PEOPLE OF MI V ANDRE L GREEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 19, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
ANDRE L. GREEN, a/k/a SYLVESTER GREEN,
No. 216367
Wayne Circuit Court
Criminal Division
LC No. 98-007990
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Wilder and Collins, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; MSA 28.279. He was acquitted of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct, and the trial court directed a verdict on an additional charge of assault with intent
to rob while armed. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm, but remand for correction of the
judgment of sentence.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court’s conduct requires reversal of his
conviction and a new trial. We disagree. “A trial court has wide, but not unlimited, discretion
and power in the matter of trial conduct.” People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 340; 543
NW2d 342 (1995). “Portions of the record should not be taken out of context in order to show
trial court bias against defendant; rather the record should be reviewed as a whole.” Id.
A defendant in a criminal trial is entitled to a neutral and detached
magistrate. The test is whether partiality could have influenced the jury to the
detriment of the defendant’s case. Judicial remarks during the course of a trial
that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their
cases do not generally support a challenge for partiality. Moreover, partiality is
not established by expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even
anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women sometimes
display. [People v McIntire, 232 Mich App 71, 104-105; 591 NW2d 231 (1998),
rev’d on other grounds, 461 Mich 147 (1999) (citations omitted).]
A defendant is not denied a fair trial when a trial court questions witnesses if the questions are
posed in a neutral manner and the trial court’s comments and questions neither add to nor distort
the evidence. People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47, 50; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). However, “[w]hile a
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trial court may question witnesses to clarify testimony or elicit additional relevant information,
the trial court must exercise caution and restraint to ensure that its questions are not intimidating,
argumentative, prejudicial, unfair or partial.” People v Cheeks, 216 Mich App 470, 480; 549
NW2d 584 (1996). In People v Conyers, 194 Mich App 395, 404; 487 NW2d 787 (1992), this
Court held that “excessive interference in the examination of witnesses, repeated rebukes and
disparaging remarks directed at defendant’s counsel, and marked impatience in the presence of
the jury displayed an attitude of partisanship, which resulted in the denial of a fair trial.”
(Emphasis added.)
Defendant first argues that the trial court belittled defense counsel throughout the trial,
which gave the jury the impression that the judge sided with the prosecution. After reviewing the
record as a whole, we disagree. The most egregious exchanges between defense counsel and the
trial court, which evidenced hostility especially on the part of defense counsel, occurred outside
the presence of the jury. Moreover, the challenged judicial remarks that were made in the
presence of the jury were not extensive and were entirely appropriate under the circumstances.
The two incidents wherein the trial court chided defendant’s counsel in front of the jury were the
result of defense counsel’s own unprofessional conduct in turning his back on the judge while the
judge was speaking, talking to the prosecutor while the judge was speaking, and continuing to
argue after the judge ruled. The trial court’s expressions of dissatisfaction were within
appropriate bounds. McIntire, supra. Further, after these expressions of dissatisfaction, the trial
court was respectful and neutral toward defendant’s counsel. The judge’s conduct in addressing
defendant’s counsel did not demonstrate partiality that could have influenced the jury to the
detriment of defendant’s case. Id.
Defendant next argues that the trial court disparaged or interfered with defense counsel’s
attempts to question or discredit prosecution witnesses. Defendant cites four examples to
support his claim.
First, defendant argues that the trial court’s decision to allow the victim to remain in the
courtroom after testifying disparaged and interfered with defendant’s attempts to question or
discredit her. The record does not support this claim. Defendant had ample opportunity to crossexamine the victim. In fact, the trial court allowed defense counsel to recross-examine the victim
twice after his initial cross-examination. Further, although the victim was apparently out of the
courtroom before her testimony, there was no sequestration order in place and it does not appear
that defendant ever requested one. When the trial court asked if there were further questions of
the witness, defendant did not indicate that he might want to recall her. He simply said nothing
until after the court informed the victim that she could remain in the courtroom. Then defendant
argued that he may reach a stipulation with the prosecutor, which might lead to additional
questions for the victim. Defendant did not subsequently attempt to recall the victim, nor was he
prohibited from doing so. The sequestration of witnesses is discretionary. In the Matter of
Jackson, 199 Mich App 22, 29; 501 NW2d 182 (1993). Here, there was no abuse of discretion
when the trial court refused to sequester the victim after she had already been subject to extensive
cross-examination and where there was no sequestration order. More importantly, defendant
never attempted to recall the victim; thus, it is disingenuous for him to argue that the trial court’s
decision improperly interfered with his ability to question the victim.
