PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN MORGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 8, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 222110
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 95-002557
JOHN MORGAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Fitzgerald and D. B. Leiber*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion to
dismiss this case with prejudice. We reverse and remand. This appeal is being decided without
oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
On February 6, 1995 defendant was charged with false pretenses over $100, MCL
750.219; MSA 28.416, and habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. The
district court’s register of actions indicated that defendant was incarcerated in the Jackson
County Jail, but did not indicate the reason for his incarceration. He waived preliminary
examination, and was bound over for trial. On March 6, 1995, defendant failed to appear for
arraignment on the information, and a capias was issued for his arrest.
By letter dated May 29, 1999, and addressed to the Wayne County Clerk, defendant stated
that the Department of Corrections (DOC), where he had been incarcerated since March 1995,
had discovered the existence of the outstanding Wayne County charges. Subsequently, defendant
moved to dismiss the charges based on a violation of the 180-day rule. The trial court granted
the motion, finding that the prosecution knew or should have known that defendant was a state
inmate. In addition, the trial court found that defendant was entitled to dismissal with prejudice
because his right to a speedy trial had been violated. MCR 6.004(D)(2).
The 180-day rule, MCL 780.131(1); MSA 28.969(1)(1), provides that a person
incarcerated in a state facility or detained in a local facility awaiting incarceration in a state
facility must be brought to trial within 180 days after either the prosecution has actual knowledge
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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of the existence of an untried charge against him, or the DOC knows or has reason to know that a
criminal charge is pending against the person. MCR 6.004(D)(1). Trial need not actually
commence within 180 days. If the prosecution takes good faith action within that period and
proceeds promptly to prepare the case for trial, the rule is satisfied. MCR 6.004(D)(2); People v
Bell, 209 Mich App 273, 278; 530 NW2d 167 (1995). The burden is on the prosecution to justify
the delay. People v Wolak, 153 Mich App 60, 64; 395 NW2d 240 (1986).
To determine whether a defendant has been denied the constitutional right to a speedy
trial, the following factors must be balanced: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the
delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial; and (4) any prejudice to the
defendant. A delay of more than eighteen months is presumed to be prejudicial to the defendant,
and the prosecution has the burden of proving lack of prejudice. Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514,
530; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972); People v Simpson, 207 Mich App 560, 563; 526
NW2d 33 (1994). We review the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, and the ultimate
decision de novo. People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 459; 564 NW2d 158 (1997).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion and dismissing
the case with prejudice. We agree, reverse the trial court’s order, and remand for further
proceedings. The trial court erroneously found that the prosecution knew or should have known
that defendant was detained in a local facility awaiting incarceration in a state facility as of
February 21, 1995, and that the prosecution should have known that defendant was in fact
incarcerated in a state facility after March 1, 1995. To trigger application of the 180-day rule, the
prosecution must have actual knowledge of the existence of an untried charge against a state
prisoner, or one awaiting transfer to a state prison. People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608, 612;
591 NW2d 669 (1998). After the DOC learned of the existence of the untried charge against
defendant, it did not request final disposition of the charge as required by MCL 780.131(1); MSA
28.969(1)(1). The 180-day rule did not require dismissal under the circumstances. Defendant
was entitled to sentence credit for the period of delay rather than dismissal. MCR 6.004(D)(2).
Furthermore, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss on
the ground that defendant was denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The length of the
delay was presumptively prejudicial. Simpson, supra. The reason for the delay, the
prosecution’s lack of actual knowledge that defendant was incarcerated in a state facility, cannot
be attributed to defendant; however, the delay was not directly caused by the prosecution.
Nothing indicates that defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial at any time. Finally, the trial
court’s finding that defendant would likely be prejudiced if he were tried after such a lengthy
delay is not supported by the record. Defendant was incarcerated for another, unrelated
conviction. His loss of liberty was not due to the failure to promptly dispose of the charges
against him in this case. In addition, any claim that the delay caused the fading of memories,
etc., a claim not made here, is insufficient to establish the denial of the right to a speedy trial.
Gilmore, supra, 461-462. The trial court’s finding that defendant was prejudiced by the delay
was clearly erroneous. Id., 459. Dismissal of the case constituted error.
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The trial court’s order dismissing the case with prejudice is reversed, and this matter is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Dennis B. Leiber
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