PEOPLE OF MI V EDMUND HARRISON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 220061
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-001823
EDMUND HARRISON,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Talbot and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s dismissal of charges against defendant.
We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon (CCW) in violation of MCL
750.227; MSA 28.424. He moved to suppress the evidence, in particular the gun that was seized
by police officers. Defendant claimed that the officers illegally entered his place of business and
seized the gun. The trial court granted defendant’s motion to suppress and then dismissed the
charge.
The trial court’s analysis of this matter was improper. The trial court found that
defendant was conducting a business on the property and that he therefore had a right to have a
gun on the property. Thus, the trial court ruled “[t]hat the officers, if they believed that there was
some activity, should have gotten a search warrant, and were not justified in entering the property
under the facts and circumstances” in this case. Therefore, the trial court granted the motion to
suppress the gun and dismissed the charge.
Whether the seizure of the gun was proper is an inquiry separate from whether defendant
was in violation of the CCW statute. When the inquiries are analyzed separately, it becomes
apparent that the trial court erred in its analysis.
After reviewing the entire record, we conclude that the motion to suppress should not
have been granted. Generally, a search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless there
exists both probable cause and a circumstance establishing an exception to the warrant
requirement. People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393, 407; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). One exception
is where “exigent circumstances” exist. Id. Pursuant to the exigent circumstances exception,
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“‘police may enter a dwelling without a warrant if the officers possess probable cause to believe
that a crime was recently committed on the premises, and probable cause to believe that the
premises contain evidence or perpetrators of the suspected crime.’” Id. at 408, quoting In re
Forfeiture of $176,598, 443 Mich 261, 271; 505 NW2d 201 (1993). Furthermore, the police
must “‘establish the existence of an actual emergency on the basis of specific and objective facts
indicating that immediate action is necessary to (1) prevent the imminent destruction of evidence,
(2) protect police officers or others, or (3) prevent the escape of a suspect.’” Snider, supra,
quoting In re Forfeiture of $176,598, supra. “Hot pursuit” is a form of exigent circumstances.
People v Raybon, 125 Mich App 295, 301; 336 NW2d 782 (1983).
In our opinion, the officers’ entry into the building was reasonable. The officers had
probable cause to believe that a crime was recently committed. The officers were dispatched to
the scene to investigate a report of a man with a gun. At the scene one officer observed a gun
sticking out of a bag that defendant was carrying. Generally, possession of a concealed weapon
is illegal. See MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424. Upon seeing the officers, defendant entered the
building. By observing defendant enter the building, the officers also had probable cause to
believe that the building contained evidence or a perpetrator of the suspected crime. In our
opinion, the officers’ minimal entry into the building would be justified for the protection of the
police and others from an armed man who had been acting in a manner that prompted a call to
the police. Moreover, the entry could be justified to prevent defendant from escaping. When
defendant saw the officers, he walked “quickly” into the building. Therefore, it would be
reasonable to conclude that defendant was attempting to escape from the officers. Because both
officers were at the back of the building, in a fenced-in parking lot, it would have been difficult
to surround and secure the building while a warrant was obtained. In essence, the evidence
indicated that the officers were in “hot pursuit” of defendant and, under the circumstances, entry
into the building and seizure of the gun was justified and reasonable.
In light of the above, the trial court’s disposition of the motion to suppress was erroneous.
The officers’ entry into the building was reasonable and the seizure of the gun from defendant’s
bag was lawful. Therefore, defendant’s motion to suppress should have been denied.
Further, the trial court’s determination that defendant was in lawful possession of the gun
was premature. There was evidence to support a prima facie case that defendant was in
possession of a concealed weapon. Therefore, defendant had the burden of producing some
evidence exempting him from the statute. See People v Henderson, 391 Mich 612, 616; 218
NW2d 2 (1974). In the case at bar, defendant asserted that the building was his place of
business. When some evidence relating to an exemption is presented, the burden of proof then
shifts back to the prosecutor to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s possession
was not exempted from the statute. See CJI2d 11.11; see also Henderson, supra. In light of the
fact that defendant merely offered a bare assertion that the building was his place of business, but
was uncertain about the details of his business arrangement, and presented no objective evidence
to support his claim, we are of the opinion that the issue remains an unresolved question of fact
for a jury.
This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling regarding a motion to dismiss for an abuse of
discretion. People v Adams, 232 Mich App 128, 132; 591 NW2d 44 (1998). In the case at bar,
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because the seizure of the gun was not unreasonable, and the trial court’s determination that
defendant should be exempted from the application of the CCW statute was premature, there is
no apparent basis on which to support the trial court’s dismissal of the charge. Therefore, the
trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the charge.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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