MICHAEL J BROOKS V KELLY LEIDE MOORE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHAEL J. BROOKS, Personal Representative
of the ESTATE OF PEPSI MORGAN, Deceased.
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
KELLY LEIDE MOORE and WILLIAM ROSS
GROOVER, III,
No. 216656
Lenawee Circuit Court
LC No. 96-007292-NI
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Hood and McDonald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Michael J. Brooks, personal representative of the estate of Pepsi Morgan,
deceased, filed a wrongful death action alleging that defendant Kelly Leide Moore was
responsible for the death of her granddaughter, Pepsi Morgan, who was killed when defendant
Moore’s negligence caused an automobile accident. Plaintiff had also sued defendant William
Ross Groover, III, for negligently entrusting defendant Moore with his automobile in light of his
knowledge that she was a cocaine addict. The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action
against either defendant. Plaintiff appeals as of right from a judgment entered on the jury verdict.
We affirm.
I
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by reading a jury instruction on an excused
statutory violation, improperly added a sudden emergency instruction to the excused statutory
violation instruction and erred by reading improper instructions on loss of memory and
proximate cause. We disagree.
Plaintiff challenges the court’s decision to read SJI2d 12.02 relating to an excuse for
violation of a statute, and to modify it by adding an additional instruction relating to a sudden
emergency. The court instructed the jury as follows:
However, if you find the defendant Kelly Groover [f/k/a Moore] used ordinary
care and was still unable to avoid the violation, the violation is excused. If you
-1-
find the defendant violated the statute and the violation was not excused you must
decide whether such violation was a cause of the occurrence.
If you find that the defendant Kelly Groover used ordinary care and was still
unable to avoid the collision because she was confronted by a sudden emergency
not due to her own misconduct, the defendants William Groover and Kelly
Groover are not liable to the plaintiff.
The determination whether an instruction is accurate and applicable based on the
characteristics of a case is in the sound discretion of the trial court. Stevens v Veenstra, 226 Mich
App 441, 443; 573 NW2d 341 (1997); Williams v Coleman, 194 Mich App 606, 623; 488 NW2d
464 (1992).
We find that the trial court acted properly within its discretion in reading the instruction
on excuse of a statutory violation. The testimony at trial by several witnesses showed that
uncertainty existed as to whether defendant Moore violated any traffic laws before her accident.
Under the circumstances the instruction given was necessary to give the jury guidance as to how
to apply the law to its findings of fact.
The court gave the sudden emergency instruction after deciding that the standard jury
instructions were insufficient under the circumstances. When the standard instructions do not
adequately cover an area, the trial court is obligated to give additional instructions when
requested if the supplemental instructions properly inform on the applicable law and are
supported by the evidence. Koester v Novi, 213 Mich App 653, 664; 540 NW2d 765 (1995),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grds 458 Mich 1; 580 NW2d 835 (1998). The determination
whether the supplemental instructions are applicable and accurate is within the trial court’s
discretion. Stoddard v Manufacturers Nat’l Bank of Grand Rapids, 234 Mich App 140, 162; 593
NW2d 630 (1999).
We find that the court’s addition of the sudden emergency instruction was appropriate.
The jury could have believed testimony by several witnesses that the roadway was covered with
black ice at the time of the accident which was undetectable until the vehicle began to skid. The
jury could have found that black ice created a sudden emergency that defendant Moore was
unable to avoid. Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the jury had the right to decide whether it
believed defendant Moore’s testimony that she did not know the black ice was on the roadway.
The court’s decision to include this instruction is properly based on the evidence.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by reading jury instructions on memory loss
and proximate cause to the jury. The trial court read SJI2d 10.09 on memory loss to the jury as
follows:
If you determine that the defendant has a loss of memory concerning the facts of
this case and it was caused by the occurrence you may infer that the defendant was
not negligent. However, you should weigh all of the evidence in determining
whether or not the defendant was or was not negligent.
The court then read SJI2d 15.06 on proximate cause to the jury as follows:
-2-
If you decide defendant Kelly Groover [f/k/a Moore] was negligent and such
negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence it is not a defense that black
ice was also a cause of this occurrence. However, if you decide that the only
proximate cause of the occurrence was black ice then your verdict should be for
the defendant.
We review claims of instructional error de novo. Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich
1, 5; 615 NW2d 17 (2000). Jury instructions should be reviewed in their entirety, rather than
extracted piecemeal to establish error in isolated portions. Wiegerink v Mitts & Merrill, 182
Mich App 546, 548; 452 NW2d 872 (1990); Willoughby v Lehrbass, 150 Mich App 319, 336;
388 NW2d 688 (1986). Reversal is not required unless the failure to do so would be inconsistent
with substantial justice. MCR 2.613(A), Case, supra. There is no error warranting reversal if,
on balance, the theories of the parties and the applicable law were adequately and fairly presented
to the jury. Murdock v Higgins, 454 Mich 46, 60; 559 NW2d 639 (1997).
We find that the trial court did not err in reading the jury instructions on loss of memory
or proximate cause. The jury instructions are fair when viewed in their entirety, and these
instructions in particular do not prejudice plaintiff. In determining whether to read a loss of
memory instruction, the trial court properly relied upon testimony by defendant Moore and her
doctor that could have persuaded a jury that she was suffering from memory loss immediately
after her accident. Regarding the proximate cause instruction, the court decided to allow the jury
to weigh the credibility of direct and circumstantial evidence regarding any negligence by
defendant Moore or other possible factors contributing to her accident. We find that plaintiff’s
claims of error regarding the loss of memory and proximate cause instructions are without merit.
II
Plaintiff’s presentation of his final issue intertwines the concepts of judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial request based on a challenge to the great weight of the
evidence. We conclude that plaintiff was neither entitled to a JNOV nor a new trial.
Judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be granted only when there was insufficient
evidence presented to create an issue for the jury. Pontiac School Dist v Miller Canfield
Paddock & Stone, 221 Mich App 602, 612; 563 NW2d 693 (1997).
A motion for new trial should not be granted on the ground that the jury’s verdict is
against the great weight of the evidence if there is competent evidence to support it; the trial
court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder. Ellsworth v Hotel Corp of
America, 236 Mich App 185, 194; 600 NW2d 129 (1999). This Court gives deference to the trial
court’s unique ability to judge the weight and credibility of the testimony and should not
substitute its judgment for that of the jury unless the record reveals a miscarriage of justice. Id.
We agree with the trial court that the jury’s verdict was not against the great weight of the
evidence and that judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial were properly denied.
Sufficient testimonial evidence was presented at trial to allow the jury to find that defendants
Moore and Groover were not negligent in the death of plaintiff’s decedent. The jury could have
believed testimony that defendant Moore did not use drugs on the morning of the accident, was
-3-
not under the influence of cocaine when the accident occurred, was driving reasonably under the
circumstances, and was not at fault for the accident that killed plaintiff’s decedent. Of course,
this testimony conflicts with plaintiff’s version of the relevant events. When testimony conflicts,
the jury should consider issues of credibility and circumstantial evidence. The jury did so. We
do not believe that the jury’s decision needs to be disturbed to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.