NOURA OTHMAN V OAKWOOD HEALTH CARE INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
NOURA OTHMAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 19, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 215852
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 97-712827-NO
OAKWOOD HEALTH CARE, INC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Talbot and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff, an invitee at defendant’s medical center, fell and injured her ankle while
crossing a median located on defendant’s property. She brought this premises liability action
against defendant, alleging that the median was negligently maintained. The case proceeded to
trial, and after plaintiff’s proofs, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
Plaintiff appeals as of right. We affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for defendant on the
basis that the danger encountered was open and obvious. A court may grant a motion for a
directed verdict if the evidence did not establish a prima facie case and reasonable persons would
agree that there was an essential failure of proof. Zander v Ogihara Corp, 213 Mich App 438,
441; 540 NW2d 702 (1995). When ruling on the propriety of a lower court’s directed verdict,
this Court reviews the evidence presented up to the time of the motion in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Kubczak v Chemical Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich 653, 663; 575 NW2d
745 (1998); Thomas v McGinnis, 239 Mich App 636, 643-644; 609 NW2d 222 (2000).
We conclude that the trial court correctly directed a verdict for defendant because the risk
of harm to plaintiff was indeed open and obvious as a matter of law. See Hughes v PMG
Building, Inc, 227 Mich App 1, 10; 574 NW2d 691 (1997). The risk of falling on the allegedly
uneven dirt and sand on which plaintiff alleged that she slipped would be easily apparent to a
reasonable person. See id.
Plaintiff additionally argues that even if the median posed an open and obvious danger,
reversal is nonetheless required because special aspects of the median created an unreasonable
risk of harm despite the open and obvious nature of the danger.
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If an obvious risk of harm remains unreasonable – in other words, if an invitor anticipates
harm in spite of the obviousness of the danger – the invitor may be obligated to take measures for
invitees’ protection. See Bertrand v Alan Ford Inc, 449 Mich 606, 611, 618; 537 NW2d 185
(1995), and Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992). In
Hottman v Hottman, 226 Mich App 171, 176; 572 NW2d 259 (1997), the Court framed this
inquiry as whether “the risk of falling . . . is eliminated by awareness of the hazard.” Here,
awareness of the hazard would indeed eliminate the risk of falling. A reasonable person, after
noticing the area of allegedly uneven dirt and sand in the median, would walk around the area so
as to avoid falling. The trial court properly concluded that there were no special circumstances
about the median’s character, location, or surrounding conditions sufficient to submit the case to
the jury.
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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