JANET D HEINS V RONALD O HEINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JANET D. HEINS,
UNPUBLISHED
December 19, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 217789
Lapeer Circuit Court
LC No. 98-025476-DO
RONALD O. HEINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from that portion of the judgment of divorce dividing the
parties’ marital assets. We affirm.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff the majority of the
marital assets based in large part on its finding that defendant was at fault for causing the
breakdown of the marital relationship. We disagree.
When reviewing a trial court’s distribution of marital assets in a judgment of divorce, this
Court must first review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. Sparks v Sparks, 440
Mich 141, 151; 485 NW2d 893 (1992); Draggoo v Draggoo, 223 Mich App 415, 429; 566
NW2d 642 (1997). A finding is clearly erroneous if, after reviewing the entire record, this Court
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Beason v Beason, 435
Mich 791, 805; 460 NW2d 207 (1989); Draggoo, supra at 429. This Court gives special
deference to the trial court’s findings that are based on the credibility of the witnesses. Draggoo,
supra at 429. If the trial court’s factual findings are upheld, this Court then decide whether the
dispositive ruling was fair and equitable in light of those facts. Id. The dispositional ruling is
discretionary and should be affirmed by this Court unless, upon review, it is left with the firm
conviction that the division was inequitable. Sands v Sands, 442 Mich 30, 34; 497 NW2d 493
(1993); Dragoo, supra at 429-430.
The goal of distributing marital assets in a divorce proceeding is to reach an equitable
distribution of the marital assets in light of the surrounding circumstances. Byington v Byington,
224 Mich App 103, 114; 568 NW2d 141 (1997). The property division does not need to be a
mathematically equal share; however, any significant departure from congruence should be
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supported by a clear exposition of the court’s rationale. Id. at 114-115. In reaching an equitable
division of the marital assets, the trial court should consider the duration of the marriage, the
contribution of each party to the marital estate, each party’s station in life, each party’s earning
ability, each party’s age, health and needs, fault and past misconduct, and any other equitable
circumstance. McDougal v McDougal, 451 Mich 80, 89; 545 NW2d 357 (1996); Sparks, supra
at 158-160. The fault of one or both of the parties in causing the breakdown of the marital
relationship is a factor to be considered by the trial court in the distribution of the parties’ assets.
McDougal, supra at 80. However, fault is only one of the factors to be considered and it must
not be used as a punitive basis for an inequitable division of the property. Id.; Sparks, supra at
144, 163.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that while the trial court found that fault was “a
huge factor” in this case, it did not place undue weight on defendant’s fault. The trial court did
not find defendant’s extramarital affair to be a significant factor because it occurred twenty years
before the breakdown of the parties’ relationship. However, the trial court considered
defendant’s second-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction a significant factor because it was
a serious felony, it involved the family members (the victim was defendant’s daughter’s friend),
and it was devastating to defendant’s family.1 Indeed, defendant admitted his fault in the
breakdown of the marriage by committing the sexual assault. The trial court further found that
plaintiff’s decision not to seek a divorce until shortly before defendant was released from prison
was insignificant because plaintiff had no need to get a divorce while defendant was incarcerated.
The trial court also considered other relevant factors in deciding the property distribution.
The trial court found that the parties had a long-term marriage (thirty-six years), they had four
children who were adults at the time of the trial, plaintiff was fifty-three years old and defendant
was fifty-six years old, plaintiff was in good health, and defendant was seeking treatment for
heart problems but there was no evidence that defendant was unable to work or that he would be
unable to receive social security or disability benefits. The trial court further found that plaintiff
worked on and off during the marriage, but she was primarily a homemaker and at the time of
trial she made approximately $220 a week. On the other hand, defendant worked for General
Motors for thirty years, received a pension of $1,890 a month at the time of trial, and had the
ability to earn additional wages in the future. The trial court found that there was a disparity in
the parties’ ability to earn income and noted that plaintiff may have to seek full-time employment
in the future.
