PEOPLE OF MI V KALOMO BHOKE COHEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
December 1, 2000
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 214032
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 97-003193-FH
KALOMO BHOKE COHEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Collins, P.J., and Jansen and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of three counts of possession of another’s
financial transactional device without consent. MCL 750.157n(1); MSA 28.354(14)(1).
Defendant was sentenced to three concurrent terms of two to fifteen years’ imprisonment. He
appeals as of right and we affirm.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence of intent to defraud or cheat
the deviceholder for a rational jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. When
determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a conviction, this Court
must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a
rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992).
MCL 750.157n(1); MSA 28.354(14)(1) provides:
A person who steals, knowingly takes, or knowingly removes a financial
transaction device from the person or possession of a deviceholder, or who
knowingly retains, knowingly possesses, knowingly secretes, or knowingly uses a
financial transaction device without the consent of the deviceholder, is guilty of a
felony. [Emphasis added.]
This Court has held that this is a specific intent crime, “given that knowledge is an essential
element.” People v Ainsworth, 197 Mich App 321, 325; 495 NW2d 177 (1992); see also CJI2d
30.3. “Specific intent is defined as a particular criminal intent beyond the act done, whereas
general intent is merely the intent to perform the physical act itself.” People v Lardie, 452 Mich
231, 240; 551 NW2d 656 (1996).
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Taken in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence showed that defendant
was an emergency room patient in a hospital on August 20, 1997, where the complainant worked
as a registration clerk. The complainant kept her purse in a desk drawer that did not have a lock
in the lobby area. On August 23, 1997, defendant was driving an automobile and was pulled
over by a police officer for speeding and reckless driving (using the center turn lane to pass other
vehicles). Upon being pulled over, the police officer discovered that defendant was driving with
a suspended driver’s license. Following an inventory search of the automobile, the police found
a credit card wallet between the driver’s seat and the console. The credit card wallet contained
the complainant’s credit cards. There was also a Blue Care Network insurance card in the wallet
that belonged to another person not known by the complainant. The complainant testified at trial
that she did not know defendant and that she did not give defendant permission to have or use her
credit cards.
We find that this evidence is sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a juror could
reasonably infer that defendant had the requisite intent to knowingly possess the credit cards
without the consent of the cardholder. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130
(1999).
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting a portion of
his medical record that contained identification information. We review the trial court’s decision
to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion and will only reverse where there is a
clear abuse of discretion. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 494; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). Where the
admission of evidence involves a question of law, such as whether a statute or rule of evidence
precludes admissibility of the evidence, then it is reviewed de novo on appeal. People v Lukity,
460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
Before trial, defendant moved in limine to exclude his medical record in its entirety based
on the physician-patient privilege. The trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce the
patient registration form from the hospital, but excluded evidence of the remainder of the
medical record as being “confidential” and, therefore, privileged information. The patient
registration form was introduced through the testimony of the hospital’s records correspondence
clerk. The clerk testified at trial from the patient registration information form that defendant
presented to the emergency room on August 20, 1997 at 11:18 a.m. and was discharged at 1:10
p.m. The clerk also testified to the name, date of birth, address, race, and type of insurance stated
on the patient registration form. This evidence obviously allowed the prosecution to
affirmatively establish that defendant was at the hospital at the same time and place when the
complainant was there three days before her credit card wallet was found by the police in
defendant’s vehicle, thus showing that defendant had access to steal the credit cards.
Defendant argues that this evidence was precluded by the physician-patient privilege, a
privilege that defendant did not waive. The physician-patient privilege is controlled by statute,
which provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a person duly authorized to practice
medicine or surgery shall not disclose any information that the person has
acquired in attending a patient in a professional character, if the information was
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necessary to enable the person to prescribe for the patient as a physician, or to do
any act for the patient as a surgeon. [MCL 600.2157; MSA 27A.2157.]
Because the physician-patient privilege was not recognized at common law, its scope is
controlled by the language of the statute. Dorris v Detroit Osteopathic Hosp, 460 Mich 26, 33;
594 NW2d 455 (1999). The purpose of this statute is to protect the confidential nature of the
physician-patient relationship and to encourage a patient to make a full disclosure of symptoms
and condition. Id. The privilege belongs to the patient and therefore can be waived only by the
patient. Id., p 34, quoting Gaertner v Michigan, 385 Mich 49, 53; 187 NW2d 429 (1971).
