PEOPLE OF MI V DAREL THEOPOLIS KING
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 5, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 226118
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 99-004381-FC
DAREL THEOPOLIS KING,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Zahra, P.J. and Hood and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged with open murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548. After an
evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police.
The prosecutor sought leave to appeal the trial court’s order, and this Court denied the
prosecutor’s application for leave to appeal. People v King, unpublished order of the Court of
Appeals, entered February 25, 2000 (Docket No. 225382). The prosecutor then filed an
application for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, and in lieu of granting leave to
appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court for consideration as on
leave granted. People v King, 461 Mich 988; 610 NW2d 922 (2000).
The prosecutor argues that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to
suppress his statement to police. We agree. When reviewing a trial court’s grant of a motion to
suppress, we review the entire record de novo, but will not disturb a trial court’s factual findings
regarding whether the waiver of Miranda1 rights was knowing and intelligent unless that ruling
was clearly erroneous. People v Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629; ___ NW2d ___ (2000); People v
Abraham, 234 Mich App 640, 644; 599 NW2d 736 (1999). Clear error exists when we are left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. People v Givans, 227 Mich
App 113, 119; 575 NW2d 84 (1997).
Whether a waiver of Miranda rights was voluntary and whether an otherwise voluntary
waiver was knowingly and intelligently given constitute separate prongs of a two-part test for a
valid waiver of Miranda rights. Daoud, supra at 635-639; Abraham, supra at 644-645. Both
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Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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inquiries are analyzed under the totality of the circumstances. Abraham, supra at 645. The
voluntariness prong of the test examines the police conduct to determine whether the statement to
police was the product of a free and unconstrained choice. Id.; Givans, supra at 121. Moreover,
a knowing and intelligent waiver requires only that the prosecutor present sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the accused understood that he did not have to speak, that he had the right to the
presence of counsel, and that the state could use his statements against him at trial. Daoud, supra
at 643-644; People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 29; 551 NW2d 355 (1996); Abraham, supra at 647.
Factors to consider when determining the admissibility of a juvenile’s confession include: (1)
whether Miranda warnings were given and whether the defendant clearly understood and waived
those rights; (2) the degree of police compliance with MCL 764.27; MSA 28.886 and the court
rules pertaining to juveniles; (3) the presence of an adult parent, custodian, or guardian; (4) the
juvenile defendant’s personal background; (5) the juvenile’s age, education, and intelligence
level; (6) the extent of the juvenile’s prior experience with the police; (7) the length of detention
before the statement was made; (8) the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and (9)
whether the accused was injured, intoxicated, in ill health, physically abused or threatened with
abuse, or deprived of food, sleep or medical attention. Givans, supra at 121; People v Good, 186
Mich App 180, 189; 463 NW2d 213 (1990).
Furthermore, once a defendant invokes his right to counsel, all interrogation must cease
until the defendant is appointed an attorney, unless the defendant himself initiates further
communication. Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477, 484; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981);
People v Kowalski, 230 Mich App 464, 478; 584 NW2d 613 (1998); People v McCuaig, 126
Mich App 754, 759-760; 338 NW2d 4 (1983). Juveniles, as well as adults, may waive their
rights through initiation of further communication with police officers. People v Black, 203
Mich App 428, 430; 513 NW2d 152 (1994). Merely advising the accused of the crime with
which he is being charged and describing the events leading to the charge does not constitute
interrogation by a police officer, and, generally, a mere inquiry into whether the accused has
changed his mind about wanting to speak without an attorney present is not considered policeinitiated interrogation. Kowalski, supra at 479-480; McCuaig, supra at 760.
The record reveals that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant’s statement to
police was voluntary. After Sergeant Rick Warren read defendant his Miranda rights, defendant
asserted his right to counsel, and all questioning ceased. Thereafter, Warren informed defendant
that he would be booked and transported to the detention facility. Because Warren merely
advised defendant of the crime with which he was being charged, the communication did not
constitute interrogation. McCuaig, supra at 760. Warren also informed defendant that if he
changed his mind about talking to him, Warren could be contacted through the people at the
detention facility. This communication likewise did not constitute interrogation. Kowalski,
supra at 479-480. Defendant, himself, initiated the conversation which led to his statement.
Defendant asked Warren how soon he would be appointed an attorney, and, when Warren replied
that he would probably be appointed an attorney the following day, defendant insisted that he
wanted to talk “now.” Defendant also notified Lieutenant Jody Matherly of his desire to talk and
insisted on talking to Warren “right now” even though no attorney was present. Although
Warren did not reread defendant’s Miranda rights prior to taking defendant’s statement, the
failure to reread a defendant’s rights before each interrogation does not render a defendant’s
statement inadmissible. People v Littlejohn, 197 Mich App 220, 223; 495 NW2d 171 (1992);
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People v Godboldo, 158 Mich App 603, 607; 405 NW2d 114 (1986). In any event, defendant
was undoubtedly conscious of his rights considering that Warren had read him his Miranda
rights less than ten minutes before defendant initiated the conversation with Warren. Although
he was a juvenile, defendant was capable of waiving his Miranda rights by initiating further
communication with Warren and Matherly. Black, supra at 430. There was also no evidence
that Warren or Matherly used coercion to force defendant to talk. Therefore, the record shows
that defendant’s statement to police was the product of a free and unconstrained choice, and, as
such, the waiver was voluntary. Abraham, supra at 645; Givans, supra at 121.
Furthermore, under the second prong of the test, defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his Miranda rights under the totality of the circumstances. Daoud, supra at 635-639;
Abraham, supra at 644-645. Defendant understood his rights as evidenced by his request for an
attorney, however, he waived those rights when he initiated further communication with Warren.
Although Bridget Boyd, defendant’s mother, was not present when defendant gave his statement
to Warren and Matherly, this factor alone is not determinative. Givans, supra at 121, 124. In
any event, Sergeant Curnow attempted to locate Boyd, but was unable to do so, and defendant
never requested Boyd’s presence before making his statement. Although defendant did not have
an extensive criminal history and had very little prior experience with the police, he was fifteen
years of age at the time of his interrogation, he had gone to school through the ninth grade, and
was able to read and write. No evidence was presented that the questioning was unduly
prolonged or that he was detained for a lengthy period of time before making the statement.
Moreover, defendant stated that he was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol.
Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that defendant knowingly and
intelligently waved his Miranda rights. Daoud, supra at 643-644; Givans, supra at 121; Good,
supra at 180.
In addition, although MCL 764.27; MSA 28.886 and MCR 5.933(C)(1) require that, upon
arrest, a juvenile under age seventeen be brought immediately before the family division of the
circuit court, defendant was eventually charged with open murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548.
People v Strunk, 184 Mich App 310, 315; 457 NW2d 149 (1990). Open murder is an
enumerated offense under the automatic waiver provisions of MCL 600.606; MSA 27A.606, and
original jurisdiction of such cases is vested in the circuit court. People v Brooks, 184 Mich App
793, 798; 459 NW2d 313 (1990). Therefore, under the automatic waiver provisions of § 606, it
was not necessary that defendant be brought immediately before the family division of the circuit
court. Brooks, supra at 797-798. Although defendant was not formally charged with violating
§ 316 at the time that he gave his statement, he was ultimately charged as such. Therefore,
Warren and Matherly did not fail to comply with any statutes or court rules pertaining to
juveniles. Givans, supra at 121; Good, supra at 180. Because defendant’s waiver was voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent, the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion to suppress his
statement to police.
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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
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