On this record, we find that the trial court did not base its property distribution solely on
defendant’s fault in causing the breakdown of the marital relationship; rather, the trial court
properly considered all the relevant factors and made a fair and equitable distribution of the
assets under the circumstances.
1
On January 25, 1993, defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct and
sexually abusive activity with a child. The victim was a friend of the parties’ daughter.
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of five to fifteen years for the CSC II conviction,
and five to twenty years for the sexually abusive activity conviction.
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Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant to
question plaintiff regarding her use of defendant’s pension while defendant was in prison. We
disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion exists when an unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the
trial court acted, would say there is no justification or excuse for the ruling made. Ellsworth v
Hotel Corp of America, 236 Mich App 185, 188; 600 NW2d 129 (1999).
Plaintiff testified that while defendant was in prison, defendant gave her a power of
attorney so she was able to receive his pension check. From this pension check, plaintiff made
payments in the amount of $300 per month to the State of Michigan and $100 per month to
defendant. Plaintiff further testified that she disclosed all her assets, bank accounts and her safe
deposit box which contained her inheritance and wages at trial. Defendant presented no evidence
or testimony to substantiate his allegation that plaintiff squandered or embezzled the parties’
assets. The trial court found that plaintiff was a credible witness and that she had not hidden or
embezzled assets from defendant. This Court gives deference to the trial court’s determinations
of the credibility of the witnesses. See Draggoo, supra at 429. On this record, we find that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in curtailing defendant’s repetitive questioning of plaintiff
regarding her use of defendant’s pension and other marital assets while defendant was in prison.
Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred by finding that his inheritance, which
included real property in Warren, Michigan, was part of the marital estate, and ordering him to
pay one-half of the inheritance to his sister out of his portion of the property division. Again, we
disagree.
Normally, property received by one marital party as an inheritance and kept separate from
the marital property is not included in the distribution of the marital estate upon the parties’
divorce unless needed for support and maintenance. Dart v Dart, 460 Mich 573, 584-585; 597
NW2d 82 (1999); Lee v Lee, 191 Mich App 73, 79; 489 NW2d 161 (1992). However, in this
case, the inheritance was treated as marital property since its acquisition in 1984 and was
properly included in the marital estate subject to distribution. Defendant and his sister, who was
mentally disabled, received their inheritance in 1984. Defendant’s sister immediately removed
her name from the deed and defendant then deeded the property to himself and plaintiff. At that
point, the property became a marital asset belonging to both parties until the time of their
divorce. Because the parties treated the property as a marital asset throughout their marriage, the
trial court did not err in including defendant’s inheritance in the marital estate. See Dart, supra.
Further, contrary to defendant’s contention, the trial court did not order defendant to pay
half of the inheritance to his sister out of his portion of the property division. Rather, the trial
court merely suggested in its oral opinion that defendant give his sister her portion of the
inheritance to which she is entitled.2 It is well settled that courts speak through their written
2
The trial court stated as follows with respect to the inheritance defendant and his sister
received:
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orders and not through their opinions. Tiedman v Tiedman, 400 Mich 571, 576; 255 NW2d 632
(1977); Waple v Waple, 179 Mich App 673, 675 n 1; 446 NW2d 536 (1989). We find no error.
Affirmed. Plaintiff, being the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.3
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
As to the inheritance of the defendant, your testimony was that the
property came from his family. It was designed for him and his sister and I think
the parties all agree that certainly half of those assets that are remaining should be
the sister’s. I can’t make that award as part of the judgment but I will give those
assets to the defendant so that he can take care of that himself but the other half
portion I believe is a marital asset. It was received some 10 or 15 years ago. Was
placed in the joint names without any effort to segregate or separate those assets
and I have no evidence on it but I assume that the parties had intended that they
[sic] would be a joint marital asset. So that’s how I’m treating them [sic].
3
We decline plaintiff’s request to award her additional damages for defendant having filed a
vexatious appeal because we are not convinced that the appeal was taken for purposes of
hindrance or delay or without any reasonable basis to believe that there was meritorious issue to
be determined on appeal. MCR 7.216(C). See Dragoo, supra at 431.
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