In Dorris, supra, p 28, the Court held that “the names of unknown patients are protected
by the physician-patient privilege, and . . . [the] hospitals have a duty to refrain from disclosure.”
We also note that MCR 6.201(C)(1) provides that there is generally no right to discover
information or evidence that is protected from disclosure by the constitution, statute, or privilege.
In the present case, defendant did not explicitly waive his privilege, nor do any of the implied
waivers in the statute apply here. Thus, pursuant to Dorris, the privilege applies to the patient
registration form that was admitted at trial.
Therefore, the question is whether there is any exception to allow the prosecution to
admit the evidence contained in the patient registration form. The prosecution relies on People v
Johnson, 111 Mich App 383; 314 NW2d 631 (1981). In Johnson, this Court set forth the
following exception to the privilege:
The privilege is to be used for preserving legitimate confidential communications,
not for suppressing the truth.
Further, where the evidence sought is
“demonstrably relevant” to the case at issue, a generalized claim of privilege must
yield to the specific need for evidence. [Id., p 389.]
***
[I]t is generally held that “(c)ommunications between the physician and patient,
however confidential they may be, are held not to be privileged if they have been
made in the furtherance of an unlawful or criminal purpose”. 3 Jones, Evidence
(6th ed), § 21.29, p 823. [Johnson, supra, pp 390-391.]
In the present case, defendant’s presence at the hospital was circumstantial evidence of
his intent to defraud or cheat the complainant. Defendant’s presence at the hospital made it
reasonable for the jury to infer that he stole the credit cards, especially in conjunction with the
time frame involved. Thus, the patient registration form identifying defendant’s presence at the
hospital was demonstrably relevant to the case as showing that defendant had the opportunity to
steal the credit cards. Because it was reasonable to conclude that defendant’s presence at the
hospital was in furtherance of a criminal purpose, the medical record was admissible under
Johnson. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the medical record in
this limited manner.
Lastly, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the portion
of defendant’s medical record that contained information relating to his medical condition.
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Although defendant initially sought to have the entire medical record excluded, when the patient
registration form was admitted through the record clerk’s testimony, defense counsel requested
that the sheet showing the diagnosis also be included as a “complete record.” The trial court did
not allow the sheet referencing defendant’s diagnosis to be admitted,1 stating that it contained
confidential information. We again review this evidentiary issue for an abuse of discretion.
Starr, supra, p 494.
Once defendant sought admission of the record, the record was no longer confidential
because the privilege was waived, and the record was admissible. Gaertner, supra, p 53.
Further, the record was relevant because it tended to show that it was more probable that
defendant was at the hospital for a legitimate purpose and not solely to steal the credit cards.
MRE 401; MRE 402. In other words, admission of the record would have rebutted the
prosecution’s contention that defendant went to the hospital solely as a ruse to steal the credit
cards. Therefore, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing defendant to
admit the diagnosis part of his medical record.
In order to reverse a conviction based on a preserved, nonconstitutional error, the
defendant has the burden of showing that it is more probable than not that the error resulted in a
miscarriage of justice. Lukity, supra, pp 494-495. During cross-examination of the record clerk,
defense counsel brought out that defendant complained of difficulty breathing as the reason for
his admission to the emergency room. Defendant, however, argues that he was denied the
opportunity to show that he was at the hospital for a legitimate medical problem when the
medical record containing his diagnosis and other medical information was not entered. Because
the part of the medical record that was admitted did reflect that defendant had a legitimate
medical problem (difficulty breathing) we find that the error in not admitting the diagnosis sheet
was harmless. The jury was made aware of why defendant presented to the emergency room and
the exact nature of defendant’s reason for presenting to the emergency room was not relevant to
any issue. The jury still had to determine whether defendant stole the credit cards, or whether he
found them at a nearby gas station as he claimed at trial. The patient registration form was
admitted only to show that defendant had the opportunity to steal the credit cards.
Therefore, defendant has not met his burden of showing that it was more probable than
not that the jury would have found differently had it been given the information that defendant
was present at the hospital for a legitimate medical problem. Consequently, the error in not
admitting the diagnosis sheet was harmless and reversal is not required.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jeffrey G. Collins
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
1
We note that defendant was seen by a doctor and diagnosed with acute bronchitis.
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