we find that even if plaintiff was similarly situated to Hunt and Miller,
plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of racial discrimination. He claims that Gracey’s
statement, “It’s a racial thing,” showed that Gracey’s motivation for the disparate suspensions
was based on racial discrimination. However, this statement was made in response to
questioning about why some citizens of Pontiac were upset with Gracey’s decision to allow
plaintiff to return to work early and was not made to support Gracey’s decision to impose a
longer suspension in plaintiff’s case. Therefore, plaintiff has produced no evidence which would
allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor for his
disparate discipline. Lytle, supra at 176.
Plaintiff’s complaint also created a rebuttable presumption of discrimination regarding his
re-suspension by Police Chief Trevor Hampton. Id. at 173. Defendants, however, articulated
legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for plaintiff’s re-suspension. Harrison, supra at 608;
Meagher, supra at 711. They contended that, after contacting the FBI, Hampton discovered that
plaintiff’s conduct was still being investigated and would probably result in a grand jury review.
As such, Hampton determined that Gracey’s decision to reinstate plaintiff prematurely was based
on inaccurate information. Hampton then determined that it would be inappropriate to allow
plaintiff to return to work prematurely and that the completion of his suspension was necessary to
protect the integrity of the department and the image of the city. Therefore, defendants presented
sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether they discriminated
against plaintiff, thereby rebutting the presumption of discrimination. Lytle, supra at 173-174.
Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence showing that defendants’ legitimate reasons
offered for plaintiff’s re-suspension were merely pretextual. Id. at 174. Plaintiff argues that
Hunt and Miller were not similarly re-suspended. However, there is no evidence that either Hunt
or Miller’s suspension was terminated early, and both officers had completed their suspensions at
the time that Hampton assumed the position of Chief of Police. As such, neither officer was
similarly situated to plaintiff. Id. at 178; Wilcoxon, supra at 369. Furthermore, plaintiff has
produced no evidence that racial discrimination was a reason for his re-suspension. Plaintiff
claims that pressure from some citizens of Pontiac and from Mayor Charlie Harrison prompted
Hampton to re-suspend him because of his race. However, Hampton stated that he alone was
responsible for plaintiff’s re-suspension and that he did obtain or solicit the input of others in
making his decision. Therefore, plaintiff has produced no evidence which would allow a
reasonable trier of fact to conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor for his resuspension. Lytle, supra at 176.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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