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Second, defendant argues that the trial court improperly refused to allow him to recrossexamine a police officer about whether people who smoke crack cocaine can burn themselves
while doing so. Trial courts have wide discretion to determine the scope of cross-examination.
People v Lucas, 188 Mich App 554, 572; 470 NW2d 460 (1991). “The exercise of that
discretion is not subject to review unless a clear abuse is shown.” Id.; MRE 611. Reasons to
limit cross-examination include concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. People v Adamski, 198 Mich App
133, 138; 497 NW2d 546 (1993). In this case, defendant was given sufficient opportunity to
question Richardson and explore the facts of the case. On recross-examination, defense counsel
decided to pursue a line of general questioning about crack cocaine users and whether they can
burn themselves when smoking crack cocaine. Counsel tried to convince the trial court that
cross-examination on this general line of questioning was necessary because of the prosecutor’s
redirect-examination. It was not. The issue whether cocaine users can burn themselves while
smoking crack cocaine was not injected into the trial on redirect-examination. Under the
circumstances in this case, where the questioning was not specific to the case, it concerned a
newly raised subject not covered by the prosecutor on redirect, and it was only marginally
relevant, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the recross-examination. The trial
court’s decision did not disparage the defendant or improperly interfere with his case. Defendant
was able to and did, in fact, argue that the victim probably could have burned herself when she
was smoking crack cocaine.
Third, defendant argues that the trial court improperly interrupted defense counsel’s
cross-examination of another police officer to explain to the jury that “working,” in the context
used, indicated prostitution. The trial court’s interruption of defense counsel’s cross-examination
did not disparage defendant or interfere with his ability to discredit any witnesses. The trial
court’s interruption, made to clarify an issue for the jury, was not intimidating, argumentative,
prejudicial, unfair or partial. Cheeks, supra.
Fourth, defendant complains that the trial court improperly interrupted the prosecutor
during his redirect-examination of the same police officer. Defense counsel elicited from the
victim on cross-examination that she went to the preliminary examination on her own. Defense
counsel later elicited from the officer that he drove the victim to the preliminary examination.
This was a strong point for defendant, who was relying on the victim’s lack of credibility as his
defense. After defense counsel elicited the inconsistent testimony from the officer, the
prosecutor tried to rehabilitate the victim. The prosecutor asked the officer whether it was
unusual for the police to transport witnesses to court and under what circumstances it would be
done. The trial court interrupted the questioning, finding that it was moving too far afield of the
issues in the case. The trial court pointed out that there was a discrepancy in the testimony of the
victim and the officer and that the jury should decide what, if anything, this meant. The trial
court had the right to limit questioning to avoid needless consumption of time and “make the
interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of truth.” MRE 611(a). The trial
court’s limitation was directed at the prosecutor, was related to marginally relevant evidence
only, and was not designed to and did not disparage the defense. Defense counsel fully explored
this issue and obtained the testimony he needed to attack the victim’s credibility during closing
argument. The trial court’s limit on the prosecutor’s inquiry was therefore appropriate.
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In sum, the trial court’s participation in the trial was not excessive or partial, and it did
not disparage defendant’s case or his attempts to discredit the prosecution’s witnesses. Further,
we disagree that the trial court’s conduct toward defendant and his counsel, when considered in
relation to the trial court’s polite treatment of the victim, demonstrates that the trial court was
biased against defendant. Defendant points to one instance where the trial court interacted
politely with the victim. The victim was having difficulty testifying that defendant had burned
her pubic hair and the trial court attempted to make her feel at ease. The trial court’s statement to
the victim did not bolster the credibility of the victim. Nothing the trial court said lent credence
to the victim’s testimony or suggested to the jury that the trial court believed the victim was
credible. Defendant’s argument that the trial court was overly friendly and appreciative to
prosecution witnesses while antagonizing defense counsel at every turn is simply not supported
by the record in this case. The particular facts of this case demonstrate that, while there were
some expressions of dissatisfaction directed at defense counsel in front of the jury, the trial was
not tainted by excessive interference in the examination of witnesses, repeated rebukes and
disparaging remarks, or marked impatience in the presence of the jury. Conyers, supra.
Finally, defendant raises two instructional errors on appeal. Defendant phrases the
instructional errors in terms of judicial misconduct. His argument with regard to the alleged
instructional errors is lacking. Defendant states only that the instructional errors likely affected
the outcome of trial, that the trial court’s examples of specific intent may have unfairly
influenced the jury, and that the trial court invaded the province of the jury when it indicated that
the touching of fire to skin is a violent touching. Defendant offers no authority to support his
positions and fails to explain how the alleged errors prejudiced his case. Where a party fails to
provide supporting authority, this Court may consider the issue abandoned. People v Piotrowski,
211 Mich App 527, 530; 536 NW2d 293 (1995). In addition, an appellant may not merely
announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
claims. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).
Nevertheless, we note that a trial court may use examples to clarify the meaning of
complex legal terms. People v Edwards, 206 Mich App 694, 696-697; 522 NW2d 727 (1994).
See also Jennings v Southwood (After Remand), 224 Mich App 15, 22-23; 568 NW2d 125
(1997), vacated in part on other grounds 457 Mich 884 (1998). When using examples, the trial
court must clearly indicate that the examples are only examples and that guilt or innocence must
be determined by following the instructions as a whole. Edwards, supra. Moreover, a trial
court’s examples of intent should not relate too strongly to the facts of the case because there is a
risk of implicitly instructing the jury that the intent element has been established as a matter of
law. People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 650 n 2; 601 NW2d 409 (1999). Here, defendant
does not argue that the examples were misleading, inaccurate or caused confusion. In addition,
the trial court told the jury that they were examples or analogies, and the examples were not
closely related to the facts of the case. We find that the use of examples was appropriate.
Further, even if the use of examples was error, reversal is not warranted. Defendant does not
argue that, without the use of examples, the result of the trial more probably than not would have
been different. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
Defendant also contends that the trial court clearly invaded the province of the jury by
indicating that placing fire on skin constitutes a violent touching. The allegedly improper
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instruction related to the crime of felonious assault. As argued by defendant, it appears that the
trial court did direct the jury that one of the elements of felonious assault was met. However,
defendant was not convicted of felonious assault. He was convicted of assault with intent to do
great bodily harm. The instruction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm was properly
given to the jury and defendant does not argue that the trial court directed the jury to find that any
element of that crime was legally established. “[A] defendant has no room to complain when he
is acquitted of a charge that is improperly submitted to a jury, as long as the defendant is actually
convicted of a charge that was properly submitted to the jury.” People v Graves, 458 Mich 476,
486-487; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). Here, even if there was error in the trial court’s giving of the
felonious assault instruction, the error was harmless in light of the fact that the jury did not
convict defendant of felonious assault. Thus, the trial court’s instruction that burning flesh with
a torch is a violent touching does not require reversal. More significantly, we note that
defendant’s theory of the case was not affected by the trial court’s improper instruction.
Defendant argued that the victim was not credible and that she had probably burned herself while
smoking crack cocaine with a torch. Defendant denied burning her. There was no issue about
whether burning flesh is or is not a violent touching. Thus, any error did not more probably than
not affect the outcome of the case. Lukity, supra.
We note that defendant’s judgment of sentence does not reflect defendant’s habitual
offender sentence, under MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083, as stated on the record. Therefore, we
remand only for entry of a corrected judgment of sentence.
Affirmed and remanded for correction of the judgment of sentence. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
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